PS5

  1. 1

    Question 1. For each of the following statements, claim whether it is true or not. If true, prove your answer; if not, provide a counterexample.

    The three parts below (a), (b), (c) are each answered separately.

  2. 1a

    Consider three allocations {A,B,C}\{A,B,C\}. If AA is Pareto efficient and BB is not Pareto efficient, then AA Pareto dominates BB.

  3. 1b

    Consider two allocations {A,B}\{A,B\}. If AA is Pareto efficient and BB is not Pareto efficient, then AA Pareto dominates BB.

  4. 1c

    Consider two agents 1 and 2, three allocations {A,B,C}\{A,B,C\}, and a social planner whose objective function is W(K)=U1(K)⋅U2(K)W(K)=U_1(K)\cdot U_2(K), where KK is an element of {A,B,C}\{A,B,C\} and the functions U1(K)U_1(K) and U2(K)U_2(K) represent agent 1 and agent 2 utilities respectively.

    If AA is Pareto efficient and BB is not Pareto efficient, then the social planner prefers AA to BB.

  5. 2

    Question 2. In each part, total endowments are XX of good xx and YY of good yy, so agent 2 receives whatever agent 1 does not: x2=X−x1x_2=X-x_1, y2=Y−y1y_2=Y-y_1. Restrict attention to the set of allocations that satisfies U1(x1,y1)=6U_1(x_1,y_1)=6, and find the Pareto efficient allocation(s) in that set.

  6. 2a

    Consider U1(x1,y1)=x1y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1y_1 and U2(x2,y2)=x2y2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2y_2 with totals XX and YY, and the set of allocations that satisfies U1(x1,y1)=6U_1(x_1,y_1)=6. Find the Pareto efficient allocation in this set and show that it is unique.

  7. 2b

    Consider U1(x1,y1)=x1+y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1+y_1 and U2(x2,y2)=2x2+y2U_2(x_2,y_2)=2x_2+y_2 with X≥6X\ge 6 and Y≥6Y\ge 6, and the set of allocations that satisfies U1(x1,y1)=6U_1(x_1,y_1)=6. Find the Pareto efficient allocation in this set and show that it is unique.

  8. 2c

    Consider U1(x1,y1)=x1+y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1+y_1 and U2(x2,y2)=x2+y2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2+y_2 with X≥6X\ge 6 and Y≥6Y\ge 6, and the set of allocations that satisfies U1(x1,y1)=6U_1(x_1,y_1)=6. Find the set of Pareto efficient allocations in this set.

  9. 3

    Question 3. Consider an exchange economy and a given indifference curve of agent 1. Assume that the agents' utility functions satisfy decreasing MRS. Prove the following results (without using graphical arguments).

  10. 3ai

    (a)(i) The point on agent 1's indifference curve at which agent 2's utility is maximised is Pareto efficient.

  11. 3aii

    (a)(ii) If a point on agent 1's indifference curve is Pareto efficient, then it is the point that maximises agent 2's utility among all the points on agent 1's indifference curve.

  12. 3bi

    (b)(i) At a point that maximises agent 2's utility among all the points on agent 1's indifference curve, we have MRS1=MRS2MRS_1=MRS_2.

  13. 3bii

    (b)(ii) A point on agent 1's indifference curve at which MRS1=MRS2MRS_1=MRS_2 maximises agent 2's utility among all the points on agent 1's indifference curve.

Key takeaway

"Pareto efficient" is a weak and negative idea: it rules out waste but says nothing about fairness, balance, or being preferred. A planner's value judgement (a Social Welfare function) is what selects among the efficient (and sometimes inefficient) allocations.

Related: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities