Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed A (March 2024) · Dr. Boaz Zik · worked-solution

Perfect Substitutes, Exchange Equilibrium, Minimum Price & Social Planner (2024 Moed A)

Perfect Substitutes, Exchange Equilibrium, Minimum Price & Social Planner (2024 Moed A)

Part of: Micro-Economics II Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed A (March 2024), Micro-Economics II, Dr. Boaz Zik. 3 hours, open material, 4 questions, 25 points each. Builds on: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities Practice: PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings, PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner, PS_07-Core, Corner Endowments & Equilibrium vs the Social Planner

Source

Answers follow the official solution (12 pages). Where the official text has a typo or a gap, the answer is kept and a > [!warning] callout flags it.

What this paper tests

Question Core idea Where it is taught
Q1 Perfect Substitutes technology: linear isoquants, corner cost minimisation, flat supply, zero profit PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium
Q2 Exchange Economy with Cobb-Douglas agents: Contract Curve, Walrasian Equilibrium, what the shape of the contract curve says about preferences PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner
Q3 Partial Equilibrium with quasilinear demand and a minimum price (price floor): how Consumer Surplus and Firm Surplus move with the floor, increasing vs constant marginal cost PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings
Q4 Contract curve, utility frontier and a Cobb-Douglas social planner PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare, PS_07-Core, Corner Endowments & Equilibrium vs the Social Planner
Intuition: the one move behind each question
  • Q1: with perfect substitutes the firm just uses whichever input gives more output per dollar, so the answer is always a corner (or a tie).
  • Q2 and Q4: find the contract curve by setting MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 and substituting the resource constraints.
  • Q3: price = marginal cost on the supply side, price = marginal utility on the demand side. A floor above equilibrium means the short side of the market (demand) decides the quantity.

Q1 — Perfect substitutes technology (25 points)

Production function f(l,k)=a⋅l+b⋅kf(l,k) = a\cdot l + b\cdot k.

1a — Quantity at a convex combination of two isoquant points (7 points)

Question. Take two bundles AA and BB on the same isoquant and C=rA+(1−r)BC = rA + (1-r)B with 0<r<10<r<1. How does the quantity under CC compare with the quantity under AA and BB? Prove it.

Answer

CC produces exactly the same quantity as AA and BB.

Proof (official). Let A=(lA,kA)A=(l_A,k_A) and B=(lB,kB)B=(l_B,k_B) both produce q0q_0:

a lA+b kA=q0⇒kA=q0b−ab lAa\,l_A + b\,k_A = q_0 \quad\Rightarrow\quad k_A = \frac{q_0}{b} - \frac{a}{b}\,l_A
a lB+b kB=q0⇒kB=q0b−ab lBa\,l_B + b\,k_B = q_0 \quad\Rightarrow\quad k_B = \frac{q_0}{b} - \frac{a}{b}\,l_B

By definition of CC:

kC=rkA+(1−r)kB,lC=rlA+(1−r)lBk_C = r k_A + (1-r)k_B, \qquad l_C = r l_A + (1-r) l_B

Substituting the two isoquant equations into kCk_C:

kC=q0b−ab(rlA+(1−r)lB)=q0b−ab lCk_C = \frac{q_0}{b} - \frac{a}{b}\Big(r l_A + (1-r) l_B\Big) = \frac{q_0}{b} - \frac{a}{b}\,l_C

So CC lies on the same line a l+b k=q0a\,l + b\,k = q_0, hence produces q0q_0.

PP04_q1_linear_isoquant

The isoquant is a straight line, so every point between AA and BB stays on it.

Intuition

This is the knife-edge case of the convex isoquant property from PS_02-Isoquants, RTS & Properties of the Profit Function. For a strictly convex isoquant (Cobb-Douglas), the midpoint of AA and BB lies on a higher isoquant. For perfect substitutes the isoquant is flat-straight, so the midpoint is on the same one: there is no gain from "mixing" inputs. That is exactly why the cost-minimiser ends up at a corner.

