PS5
- #micro-economics-ii
- #pareto-efficiency
- #pareto-dominance
- #social-welfare
- #exchange-economy
- #mrs
- #solutions
Toolkit
- 1
Question 1. For each of the following statements, claim whether it is true or not. If true, prove your answer; if not, provide a counterexample.
The three parts below (a), (b), (c) are each answered separately.
- 1a
Consider three allocations . If is Pareto efficient and is not Pareto efficient, then Pareto dominates .
- 1b
Consider two allocations . If is Pareto efficient and is not Pareto efficient, then Pareto dominates .
- 1c
Consider two agents 1 and 2, three allocations , and a social planner whose objective function is , where is an element of and the functions and represent agent 1 and agent 2 utilities respectively.
If is Pareto efficient and is not Pareto efficient, then the social planner prefers to .
- 2
Question 2. In each part, total endowments are of good and of good , so agent 2 receives whatever agent 1 does not: , . Restrict attention to the set of allocations that satisfies , and find the Pareto efficient allocation(s) in that set.
- 2a
Consider and with totals and , and the set of allocations that satisfies . Find the Pareto efficient allocation in this set and show that it is unique.
- 2b
Consider and with and , and the set of allocations that satisfies . Find the Pareto efficient allocation in this set and show that it is unique.
- 2c
Consider and with and , and the set of allocations that satisfies . Find the set of Pareto efficient allocations in this set.
- 3
Question 3. Consider an exchange economy and a given indifference curve of agent 1. Assume that the agents' utility functions satisfy decreasing MRS. Prove the following results (without using graphical arguments).
- 3ai
(a)(i) The point on agent 1's indifference curve at which agent 2's utility is maximised is Pareto efficient.
- 3aii
(a)(ii) If a point on agent 1's indifference curve is Pareto efficient, then it is the point that maximises agent 2's utility among all the points on agent 1's indifference curve.
- 3bi
(b)(i) At a point that maximises agent 2's utility among all the points on agent 1's indifference curve, we have .
- 3bii
(b)(ii) A point on agent 1's indifference curve at which maximises agent 2's utility among all the points on agent 1's indifference curve.
Key takeaway"Pareto efficient" is a weak and negative idea: it rules out waste but says nothing about fairness, balance, or being preferred. A planner's value judgement (a Social Welfare function) is what selects among the efficient (and sometimes inefficient) allocations.
Related: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities