Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed A (2026), question text reconstructed from the official solution · Dr. Boaz Zik · worked-solution

True-False, Price Controls, Production Economy & Externality (2026 Moed A)

True-False, Price Controls, Production Economy & Externality (2026 Moed A)

Part of: Micro-Economics II Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed A (2026), Micro-Economics II. Four questions: Q1 is five true/false items, Q2 a price-control market, Q3 a production economy, Q4 an externality between two exporters. Builds on: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities, Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism Practice: PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings, PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare, PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner, PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation

Question text reconstructed

There is no original question paper for this sitting. The wording of every question below is rebuilt from how the official solution slides restate it (the "Solution Moed A - 2026" deck, 36 slides). Mark allocations are not given anywhere in the deck, so none are shown. Where the deck does not make the full question clear, a > [!todo] Original wording unknown callout says so. No givens have been invented.

Source

Answers follow the official solution. Where the official text has a typo or a gap the answer is kept and a > [!warning] callout flags it.

What this paper tests

Question Core idea Where it is taught
Q1 Five true/false claims: Pareto Dominance vs a planner's choice, marginal cost with a convex technology, cost minimisation with quasi-linear technology, the Contract Curve, and the public-good Nash equilibrium PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare, PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism
Q2 Partial Equilibrium with quasi-linear demand and a Cobb-Douglas firm; a government that weights Consumer Surplus and Firm Surplus and chooses a price ceiling or floor PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings
Q3 Production Economy with a productivity parameter bb: PPF, RPT vs MRS, equilibrium prices, comparative statics Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities, PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation
Q4 A two-firm Externalities game: equilibrium vs social planner, and the Pigouvian Tax Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities
Intuition: the one move behind each question
  • Q1: for each claim, find one concrete counterexample (false) or run one short derivation (true).
  • Q2: price equals marginal cost on the supply side, marginal utility on the demand side; a binding control makes the short side decide the quantity.
  • Q3: equalise RTS across firms to get a straight-line PPF with slope bb; then price ratio = RPT = MRS.
  • Q4: each firm's effort eie_i is free to itself but costs the rival 4 per unit, so the market overuses effort.

Q1 — True or false (five items)

Original wording unknown

The deck restates each claim as a statement to be judged true or false. The instruction line for the section (for example "determine whether each claim is true or false and explain") and the marks per item are not shown. The five claims below are quoted from the slides.

Q1.1 — Adding a feasible alternative

Claim. Consider a social planner who faces a set of alternatives and chooses alternative AA. Suppose now that an additional alternative A′A' is added to the feasible set, after which the social planner chooses A′A'. Alternative A′A' Pareto dominates alternative AA.

Answer

False.

Counterexample (official). Exchange economy with U1(x1,y1)=x1y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1y_1, U2(x2,y2)=x2y2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2y_2 and endowments w1x=w1y=w2x=w2y=10w_1^x=w_1^y=w_2^x=w_2^y=10. The planner's welfare is

W((x1,y1),(x2,y2))=U1(x1,y1)⋅U2(x2,y2)W\big((x_1,y_1),(x_2,y_2)\big)=U_1(x_1,y_1)\cdot U_2(x_2,y_2)

The contract curve is x1=y1x_1=y_1.

Allocation Agent 1 gets Agent 2 gets U1U_1 U2U_2 WW
AA (1,2)(1,2) (19,18)(19,18) 22 342342 684684
A′A' (10,10)(10,10) (10,10)(10,10) 100100 100100 10,00010{,}000

The planner prefers A′A' to AA (10,00010{,}000 against 684684), yet A′A' does not Pareto dominate AA: agent 1 gains (2→1002\to100) but agent 2 loses (342→100342\to100).

Intuition

A welfare function can trade one person's loss against another's gain. "The planner prefers A′A'" only means the weighted total went up. Pareto Dominance needs nobody worse off. Preferred by WW is much weaker than dominating.

Typo in the official solution

The last line says "A′A' doesn't dominate allocation b". There is no allocation bb in the question; it means allocation AA.

Q1.2 — Convex production with one input

Claim. Consider a firm that produces using a single input, labour. Assume that the production function f(l)f(l) is increasing and strictly convex. Then the marginal cost of production is increasing.

Answer

False. Marginal cost is decreasing.

Why (official). With one input, C(q)=w⋅f−1(q)C(q) = w\cdot f^{-1}(q), so

MC(q)=C′(q)=wf′(l(q))MC(q) = C'(q) = \frac{w}{f'(l(q))}

If ff is convex, f′(l)f'(l) is increasing in ll, so 1f′(l)\frac{1}{f'(l)} is decreasing in ll. Since l(q)=f−1(q)l(q)=f^{-1}(q) rises with qq, MCMC is decreasing in qq.

Intuition

Convex ff means each extra hour of labour adds more output than the last (increasing returns). So each extra unit of output needs less extra labour, and costs less at the margin. Marginal cost rising is the concave ff story (diminishing marginal product). To make the claim true you would need ff concave.

Q1.3 — Quasi-linear technology

Claim. Consider a firm whose production function is quasi-linear, f(k,l)=g(l)+kf(k,l)=g(l)+k, where gg is a concave function. Suppose that g′(0)<1g'(0)<1. Then, at any output level, an increase in the firm's production level does not lead to an increase in the use of input ll.

Answer

False.

Why (official). The firm minimises cost, which depends on input prices as well as marginal products. If there is an l>0l>0 with

g′(l)=PlPkg'(l)=\frac{P_l}{P_k}

then the firm uses labour and raises its labour for output levels q<g(l)q<g(l). For example, when labour is sufficiently cheap relative to capital, labour delivers more output per unit of cost than capital, so the cost-minimising choice uses positive labour and, as qq rises, the firm increases ll.

Intuition

gg is concave, so g′g' falls as ll rises. At low output the firm uses only labour (while g′(l)>Pl/Pkg'(l) > P_l/P_k, labour is the better buy per dollar) and l=g−1(q)l = g^{-1}(q) rises with qq. Once ll reaches the point where g′(l)=Pl/Pkg'(l)=P_l/P_k, extra output comes from capital, which has a constant marginal product of 11, so ll stops growing. The claim says "at any output level", so one range where ll rises is enough to make it false. The condition g′(0)<1g'(0)<1 is compatible with this as long as Pl/PkP_l/P_k is small enough, which is what "labour sufficiently cheap relative to capital" means.

Q1.4 — The midpoint allocation

Claim. Consider an exchange economy with two agents. The agents' utility functions are U1(x1,y1)=x1ay11−aU_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1^{a}y_1^{1-a} and U2(x2,y2)=x2by21−bU_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2^{b}y_2^{1-b}, where 0<a,b<10<a,b<1 and a≠ba\neq b. The aggregate endowments of goods xx and yy are Xˉ\bar X and Yˉ\bar Y. Then the allocation (Xˉ2,Yˉ2)\left(\frac{\bar X}{2},\frac{\bar Y}{2}\right) is not on the contract curve.

Answer

True.

Why (official). A point on the contract curve must be Pareto efficient, so MRS1=MRS2MRS_1=MRS_2:

MRS1=a y1(1−a) x1,MRS2=b y2(1−b) x2MRS_1=\frac{a\,y_1}{(1-a)\,x_1}, \qquad MRS_2=\frac{b\,y_2}{(1-b)\,x_2}

At the midpoint each agent gets half of everything: y1=y2=Yˉ/2y_1=y_2=\bar Y/2 and x1=x2=Xˉ/2x_1=x_2=\bar X/2. The common factor Yˉ/2Xˉ/2\frac{\bar Y/2}{\bar X/2} cancels, so equality would need

a1−a=b1−b  ⇒  a−ab=b−ab  ⇒  a=b\frac{a}{1-a}=\frac{b}{1-b}\;\Rightarrow\; a-ab=b-ab\;\Rightarrow\; a=b

Since a≠ba\neq b, the MRS values differ, the allocation is not Pareto efficient and so is not on the contract curve.

Intuition

With the same bundle each, the agent with the larger Cobb-Douglas weight on xx values xx more at the margin. They would both gain from trading, so the midpoint cannot be efficient. It lies on the contract curve only in the knife-edge case a=ba=b (compare PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner).

Q1.5 — Public good game with identical agents

Claim. Consider a two-agent public good game, as studied in class. If the two agents have identical utility functions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which both agents contribute the same amount to the public good.

Answer

False.

Why (official). When both agents have the same utility function, every combination of g1g_1 and g2g_2 that results in the total quantity g0g^0 is a Nash equilibrium, and there are infinitely many such combinations.

Link to the lecture. In Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism the best response is BRi(gj)=max⁡(gio−gj,0)BR_i(g_j)=\max(g_i^o-g_j,0). When g1o=g2o=g0g_1^o=g_2^o=g^0, any pair with g1+g2=g0g_1+g_2=g^0 satisfies both best responses. The equal split g1=g2=g0/2g_1=g_2=g^0/2 is one equilibrium among infinitely many, so the equilibrium is neither unique nor forced to be symmetric.

Intuition

Each agent only cares about the total supply of the public good. Once the total hits what both of them want, neither wants to change, no matter who paid for how much of it.


Q2 — Price controls and the government's objective

Setup (as restated in the solution). A market for goods XX and YY, where YY represents money. Demand comes from a representative consumer with utility

100x−x2+y100x-x^2+y

(income is high enough that there are no corner solutions). Supply comes from a representative firm with production function

f(l,k)=l1/4k1/4f(l,k)=l^{1/4}k^{1/4}

and input prices pl=12p_l=\tfrac12 and pk=12p_k=\tfrac12.

Questions (as restated in the solution).

  1. Derive the inverse demand function and the inverse supply function in the market. Provide an economic explanation for the derivation.
  2. Find the equilibrium price and the equilibrium quantity in the market.
  3. Calculate the overall welfare in equilibrium, the consumer surplus, and the firm surplus.

The government can now intervene by setting a maximal price or a minimal price for the good xx. Its objective is G(CS,FS)=a⋅CS+b⋅FSG(CS,FS)=a\cdot CS+b\cdot FS, where CSCS is consumer surplus and FSFS is firm surplus.

  1. Assume a=ba=b. Find the government's optimal policy.
  2. Assume a>0a>0 and b=0b=0. Find the government's optimal policy.
  3. Assume a=0a=0 and b>0b>0. Find the government's optimal policy.
  4. Assume a>b>0a>b>0. Find the set of policies that cannot be optimal.
  5. Assume b>a>0b>a>0. Find the set of policies that cannot be optimal.

Q2.1 — Inverse demand and inverse supply

Answer

PD(x)=100−2x,PS(x)=C′(x)=2xP^D(x)=100-2x, \qquad P^S(x)=C'(x)=2x

Demand. The utility is quasi-linear with yy as money (price 11), so the consumer's price equals the marginal utility of xx: PD(x)=ddx(100x−x2)=100−2xP^D(x)=\frac{d}{dx}(100x-x^2)=100-2x. The consumer buys until the last unit is worth exactly its price.

Supply. The firm's supply is its marginal cost, so first find the cost function.

  1. Cost minimisation: RTS=kl=plpk=1RTS=\frac{k}{l}=\frac{p_l}{p_k}=1, so k=lk=l.
  2. Put this into the isoquant for output xx: x=l1/4k1/4=k1/2x=l^{1/4}k^{1/4}=k^{1/2}, hence k(x)=x2=l(x)k(x)=x^2=l(x).
  3. Cost: C(x)=pl l(x)+pk k(x)=12x2+12x2=x2C(x)=p_l\,l(x)+p_k\,k(x)=\tfrac12x^2+\tfrac12x^2=x^2.
  4. Supply: PS(x)=C′(x)=2xP^S(x)=C'(x)=2x.

Why. A price-taking firm produces until price equals marginal cost, so the MC curve is the supply curve. The consumer's marginal utility is the maximum they will pay for one more unit, so it is the demand curve.

Q2.2 — Equilibrium

Answer

xe=25x^e=25, Pe=50P^e=50

Set 100−2x=2x100-2x=2x, so xe=25x^e=25 and Pe=2⋅25=50P^e=2\cdot25=50.

Q2.3 — Welfare, consumer surplus, firm surplus

Answer

Total welfare =1,250=1{,}250, consumer surplus =625=625, firm surplus =625=625.

Total welfare is the area between marginal utility and marginal cost:

∫025(100−2x−2x) dx=[100x−2x2]025=2500−1250=1250\int_0^{25}\big(100-2x-2x\big)\,dx=\Big[100x-2x^2\Big]_0^{25}=2500-1250=1250

Consumer surplus is the area between demand and the price line:

∫025(100−2x−50) dx=[50x−x2]025=1250−625=625\int_0^{25}\big(100-2x-50\big)\,dx=\Big[50x-x^2\Big]_0^{25}=1250-625=625

Firm surplus is the area between the price line and supply:

∫025(50−2x) dx=[50x−x2]025=1250−625=625\int_0^{25}\big(50-2x\big)\,dx=\Big[50x-x^2\Big]_0^{25}=1250-625=625

Check: 625+625=1250625+625=1250.

PP08_q2_price_controls

Left: demand, supply and the two best price controls found in parts 5 and 6. Right: how consumer surplus (CS) and firm surplus (FS) move as the regulated price moves away from 5050. The ceiling is a price below 5050, the floor a price above 5050.

Q2.4 — Equal weights, a=ba=b

Answer

Total surplus CS+FSCS+FS is maximised at the competitive equilibrium, price 5050. The government can do nothing, set a maximal price ≥50\ge 50, or set a minimal price ≤50\le 50. All of these leave the equilibrium in place and maximise its objective.

With a=ba=b the objective is a(CS+FS)a(CS+FS), a multiple of total surplus. Any binding control moves the quantity away from 2525 and loses surplus. Non-binding controls (a ceiling at or above 5050, a floor at or below 5050) change nothing.