1b — Cost function when a/b>pl/pka/b > p_l/p_k (6 points)

Answer

l(q0)=q0/al(q_0) = q_0/a, k(q0)=0k(q_0) = 0, so C(q0)=pl⋅q0aC(q_0) = p_l \cdot \frac{q_0}{a}

Why. The condition ab>plpk\frac{a}{b} > \frac{p_l}{p_k} is the same as apl>bpk\frac{a}{p_l} > \frac{b}{p_k}: labour gives more output per dollar than capital. The RTS is the constant a/ba/b (slope of the isoquant) and the isocost slope is pl/pkp_l/p_k. Since the isoquant is steeper than the isocost line, the isocost line touches the isoquant only at the labour-axis corner. The firm uses labour only: a l=q0⇒l=q0/aa\,l = q_0 \Rightarrow l = q_0/a.

1c — A fall in pkp_k (6 points)

Question. What happens to the chosen k(q0)k(q_0) and to C(q0)C(q_0) when pkp_k falls?

Answer

It depends on where pl/pkp_l/p_k ends up relative to a/ba/b (a fall in pkp_k raises pl/pkp_l/p_k):

After the fall Regime k(q0)k(q_0) C(q0)C(q_0)
ab>plpk\frac{a}{b} > \frac{p_l}{p_k} still labour corner stays 00 unchanged, plq0/ap_l q_0/a
ab=plpk\frac{a}{b} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} indifferent anywhere from 00 to q0/bq_0/b unchanged, plq0/ap_l q_0/a
ab<plpk\frac{a}{b} < \frac{p_l}{p_k} capital corner jumps to q0/bq_0/b changes to pkq0/bp_k q_0/b

Why. The firm is bang-bang: small price changes do nothing while the same input stays cheaper per unit of output, and the firm switches entirely once the ranking flips. In the third case the new cost pkq0/bp_k q_0/b is below the old plq0/ap_l q_0/a (that is what ab<plpk\frac{a}{b}<\frac{p_l}{p_k} means), so cost falls.

1d — Supply function and equilibrium profit (6 points)

Answer

C(q)=plq/aC(q) = p_l q/a, so the supply (inverse) function is the marginal cost PS(q)=C′(q)=pla,P^S(q) = C'(q) = \frac{p_l}{a}, a horizontal line. In equilibrium p=MCp = MC, so profit per marginal unit is zero for every qq and the firm makes zero profit.

PP04_q1_flat_supply

Constant marginal cost gives a perfectly elastic supply curve at height pl/ap_l/a.

Intuition

Constant returns to scale (the cost is linear in qq) means no fixed cost and no rising marginal cost to earn a rent on. Competition pushes price to pl/ap_l/a and nothing is left over. This zero-profit result is used again in Q3(g).


Q2 — Exchange economy with Cobb-Douglas agents (25 points)

U1=x1ay11−aU_1 = x_1^{a} y_1^{1-a} and U2=x2by21−bU_2 = x_2^{b} y_2^{1-b}, total resources XX and YY.

2a — Numerical case: a=23a=\tfrac23, b=13b=\tfrac13, ωx1=ωx2=50\omega_{x1}=\omega_{x2}=50, ωy1=ωy2=70\omega_{y1}=\omega_{y2}=70

(1) Contract curve (5 points)

Answer

y1=140 x1400−3x1y_1 = \frac{140\,x_1}{400 - 3x_1}

The Contract Curve is where MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2.

MRS1=2y1x1,MRS2=y22x2MRS_1 = \frac{2y_1}{x_1}, \qquad MRS_2 = \frac{y_2}{2x_2}

With x2=100−x1x_2 = 100 - x_1 and y2=140−y1y_2 = 140 - y_1:

2y1x1=140−y1200−2x1\frac{2y_1}{x_1} = \frac{140 - y_1}{200 - 2x_1}

Cross-multiplying: 4y1(100−x1)=x1(140−y1)4y_1(100-x_1) = x_1(140-y_1), so 400y1−4x1y1=140x1−x1y1400y_1 - 4x_1y_1 = 140x_1 - x_1y_1, giving y1(400−3x1)=140x1y_1(400-3x_1) = 140x_1, the stated curve.

(2) Equilibrium prices and quantities (5 points)

Answer

px=75p_x = \tfrac75 (good yy is the numeraire), and x1=2003,  y1=1403,  x2=1003,  y2=2803x_1 = \tfrac{200}{3},\; y_1 = \tfrac{140}{3},\; x_2 = \tfrac{100}{3},\; y_2 = \tfrac{280}{3}

Agent 1 maximises x12/3y11/3x_1^{2/3}y_1^{1/3} subject to pxx1+y1=50px+70p_x x_1 + y_1 = 50p_x + 70. Cobb-Douglas spends the share aa of income on xx:

x1=1003+1403pxx_1 = \frac{100}{3} + \frac{140}{3p_x}

Agent 2 maximises x21/3y22/3x_2^{1/3}y_2^{2/3} on the same budget form:

x2=503+703pxx_2 = \frac{50}{3} + \frac{70}{3p_x}

Market clearing for xx (x1+x2=100x_1 + x_2 = 100):

1003+1403px+503+703px=100  ⇒  50+70px=100  ⇒  px=75\frac{100}{3} + \frac{140}{3p_x} + \frac{50}{3} + \frac{70}{3p_x} = 100 \;\Rightarrow\; 50 + \frac{70}{p_x} = 100 \;\Rightarrow\; p_x = \frac{7}{5}

Plugging back gives the allocation above. By Walras' Law the yy market clears automatically.

PP04_q2_contract_curve_equilibrium

The equilibrium allocation lies on the contract curve, as the First Welfare Theorem requires. Agent 1, who likes xx more, ends up with more xx than the endowment.

Intuition

Agent 1 has a=2/3a = 2/3 (loves xx), agent 2 has b=1/3b = 1/3 (loves yy). Both start with the same bundle, so agent 1 sells yy and buys xx. The allocation sits below the diagonal: y1<70y_1 < 70 and x1>50x_1 > 50.

2b — Contract curve y1=YXx1y_1 = \frac{Y}{X}x_1 (5 points)

Answer

This holds if and only if a=ba = b.

Proof (official), both directions.

(a=b⇒a=b \Rightarrow line). Equal MRS gives

a1−a⋅y1x1=a1−a⋅y2x2\frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{y_2}{x_2}

and with x2=X−x1x_2 = X - x_1, y2=Y−y1y_2 = Y - y_1:

y1x1=Y−y1X−x1\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{Y-y_1}{X-x_1}

Cross-multiplying: y1X−y1x1=x1Y−y1x1y_1X - y_1x_1 = x_1Y - y_1x_1, so y1=YXx1y_1 = \frac{Y}{X}x_1.

(line ⇒a=b\Rightarrow a=b). If y1=YXx1y_1 = \frac{Y}{X}x_1 then y1X−y1x1=x1Y−y1x1y_1X - y_1x_1 = x_1Y - y_1x_1, so y1x1=Y−y1X−x1=y2x2\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{Y-y_1}{X-x_1} = \frac{y_2}{x_2}. The contract curve condition a1−ay1x1=b1−by2x2\frac{a}{1-a}\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{b}{1-b}\frac{y_2}{x_2} then forces a1−a=b1−b\frac{a}{1-a} = \frac{b}{1-b}, i.e. a=ba=b.

Intuition

Identical tastes mean that when both agents face the same ratio y/xy/x their MRS is equal. The contract curve is then the Edgeworth box diagonal: efficient allocations give both agents the same bundle proportions.

2c — Price ratio when X=YX = Y, diagonal contract curve, a=15a = \tfrac15 (5 points)

Answer

px=14p_x = \tfrac14

With X=YX=Y the diagonal is y1=x1y_1 = x_1. A competitive equilibrium in the interior is Pareto efficient, so it sits on the contract curve, and the price ratio equals the MRS:

a1−a⋅y1x1=px\frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{y_1}{x_1} = p_x

On the diagonal y1/x1=1y_1/x_1 = 1, so px=a1−a=1/54/5=14p_x = \frac{a}{1-a} = \frac{1/5}{4/5} = \frac14.

2d — Contract curve passes above the centre: y1(X/2)>Y/2y_1(X/2) > Y/2 (5 points)

Answer

a≠ba \neq b, and more precisely a<ba < b.

Why (official). By 2b, if a=ba=b the contract curve is the diagonal and passes through the centre (X/2,Y/2)(X/2, Y/2). A curve strictly above the centre therefore means a≠ba \neq b. At the point where xx is split evenly, agent 1 gets more yy than agent 2, so agent 1 values yy more relative to xx: a<ba < b.

Intuition: check it with the MRS

At x1=x2=X/2x_1 = x_2 = X/2: equal MRS requires a1−ay1=b1−by2\frac{a}{1-a}y_1 = \frac{b}{1-b}y_2. If y1>y2y_1 > y_2, then a1−a\frac{a}{1-a} must be smaller than b1−b\frac{b}{1-b}, so a<ba<b. The agent who weights yy more (agent 1) gets more yy when xx is split equally.


Q3 — Partial equilibrium and a minimum price (25 points: parts 3, 3, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3)

Demand comes from a consumer with quasilinear utility 60x−x2+y60x - x^2 + y (yy is money). Supply comes from a representative firm.

Setup used in every part

For Quasilinear Utility, the inverse demand is the marginal utility of xx: PD(x)=60−2xP^D(x) = 60 - 2x. The inverse supply is the marginal cost: PS(x)=C′(x)P^S(x) = C'(x). See PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings.

Part I: firm with f=l1/4k1/4f = l^{1/4}k^{1/4}, pk=pl=2p_k = p_l = 2

3a — Cost function (3 points)

Answer

C(x)=4x2C(x) = 4x^2

Set RTS equal to the price ratio: kl=plpk=1\frac{k}{l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = 1, so l=kl = k. The isoquant is l1/4k1/4=l1/2=xl^{1/4}k^{1/4} = l^{1/2} = x, so l(x)=k(x)=x2l(x)=k(x)=x^2 and

C(x)=2x2+2x2=4x2C(x) = 2x^2 + 2x^2 = 4x^2

3b — Equilibrium (3 points)

Answer

x∗=6x^* = 6, p∗=48p^* = 48

PS(x)=C′(x)=8xP^S(x) = C'(x) = 8x. Equate 60−2x=8x60 - 2x = 8x, so x∗=6x^*=6 and p∗=48p^* = 48.

3c — Minimum price p~\tilde p (7 points)

Question. Find the consumer surplus and the firm's surplus as functions of p~\tilde p, and where each is increasing or decreasing.

Answer
  • If p~≤48\tilde p \le 48: the floor does not bind, price is 48 and quantity 6. CS=60x−x2−px=36CS = 60x - x^2 - px = 36 and firm surplus =px−4x2=144= px - 4x^2 = 144. Both are constant.
  • If p~>48\tilde p > 48: quantity is set by demand, x=60−p~2x = \frac{60-\tilde p}{2}.
    • CSCS decreases in p~\tilde p throughout (down to 0 at p~=60\tilde p = 60).
    • Firm surplus is −3p~22+150p~−3600-\frac{3\tilde p^2}{2} + 150\tilde p - 3600, which increases until p~=50\tilde p = 50 and decreases afterwards.

Derivation. Above the equilibrium price, firms would gladly supply more than consumers want to buy, so the quantity traded is the short side, which is demand: 60−2x=p~60 - 2x = \tilde p.

Firm surplus:

p~⋅60−p~2−4(60−p~2)2=−3p~22+150p~−3600\tilde p\cdot\frac{60-\tilde p}{2} - 4\left(\frac{60-\tilde p}{2}\right)^2 = -\frac{3\tilde p^2}{2} + 150\tilde p - 3600

First-order condition: −3p~+150=0-3\tilde p + 150 = 0, so p~=50\tilde p = 50 is the peak.

Typo in the official consumer surplus

The solution prints CS=(60−p~)22CS = \frac{(60-\tilde p)^2}{2}. Computing it: CS=x(60−p~)−x2=2x2−x2=x2=(60−p~)24CS = x(60 - \tilde p) - x^2 = 2x^2 - x^2 = x^2 = \frac{(60-\tilde p)^2}{4}. At p~=48\tilde p = 48 this gives 1224=36\frac{12^2}{4} = 36, matching the "36" in the first case (with /2/2 it would be 72, which breaks continuity). The conclusion (decreasing in p~\tilde p) is unaffected. The /4/4 version is used here.

PP04_q3_min_price_surplus

Left: consumer surplus is flat at 36 and then falls once the floor binds. Right: firm surplus rises from 144 to a peak of 150 at p~=50\tilde p = 50, then falls and crosses back through 144 at p~=52\tilde p = 52.

Intuition

A small floor above 48 makes the firm earn more per unit, which outweighs the units lost. Beyond 50 the lost sales dominate. This is the standard price-floor trade-off: the producer benefits from the higher price only while the volume loss is small, because the firm has rising marginal cost so the units lost were not very profitable.

3d — When is the firm worse off than in equilibrium? (3 points)

Answer

For p~>52\tilde p > 52.

Set firm surplus equal to its equilibrium value, 144:

−3p~22+150p~−3744=0-\frac{3\tilde p^2}{2} + 150\tilde p - 3744 = 0

which has roots p~=48\tilde p = 48 and p~=52\tilde p = 52 (the official solution reports the positive root 52 that is relevant above 48). Above 52 firm surplus is strictly below 144.

Part II: firm with f=l1/2k1/2f = l^{1/2}k^{1/2}, pk=4p_k = 4, pl=1p_l = 1

3e — Cost function (3 points)

Answer

C(x)=4xC(x) = 4x

RTS equals the price ratio: kl=plpk=14\frac{k}{l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = \frac14, so k=l/4k = l/4. The isoquant l1/2k1/2=l/2=xl^{1/2}k^{1/2} = l/2 = x gives l=2xl = 2x and k=x/2k = x/2. Then

C(x)=1⋅2x+4⋅x2=4xC(x) = 1\cdot 2x + 4\cdot\frac{x}{2} = 4x
Printed typo

The official text writes the condition as "k=4lk = 4l" in one place but the numbers it then uses (l=2xl = 2x, k=x/2k = x/2, C=4xC = 4x) correspond to k=l/4k = l/4, which is the correct tangency above.

3f — Equilibrium (3 points)

Answer

x∗=28x^* = 28, p∗=4p^* = 4

PS=C′(x)=4P^S = C'(x) = 4. Equate 60−2x=460 - 2x = 4, so x∗=28x^* = 28 and p∗=4p^* = 4.

3g — Minimum price with constant marginal cost (3 points)

Answer

The firm makes zero surplus in equilibrium, whereas any floor p~>4\tilde p > 4 gives it a positive surplus. So the firm never loses from a minimum price, unlike part (d), where a high enough floor leaves it worse off.

Economic explanation. In (d) the firm had increasing marginal cost, so extra production earned a rent, and a high floor that cut the quantity destroyed more rent than the higher price created. Here marginal cost is constant (as in Q1d), so there is no rent from the quantity in equilibrium to lose: the equilibrium surplus is zero, and any floor above 4 can only help.

Gap in the official solution

The last sentence of the official explanation is cut off ("The explanation for the difference is that when the firm has constant marginal cost."). The reading above is the natural completion. Also, strictly, at p~≥60\tilde p \ge 60 demand is zero, so quantity and surplus are 00, which equals (not exceeds) the equilibrium surplus. The statement "never loses" is therefore weakly true.


Q4 — Exchange economy and the social planner (25 points)

U1=x11/3y12/3U_1 = x_1^{1/3}y_1^{2/3}, U2=2 x21/3y22/3U_2 = 2\,x_2^{1/3}y_2^{2/3}, X=Y=50X = Y = 50.

4a — Contract curve (5 points)

Answer

y1=x1y_1 = x_1 (the diagonal of the box)

MRS1=y12x1MRS_1 = \frac{y_1}{2x_1} and MRS2=y22x2MRS_2 = \frac{y_2}{2x_2}. With x2=50−x1x_2 = 50-x_1, y2=50−y1y_2 = 50-y_1:

y12x1=50−y1100−2x1\frac{y_1}{2x_1} = \frac{50 - y_1}{100 - 2x_1}

Cross-multiplying: y1(100−2x1)=2x1(50−y1)y_1(100 - 2x_1) = 2x_1(50 - y_1), so 100y1=100x1100y_1 = 100x_1, i.e. y1=x1y_1 = x_1.

Intuition

Both agents have the same Cobb-Douglas exponents (a=b=1/3a = b = 1/3). The factor 2 in U2U_2 scales the utility level but leaves the MRS unchanged, so it does not move the contract curve. This is the a=ba=b case from Q2(b) with X=YX=Y.

4b — The planner's problem (5 points)

Answer
max⁡(x1,y1),(x2,y2)  (x11/3y12/3)1/3⋅(2 x21/3y22/3)2/3\max_{(x_1,y_1),(x_2,y_2)}\; \big(x_1^{1/3}y_1^{2/3}\big)^{1/3}\cdot\big(2\,x_2^{1/3}y_2^{2/3}\big)^{2/3}

subject to x1+x2=50x_1 + x_2 = 50 and y1+y2=50y_1 + y_2 = 50.

This is SW(U1,U2)=U11/3U22/3SW(U_1,U_2) = U_1^{1/3}U_2^{2/3} with the utilities substituted in.

4c — Optimal allocation (10 points)

Answer

x1=y1=1006=503x_1 = y_1 = \tfrac{100}{6} = \tfrac{50}{3},   x2=y2=1003\;x_2 = y_2 = \tfrac{100}{3},   U1=503\;U_1 = \tfrac{50}{3},   U2=2003\;U_2 = \tfrac{200}{3}.

Method (official). This is the same algorithm as the planner in a production economy: first restrict to efficient allocations, then trace the utility frontier, then find the tangency with the planner's indifference curve.

Step 1: utility frontier. On the contract curve y1=x1y_1 = x_1:

U1=x11/3x12/3=x1U_1 = x_1^{1/3}x_1^{2/3} = x_1
U2=2 (50−x1)1/3(50−x1)2/3=2(50−x1)=100−2U1U_2 = 2\,(50 - x_1)^{1/3}(50 - x_1)^{2/3} = 2(50 - x_1) = 100 - 2U_1

So the frontier is U2=100−2U1U_2 = 100 - 2U_1, a straight line with slope −2-2.

Step 2: the planner's MRS. For SW=U11/3U22/3SW = U_1^{1/3}U_2^{2/3}:

MRSSW=13U1−2/3U22/323U11/3U2−1/3=U22U1MRS_{SW} = \frac{\tfrac13 U_1^{-2/3}U_2^{2/3}}{\tfrac23 U_1^{1/3}U_2^{-1/3}} = \frac{U_2}{2U_1}

Step 3: tangency. Set U22U1=2\frac{U_2}{2U_1} = 2, so U2=4U1U_2 = 4U_1. Plug into the frontier:

4U1=100−2U1  ⇒  U1=503,U2=20034U_1 = 100 - 2U_1 \;\Rightarrow\; U_1 = \frac{50}{3},\quad U_2 = \frac{200}{3}

Since U1=x1U_1 = x_1: x1=y1=503=1006x_1 = y_1 = \frac{50}{3} = \frac{100}{6}, and x2=y2=50−503=1003x_2 = y_2 = 50 - \frac{50}{3} = \frac{100}{3}. Check: U2=2⋅1003=2003U_2 = 2\cdot\frac{100}{3} = \frac{200}{3}.

PP04_q4_utility_frontier

The planner picks the point where the highest social-welfare indifference curve just touches the utility frontier.

Intuition

The planner weights agent 2 twice as much (exponent 2/32/3 vs 1/31/3), and agent 2's utility is also scaled up by the factor 2. Agent 2 therefore ends up with more of the resources (two thirds of each good) and four times the utility of agent 1.

4d — General weight aa: SW=U1aU21−aSW = U_1^{a}U_2^{1-a} (5 points)

Answer (official)

The official solution states U2U1=2a1−a\frac{U_2}{U_1} = \frac{2a}{1-a} obtained from 1−aa⋅U2U1=2\frac{1-a}{a}\cdot\frac{U_2}{U_1} = 2, and explains that the planner divides utility according to the weights in its Cobb-Douglas objective: with equal weights (a=12a=\tfrac12) the resources are split equally and agent 2 gets twice the utility; when aa falls, agent 2 gets more.

Concern: the official formula looks inverted

Differentiating SW=U1aU21−aSW = U_1^{a}U_2^{1-a} gives MRSSW=∂SW/∂U1∂SW/∂U2=a1−a⋅U2U1MRS_{SW} = \frac{\partial SW/\partial U_1}{\partial SW/\partial U_2} = \frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{U_2}{U_1} (the weight on U1U_1 is in the numerator). Setting this equal to the frontier slope 2 gives U2U1=2⋅1−aa\frac{U_2}{U_1} = 2\cdot\frac{1-a}{a} Check against part (c): a=13a=\tfrac13 gives U2/U1=2⋅2=4U_2/U_1 = 2\cdot 2 = 4, which is the U2=4U1U_2 = 4U_1 found in 4c. The official formula would give 2/32/3=1\frac{2/3}{2/3}=1 at a=13a=\tfrac13, contradicting 4c. The corrected form is also what the question seems to be after (ratio of utilities as a function of 1−aa\frac{1-a}{a}: proportional, factor 2). It also agrees with the official explanation that a lower aa gives agent 2 more. The official wording is kept above; check with the lecturer before relying on either form in an exam.

Derivation with the check. The frontier U2=100−2U1U_2 = 100 - 2U_1 does not depend on the planner's weights, so its slope is 22 for any aa. Tangency: a1−a⋅U2U1=2\frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{U_2}{U_1} = 2. Equal weights (a=12a=\tfrac12): U2=2U1U_2 = 2U_1 and U2=100−2U1U_2 = 100-2U_1 give U1=25U_1 = 25, U2=50U_2 = 50, so x1=y1=25x_1 = y_1 = 25 and resources are split equally while utilities are 1:21:2 (the extra factor 2 in U2U_2 does that). Both versions agree at a=12a=\tfrac12, which is why the typo is easy to miss.

Intuition

The weight aa is how much the planner cares about agent 1. A smaller aa (larger 1−aa\frac{1-a}{a}) tilts utility, and resources, towards agent 2.


Recap table

Part Tool One-line answer
1a Linear isoquant algebra CC is on the same isoquant: same output q0q_0
1b Corner solution, ab>plpk\frac{a}{b} > \frac{p_l}{p_k} C=plq0/aC = p_l q_0 / a, labour only
1c Comparative statics on a corner kk stays 0, becomes any value up to q0/bq_0/b, or jumps to q0/bq_0/b depending on plpk\frac{p_l}{p_k} vs ab\frac ab
1d PS=MCP^S = MC Flat supply at pl/ap_l/a, zero profit
2a1 MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 y1=140x1/(400−3x1)y_1 = 140x_1/(400-3x_1)
2a2 Walrasian equilibrium px=7/5p_x = 7/5, (x1,y1)=(200/3,140/3)(x_1,y_1) = (200/3, 140/3)
2b Equal MRS with identical shares a=ba = b iff contract curve is y1=YXx1y_1 = \frac{Y}{X}x_1
2c Price = MRS on the diagonal px=1/4p_x = 1/4
2d Curve above the centre a<ba < b
3a RTS = price ratio C=4x2C = 4x^2
3b PD=PSP^D = P^S x∗=6x^*=6, p∗=48p^*=48
3c Short side of the market CSCS falls, firm surplus peaks at p~=50\tilde p = 50
3d Solve FS=144FS = 144 Firm worse off for p~>52\tilde p > 52
3e RTS = price ratio C=4xC = 4x
3f PD=PSP^D = P^S x∗=28x^*=28, p∗=4p^*=4
3g Constant MC, zero equilibrium surplus Firm never loses from a floor
4a MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 y1=x1y_1 = x_1
4b Planner's problem maximise SWSW s.t. resource constraints
4c Utility frontier tangency U1=50/3U_1 = 50/3, U2=200/3U_2 = 200/3, x1=y1=50/3x_1 = y_1 = 50/3
4d Frontier slope = planner MRS Official U2/U1=2a/(1−a)U_2/U_1 = 2a/(1-a) (flagged; correct tangency gives 2(1−a)/a2(1-a)/a)