Q2.5 — Only consumers matter, a>0a>0, b=0b=0

Answer

Set a maximal price at p~=2006=33.33\tilde p=\dfrac{200}{6}=33.33.

The government only cares about CSCS.

  1. A price floor above 5050 lowers CS, so it cannot help. The only useful tool is a ceiling below 5050.
  2. With a binding ceiling p~\tilde p, the quantity is set by supply (the short side): q=p~/2q=\tilde p/2.
  3. Consumer surplus:
CS=∫0p~/2(100−2x−p~) dx=[(100−p~)x−x2]0p~/2CS=\int_0^{\tilde p/2}\big(100-2x-\tilde p\big)\,dx=\Big[(100-\tilde p)x-x^2\Big]_0^{\tilde p/2}
=100⋅p~2−p~22−(p~2)2=50p~−3p~24=100\cdot\frac{\tilde p}{2}-\frac{\tilde p^2}{2}-\Big(\frac{\tilde p}{2}\Big)^2=50\tilde p-\frac{3\tilde p^2}{4}
  1. First-order condition:
∂CS∂p~=50−64p~=0  ⇒  p~=2006≈33.33\frac{\partial CS}{\partial \tilde p}=50-\frac{6}{4}\tilde p=0\;\Rightarrow\;\tilde p=\frac{200}{6}\approx33.33
Intuition

A lower ceiling gives consumers a cheaper price but cuts the quantity they can buy. Near 5050 the price gain beats the quantity loss, so the ceiling helps. Below 33.3333.33 the lost quantity wins. CS peaks at 33.3333.33 (in the figure, the blue curve on the right).

Q2.6 — Only firms matter, a=0a=0, b>0b>0

Answer

Set a minimal price at p~=2003=66.67\tilde p=\dfrac{200}{3}=66.67.

The government only cares about FSFS.

  1. A price ceiling below 5050 lowers FS, so the only useful tool is a floor above 5050.
  2. With a binding floor p~\tilde p, the quantity is set by demand (the short side): q=100−p~2q=\frac{100-\tilde p}{2}.
  3. Firm surplus:
FS=∫0(100−p~)/2(p~−2x) dx=[p~x−x2]0(100−p~)/2FS=\int_0^{(100-\tilde p)/2}\big(\tilde p-2x\big)\,dx=\Big[\tilde p x-x^2\Big]_0^{(100-\tilde p)/2}
=p~(100−p~2)−(100−p~2)2=50p~−p~22−14(100−p~)2=\tilde p\Big(\frac{100-\tilde p}{2}\Big)-\Big(\frac{100-\tilde p}{2}\Big)^2=50\tilde p-\frac{\tilde p^2}{2}-\frac14(100-\tilde p)^2
  1. First-order condition:
∂FS∂p~=50−p~+12(100−p~)=0  ⇒  100−32p~=0  ⇒  p~=2003≈66.67\frac{\partial FS}{\partial\tilde p}=50-\tilde p+\frac12(100-\tilde p)=0\;\Rightarrow\;100-\frac32\tilde p=0\;\Rightarrow\;\tilde p=\frac{200}{3}\approx66.67

Q2.7 — Consumers weighted more, a>b>0a>b>0

Answer

Policies that cannot be optimal: any price floor pmin⁡≥50p_{\min}\ge50, and any price ceiling pmax⁡<33.33p_{\max}<33.33.

Why (official). Consumers count more than firms. Any floor at or above 5050 cannot be optimal. A ceiling below 5050 raises CS until the price reaches 33.3333.33, the CS maximum; a lower ceiling reduces both CS and FS, so it is worse.

Intuition: check with the derivative (my own check)

Using the surplus formulas above, the objective along a floor has slope −a100−p~2+b(100−32p~)-a\frac{100-\tilde p}{2}+b\big(100-\tfrac32\tilde p\big), which at p~=50\tilde p=50 equals 25(b−a)<025(b-a)<0 when a>ba>b: raising the price above 5050 already hurts the government. Along a ceiling, FS=p~2/4FS=\tilde p^2/4 and the slope is a(50−32p~)+12bp~a(50-\tfrac32\tilde p)+\tfrac12b\tilde p. At p~=33.33\tilde p=33.33 this is 503b>0\tfrac{50}{3}b>0, so the objective is still rising there and is increasing for all lower prices too. Ceilings below 33.3333.33 are therefore beaten by a ceiling at 33.3333.33. This also shows the equilibrium itself (pmin⁡=50p_{\min}=50, or a non-binding ceiling) is not optimal here.

Q2.8 — Firms weighted more, b>a>0b>a>0

Answer

Policies that cannot be optimal: any price ceiling pmax⁡≤50p_{\max}\le50, and any price floor pmin⁡>66.67p_{\min}>66.67.

Why (official). Firms count more than consumers. Any ceiling at or below 5050 cannot be optimal. A floor above 5050 raises FS until the price reaches 66.6766.67, the FS maximum; a higher floor reduces both FS and CS, so it is worse.

Typos in the official solution

The text says "producers are weighted more than firms" in Q2.8 and "consumes surplus increases until price reaches maximum" in Q2.7. These are slips ("firms" should be "consumers" in Q2.8). The answers are unaffected. The slide writes 66.6666.66; the exact value is 200/3=66.67200/3=66.67.


Q3 — A production economy with a productivity parameter

Setup (as restated in the solution). A production economy with two firms:

f1(l1,k1)=l1ak11−aandf2(l2,k2)=b⋅(l2ak21−a),0<a<1f_1(l_1,k_1)=l_1^{a}k_1^{1-a}\quad\text{and}\quad f_2(l_2,k_2)=b\cdot\big(l_2^{a}k_2^{1-a}\big),\qquad 0<a<1

The representative consumer has utility U(x,y)=xαy1−αU(x,y)=x^{\alpha}y^{1-\alpha}. The resource constraints are k1+k2=50k_1+k_2=50 and l1+l2=50l_1+l_2=50. Firm 1 produces xx and firm 2 produces yy.

Original wording unknown

The deck does not say which good each firm produces. It is clear from the working that x=f1(l1,k1)x=f_1(l_1,k_1) and y=f2(l2,k2)y=f_2(l_2,k_2) ("x=f1(l1,k1)=l1x=f_1(l_1,k_1)=l_1", "y=f2(l2,k2)=b(50−l1)y=f_2(l_2,k_2)=b(50-l_1)"), so that is used here.

Questions (as restated in the solution).

  1. How does social welfare change as bb changes? Base your answer on an analysis of the environment (an intuitive explanation is not sufficient).
  2. Assume α=1/2\alpha=1/2 and b=1b=1. Find the equilibrium allocation and the equilibrium prices.
  3. Consider an arbitrary economy with the above structure (no specific values for the parameters other than those given at the start).
    • a. How does the equilibrium price ratio px∗/py∗p_x^*/p_y^* change as bb changes? (Hint: you do not necessarily need a full analysis of the equilibrium to give a logical answer.)
    • b. How does the equilibrium quantity ratio x∗/y∗x^*/y^* change as bb changes?

Q3.1 — Social welfare as bb rises

Answer

Social welfare increases with bb.

Step 1: efficient input allocation. Compute the RTS of each firm. For firm 1, MPl1=a l1a−1k11−aMP_{l_1}=a\,l_1^{a-1}k_1^{1-a} and MPk1=(1−a) l1ak1−aMP_{k_1}=(1-a)\,l_1^{a}k_1^{-a}, so

RTS1=a k1(1−a) l1,RTS2=b a l2a−1k21−ab (1−a) l2ak2−a=a k2(1−a) l2RTS_1=\frac{a\,k_1}{(1-a)\,l_1}, \qquad RTS_2=\frac{b\,a\,l_2^{a-1}k_2^{1-a}}{b\,(1-a)\,l_2^{a}k_2^{-a}}=\frac{a\,k_2}{(1-a)\,l_2}

The factor bb cancels in the ratio. Efficiency needs RTS1=RTS2RTS_1=RTS_2, so

k1l1=k2l2=50−k150−l1  ⇒  k1=l1\frac{k_1}{l_1}=\frac{k_2}{l_2}=\frac{50-k_1}{50-l_1}\;\Rightarrow\;k_1=l_1

Step 2: outputs. With k1=l1k_1=l_1 (and k2=l2=50−l1k_2=l_2=50-l_1):

x=f1(l1,k1)=l1,y=f2(l2,k2)=b (50−l1)a(50−l1)1−a=b (50−l1)x=f_1(l_1,k_1)=l_1,\qquad y=f_2(l_2,k_2)=b\,(50-l_1)^{a}(50-l_1)^{1-a}=b\,(50-l_1)

Step 3: the PPF. Eliminating l1l_1 (so l1=xl_1=x):

y=b (50−x)=50b−bxy=b\,(50-x)=50b-bx

The PPF is a straight line, so RPT=bRPT=b everywhere.

PP08_q3_ppf_and_b

The PPF is a straight line from (0,50b)(0,50b) to (50,0)(50,0). A higher bb raises the yy-intercept and keeps the xx-intercept at 5050. The b=2b=2 line is only illustrative; the b=1b=1 point is the equilibrium from Q3.2.

Step 4: conclusion. As bb rises, the maximum yy that can be produced, 50b50b, rises while the maximum xx stays 5050. The PPF moves outward at every x<50x<50, so the consumer can reach strictly more yy for any xx.

Intuition: why this is a proof and not just a story

Because UU is increasing in yy, the bundle that was optimal at the old bb is still feasible at the new, larger bb, and the same xx with more yy is strictly better. So the welfare maximum can only go up. (This last sentence is my own filling-in of the argument.)

Q3.2 — Equilibrium for α=1/2\alpha=1/2, b=1b=1

Answer

x∗=y∗=25x^*=y^*=25 and l1∗=k1∗=l2∗=k2∗=25l_1^*=k_1^*=l_2^*=k_2^*=25. Prices: px∗=1p_x^*=1 (taking py=1p_y=1) and pl∗=pk∗=12p_l^*=p_k^*=\tfrac12.

Allocation.

  1. With b=1b=1 the PPF is y=50−xy=50-x, so RPT=1RPT=1.
  2. With α=12\alpha=\tfrac12, MRS=yxMRS=\frac{y}{x}.
  3. Set MRS=RPTMRS=RPT: yx=1⇒y=x\frac{y}{x}=1\Rightarrow y=x.
  4. Combine with the PPF: x=y=25x=y=25. From x=l1x=l_1 and the efficiency condition k1=l1k_1=l_1: l1∗=k1∗=25l_1^*=k_1^*=25, and then l2∗=k2∗=25l_2^*=k_2^*=25.

Prices.

  1. Output prices: MRS(x∗,y∗)=2525=1=px∗MRS(x^*,y^*)=\frac{25}{25}=1=p_x^*, with yy as the numeraire (py=1p_y=1).
  2. Input prices: firm 1's RTS equals the input price ratio, k1l1=plpk\frac{k_1}{l_1}=\frac{p_l}{p_k}, so k1=l1plpkk_1=l_1\frac{p_l}{p_k}. Here k1∗l1∗=1=pl∗pk∗\frac{k_1^*}{l_1^*}=1=\frac{p_l^*}{p_k^*}.
  3. To pin down the level, derive firm 1's cost function. Substitute k1=l1plpkk_1=l_1\frac{p_l}{p_k} into x=l11/2k11/2=l1(plpk)1/2x=l_1^{1/2}k_1^{1/2}=l_1\left(\frac{p_l}{p_k}\right)^{1/2}:
l1=x(pkpl)1/2,k1=x(plpk)1/2l_1=x\Big(\frac{p_k}{p_l}\Big)^{1/2},\qquad k_1=x\Big(\frac{p_l}{p_k}\Big)^{1/2}
C(x)=pl x(pkpl)1/2+pk x(plpk)1/2=2x (plpk)1/2C(x)=p_l\,x\Big(\frac{p_k}{p_l}\Big)^{1/2}+p_k\,x\Big(\frac{p_l}{p_k}\Big)^{1/2}=2x\,(p_lp_k)^{1/2}
  1. Profit maximisation (price equals marginal cost): C′(x)=2plpk=px=1C'(x)=2\sqrt{p_lp_k}=p_x=1.
  2. With pl∗pk∗=1\frac{p_l^*}{p_k^*}=1: 1=2pl∗pk∗=2pl∗1=2\sqrt{p_l^*p_k^*}=2p_l^*, so pl∗=pk∗=12p_l^*=p_k^*=\tfrac12.
Note on the official working

The slide's cost-function steps use l11/2k11/2l_1^{1/2}k_1^{1/2}, which means firm 1's exponent is a=12a=\tfrac12. The question as restated fixes α=1/2\alpha=1/2 and b=1b=1 but not aa, so the official solution silently takes a=12a=\tfrac12 here. The allocation x∗=y∗=25x^*=y^*=25 does not depend on aa (the efficiency condition k1=l1k_1=l_1 holds for every aa), but the input prices above do.

Q3.3a — Price ratio as bb changes

Answer

px∗/py∗=bp_x^*/p_y^*=b, so the price ratio increases with bb.

As bb rises, the slope of the PPF rises. The PPF is a straight line, so it coincides with the consumer's budget line in equilibrium (the budget line has slope px/pyp_x/p_y). Hence in the optimal bundle px∗py∗=b\frac{p_x^*}{p_y^*}=b.

Intuition

Producing one more unit of xx costs bb units of yy (the RPT). A competitive price ratio must reflect this opportunity cost, so xx becomes relatively more expensive as yy gets easier to make.

Q3.3b — Quantity ratio as bb changes

Answer

x∗/y∗x^*/y^* decreases with bb.

At the optimum MRS=RPT=bMRS=RPT=b. For α=12\alpha=\tfrac12 the slide writes MRS=yx=bMRS=\frac{y}{x}=b, so x∗y∗=1b\frac{x^*}{y^*}=\frac1b falls as bb rises. A higher bb means the economy can turn resources into yy more effectively, so the PPF is steeper. The consumer faces what looks like a fall in the price of yy (with no change in income), and Cobb-Douglas preferences shift the consumption mix towards yy, so x∗/y∗x^*/y^* falls.

Intuition (my own generalisation to any α\alpha)

For U=xαy1−αU=x^\alpha y^{1-\alpha} the MRS is αy(1−α)x\frac{\alpha y}{(1-\alpha)x}, so setting it equal to bb gives x∗y∗=α(1−α) b\frac{x^*}{y^*}=\frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha)\,b}. This is decreasing in bb for every α\alpha, which agrees with the official conclusion.


Q4 — Two exporters and an effort externality

Setup (as restated in the solution). A market where two firms, AA and BB, export a given product XX abroad. The international price is pX=60p_X=60. The cost function of firm AA is

CA(xA,eA,eB)=xA2+12(xA−eA)2+4eBC_A(x_A,e_A,e_B)=x_A^2+\frac12(x_A-e_A)^2+4e_B

and of firm BB:

CB(xB,eB,eA)=xB2+12(xB−eB)2+4eAC_B(x_B,e_B,e_A)=x_B^2+\frac12(x_B-e_B)^2+4e_A
Original wording unknown

The deck does not say what eAe_A and eBe_B stand for (the "effort" label is used below only as a convenient name; the official explanation itself says each firm's "effort" benefits itself and harms the other). The slide itself uses pAp_A for the price firm AA receives; it is the international price, 6060.

Questions (as restated in the solution).

  • (a) Find the equilibrium in this market (an equilibrium is a choice of (xA,eA)(x_A,e_A) for firm AA and a choice of (xB,eB)(x_B,e_B) for firm BB) and each firm's profit in equilibrium.
  • (b) Assume now that a social planner, whose aim is to maximise the sum of the firms' profits, decides on the quantities (xA,xB,eA,eB)(x_A,x_B,e_A,e_B).
    • (i) Find the optimal quantities for the social planner, and each firm's profit under the planner's optimal quantities.
    • (ii) What happens to the quantity of good XX that each firm produces compared with the equilibrium level? On the other hand, what happens to each firm's profit compared with its profit in equilibrium? Provide an economic explanation for this seemingly puzzling result.
  • (c) Find the Pigouvian tax in this setting.

Q4a — Equilibrium

Answer

eA=xA=eB=xB=30e_A=x_A=e_B=x_B=30, and πA=πB=780\pi_A=\pi_B=780.

Firm AA's profit is

πA(xA,eA)=60 xA−xA2−12(xA−eA)2−4eB\pi_A(x_A,e_A)=60\,x_A-x_A^2-\frac12(x_A-e_A)^2-4e_B
  1. Choose eAe_A. Firm AA treats eBe_B as given (the term −4eB-4e_B is a constant to it). The term 12(xA−eA)2\frac12(x_A-e_A)^2 is a pure cost to AA, and eAe_A affects nothing else in AA's own profit. So AA sets eA=xAe_A=x_A to make it vanish.
  2. Choose xAx_A. With eA=xAe_A=x_A: ∂πA∂xA=60−2xA=0\frac{\partial\pi_A}{\partial x_A}=60-2x_A=0, so xA=30=eAx_A=30=e_A.
  3. By symmetry xB=eB=30x_B=e_B=30.
  4. Profit. πA=60⋅30−302−0−4⋅30=1800−900−120=780\pi_A=60\cdot30-30^2-0-4\cdot30=1800-900-120=780. By symmetry πB=780\pi_B=780.

Q4b(i) — The planner's optimum

Answer

xA=xB=28x_A=x_B=28, eA=eB=24e_A=e_B=24, and each firm's profit is 792792.

The planner maximises total profit:

πT=60(xA+xB)−xA2−12(xA−eA)2−4eB−xB2−12(xB−eB)2−4eA\pi_T=60(x_A+x_B)-x_A^2-\frac12(x_A-e_A)^2-4e_B-x_B^2-\frac12(x_B-e_B)^2-4e_A
  1. Effort eAe_A. Now eAe_A appears in AA's own cost term and in BB's cost (4eA4e_A): ∂πT∂eA=(xA−eA)−4=0  ⇒  xA−eA=4\frac{\partial\pi_T}{\partial e_A}=(x_A-e_A)-4=0\;\Rightarrow\;x_A-e_A=4
  2. Quantity xAx_A. ∂πT∂xA=60−2xA−(xA−eA)=0  ⇒  60−2xA−4=0  ⇒  xA=28,  eA=24\frac{\partial\pi_T}{\partial x_A}=60-2x_A-(x_A-e_A)=0\;\Rightarrow\;60-2x_A-4=0\;\Rightarrow\;x_A=28,\;e_A=24
  3. By symmetry xB=28x_B=28, eB=24e_B=24.
  4. Profit. πA=60⋅28−282−12(28−24)2−4⋅24=1680−784−8−96=792\pi_A=60\cdot28-28^2-\frac12(28-24)^2-4\cdot24=1680-784-8-96=792. By symmetry πB=792\pi_B=792.

Q4b(ii) — Why less output but higher profit?

Answer

Each firm produces less (2828 against 3030) but earns more (792792 against 780780).

Why (official). Each firm's effort benefits itself but harms the other by raising the other firm's cost. In equilibrium firms ignore this and overuse effort. The planner internalises the externality, reduces both effort and output, and achieves higher overall efficiency and profit.

Intuition

This is the classic mutual negative externality. Each firm gets a private benefit from effort (it cancels its own adjustment cost 12(x−e)2\frac12(x-e)^2) while the cost of 44 per unit lands on the rival. The market is a prisoners' dilemma: both would be better off if both cut effort, but neither has a private reason to. Cutting effort from 3030 to 2424 and output from 3030 to 2828 raises profit from 780780 to 792792 each, a joint gain of 2424 (1,5841{,}584 against 1,5601{,}560).

Q4c — Pigouvian tax

Answer

The Pigouvian tax is 4 (per unit of eie_i).

One extra unit of eAe_A raises firm BB's cost by ∂CB∂eA=4\frac{\partial C_B}{\partial e_A}=4, and one extra unit of eBe_B raises firm AA's cost by ∂CA∂eB=4\frac{\partial C_A}{\partial e_B}=4. A Pigouvian Tax equals the marginal external damage of the action. Here the external damage from eie_i is constant and equals 44, so the tax is 44.

Intuition: check against Q4b (my own check)

With a tax of 44 on eAe_A, firm AA's profit becomes 60xA−xA2−12(xA−eA)2−4eA−4eB60x_A-x_A^2-\frac12(x_A-e_A)^2-4e_A-4e_B. Its first-order conditions are xA−eA=4x_A-e_A=4 (from eAe_A) and 60−2xA−(xA−eA)=060-2x_A-(x_A-e_A)=0 (from xAx_A), which are exactly the planner's conditions, giving xA=28x_A=28 and eA=24e_A=24. So a tax of 44 implements the planner's optimum.


Recap table

Part Tool Answer
Q1.1 Welfare preference is not Pareto dominance False (WW: 684→10,000684\to10{,}000, but agent 2 falls 342→100342\to100)
Q1.2 MC=w/f′(l(q))MC=w/f'(l(q)) with f′f' rising False, MC decreasing
Q1.3 Cost minimisation with g′(l)=Pl/Pkg'(l)=P_l/P_k False, ll rises at low output
Q1.4 MRS1=MRS2MRS_1=MRS_2 at the midpoint True (a≠ba\neq b)
Q1.5 Public good Nash equilibrium False, infinitely many with g1+g2=g0g_1+g_2=g^0
Q2.1 MU = demand, MC = supply PD=100−2xP^D=100-2x, PS=2xP^S=2x
Q2.2 PD=PSP^D=P^S xe=25x^e=25, Pe=50P^e=50
Q2.3 Areas under demand and supply W=1250W=1250, CS=FS=625CS=FS=625
Q2.4 a=ba=b means total surplus No control, or non-binding ones
Q2.5 Maximise CS under a ceiling Ceiling at 33.3333.33
Q2.6 Maximise FS under a floor Floor at 66.6766.67
Q2.7 a>b>0a>b>0 Not optimal: floors ≥50\ge50, ceilings <33.33<33.33
Q2.8 b>a>0b>a>0 Not optimal: ceilings ≤50\le50, floors >66.67>66.67
Q3.1 RTS1=RTS2⇒k1=l1RTS_1=RTS_2\Rightarrow k_1=l_1, PPF y=b(50−x)y=b(50-x) Welfare rises with bb
Q3.2 MRS=RPTMRS=RPT, C′(x)=pxC'(x)=p_x x∗=y∗=25x^*=y^*=25, all inputs 2525, pl=pk=12p_l=p_k=\frac12
Q3.3a PPF coincides with budget line px/py=bp_x/p_y=b, rises
Q3.3b MRS=RPT=bMRS=RPT=b x∗/y∗x^*/y^* falls
Q4a ei=xie_i=x_i, p=2xip=2x_i x=e=30x=e=30, π=780\pi=780 each
Q4b(i) Maximise joint profit x=28x=28, e=24e=24, π=792\pi=792 each
Q4b(ii) Internalise the externality Less output, more profit
Q4c Marginal external damage Tax =4=4