Theory of the firm & costs 22
- Theory of the Firm:
How firms choose inputs and output to maximise profit. Lec 04
- Production Function:
— output obtained from labour and capital; its shape (concave , Cobb-Douglas, linear) fixes the isoquants, RTS and marginal cost. Lec 04
- Cost Function:
— minimum cost to produce units. Lec 04
- Marginal Physical Product:
Extra output from one more unit of an input, other inputs fixed. Lec 04
- Marginal Cost:
— cost of one more unit of output; a competitive firm produces where , so MC is the supply curve (rising if is convex, constant under constant returns to scale). Lec 04
- Profit Maximisation:
Firm chooses where ; SOC requires . PS 01
- Optimal Profit Function:
— profit at the optimal ; homogeneous degree 1, increasing in , decreasing in . PS 01
- Homogeneity of Degree 1:
; only relative prices matter for production decisions. PS 01
- Envelope Theorem:
(Hotelling's Lemma); derivative of value function w.r.t. a parameter equals partial derivative of objective. PS 01
- Isoquant:
Set of input bundles producing the same output. Lec 04
- RTS:
Rate of Technical Substitution: — slope of isoquant. Lec 04
- Diminishing RTS:
RTS decreases as rises along isoquant; implies convex isoquants and preference for input diversity. PS 02
- Convex Isoquant:
Isoquant bows inward; midpoint of two bundles on same isoquant lies on a higher isoquant. PS 02
- Cobb-Douglas Production Function:
; RTS ; diminishing RTS, convex isoquant. PS 02
- Quasilinear Production Function:
with concave: and , so labour is fixed at the tangency level and output beyond comes from capital (marginal cost then equals ). PP 02
- Constant Returns to Scale:
Scaling all inputs by scales output by (e.g. Cobb-Douglas with exponents summing to 1); cost is linear in output, , competitive profit is zero, and scaling a production economy's resources by scales its PPF by . PS 03
- Perfect Substitutes:
; linear isoquants; corner solution using cheaper ; bang-bang switching. PS 03
- Isocost Line:
Set of input bundles with the same total cost. Lec 04
- Cost Minimisation:
Choosing to minimise subject to . PS 03
- Tangency Condition:
Interior cost min: RTS (isocost tangent to isoquant). PS 03
- Conditional Input Demand:
Cost-minimising input quantities as functions of prices and output. PS 03
- Corner Solution:
Optimum on a boundary ( or ); arises when tangency is infeasible or violates non-negativity. PS 03
Partial equilibrium & welfare 13
- Partial Equilibrium:
Single-market equilibrium with other prices fixed. Lec 04
- Quasilinear Utility:
; no income effects on , so surplus areas are money-valued and additive. PS 04
- Consumer Surplus:
Area between demand curve and price. → Lec 04 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).
- Firm Surplus:
Area between price and supply (marginal cost) curve. Lec 04
- Social Welfare:
; total value minus cost, maximised at the competitive quantity; in general equilibrium the planner's social welfare function , increasing in each agent's utility (also called the social-welfare function). PS 04
- Deadweight Loss:
Welfare loss from a policy distorting the equilibrium quantity. Lec 04
- Marginal Cost Pricing:
Competitive firms set price equal to marginal cost (); with constant supply is a flat line and profit is zero. PS 04
- Price Ceiling:
Legal maximum price; binding if below ; creates a shortage with quantity traded = supply (also called a maximum price or price cap). PS 04
- Price Floor:
Legal minimum price (also called a minimum price or a fixed price above equilibrium); binding if above , then demand is the short side and quantity traded is demand at the floor. PS 04
- Short-Side Rule:
Under a binding price control the quantity traded is the smaller of demand and supply (also called the short side of the market): supply under a binding ceiling, demand under a binding floor. PS 04
- Efficient Rationing:
Assumption that scarce units go to the consumers who value them most (top of the demand curve), so ; random queuing would give lower welfare. PS 04
- Price Subsidy:
Per-unit payment to buyers (also consumer subsidy): consumers pay , shifting demand up by ; pushes quantity above the competitive level so exceeds marginal value on the extra units and social welfare falls. Lec 04
- Revealed Preference:
Argument bounding a value function by evaluating a new optimum at old parameters. PS 04
Exchange economy & general equilibrium 20
- General Equilibrium:
Simultaneous equilibrium across all markets. Lec 04
- Exchange Economy:
Economy with no production; agents trade endowments. Lec 04
- Edgeworth Box:
Graphical tool showing all feasible allocations for two agents and two goods. Lec 04
- MRS:
Marginal Rate of Substitution; along an indifference curve; equalised across agents at an efficient allocation. PS 05
- Local Nonsatiation:
Near any bundle there is a strictly preferred bundle; used to construct Pareto improvements. PS 05
- Pareto Efficiency:
Allocation where no agent can be made better off without making another worse off. Lec 04
- Pareto Dominance:
dominates if weakly better for all agents and strictly better for at least one. PS 05
- Contract Curve:
Set of all Pareto efficient allocations in the Edgeworth box. Lec 04
- Utility Possibility Frontier:
Pairs achievable along the contract curve (also called the utility frontier); the planner picks the tangency with the highest social-welfare indifference curve. PP 04
- Social Planner:
Hypothetical decision-maker maximising a social welfare function over feasible allocations (e.g. a Cobb-Douglas ); compared with the market equilibrium, and able to implement its choice by redistributing endowments. PS 06
- Walras' Law:
If one market clears, all other markets also clear. Lec 04
- Excess Demand:
= demand minus supply (endowment) of a good; by Walras' Law , so at non-equilibrium positive prices both goods have non-zero excess demand (a price above equilibrium gives excess supply). PP 02
- Walrasian Equilibrium:
Price ratio + allocation where each agent maximises utility on the budget line through their endowment and all markets clear; equivalently "competitive equilibrium". PS 06
- Numeraire:
Good whose price is fixed at 1 (e.g. ) so that only relative prices matter; under quasilinear utility the linear good plays this role. PS 09
- Price Indeterminacy:
With constant-returns technologies and a corner solution (or a zero-endowment agent) a whole range of price vectors clears all markets and gives zero profit, so the price is not pinned down although the real allocation is. PS 07
- Core:
Allocations that are both Pareto efficient and individually rational; the slice of the contract curve inside the lens of indifference curves through the endowment; every Walrasian equilibrium lies here. PS 07
- Individual Rationality:
No agent ends up worse than at their own endowment (); holds at any equilibrium because the endowment is always affordable. PS 07
- First Welfare Theorem:
Every competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Lec 04
- Second Welfare Theorem:
Any Pareto efficient allocation is achievable via redistribution of endowments. Lec 05
- Lump-Sum Tax:
Tax independent of the agent's choices, so it does not distort margins; the right tool for redistribution (Second Welfare Theorem) but useless for correcting an externality. → Lec 05 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).
Production economy 4
- Production Economy:
GE model with firms producing goods from inputs; efficiency requires RTS₁=RTS₂. Lec 05
- Efficiency Locus:
Set of Pareto efficient input allocations; all points where firms' isoquants are tangent. Lec 05
- PPF:
Production Possibility Frontier — all efficient output combinations. Lec 05
- RPT:
Rate of Product Transformation — opportunity cost of in terms of on the PPF. Lec 05
Externalities 6
- Externalities:
Effect of one agent's choices on another's utility/cost, not reflected in prices. Lec 05
- Market Failure:
Situation where competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. → Lec 05 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).
- Pigouvian Tax:
Per-unit tax on a negative externality set equal to marginal external harm. Lec 05
- Marginal External Damage:
Extra cost or harm that one unit of an agent's activity imposes on another at the margin; the Pigouvian tax equals it at the efficient allocation. PS 10
- Tradable Permits:
Property right over units of the externality (e.g. noise) traded at price ; the permit price plays the role of the Pigouvian tax and the initial split of permits changes who is paid, not the quantities (Coase logic). PS 10
- Coase Theorem:
With well-defined property rights and low transaction costs, markets achieve efficiency. Lec 05
Public goods 7
- Public Goods:
Good whose aggregate quantity affects every agent's utility (national security, a pool, a joint seminar paper); an externality hitting many agents at once, which causes under-provision and free riding. Lec 06
- Free Riding:
An agent invests less (or nothing) because other agents' investment already gives her the benefit; the agent who wants the good more provides it all. Lec 06
- Under-Provision:
The market provides a public good at too low a level: in Nash equilibrium at the equilibrium total, so and the gap grows with the number of agents. Lec 06
- Nash Equilibrium:
Choices where each agent's contribution is her best response to the others' and no one wants to deviate; models the free market for a public good. → Lec 06 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).
- Best Response:
Agent's optimal choice given the others' choices; for a public good , where solves . → Lec 06 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).
- Marginal Social Benefit:
Sum of all agents' marginal benefits from a public good; the planner provides it until marginal cost (1). Lec 06
- Altruistic Utility:
with : the agent internalises part of the other's utility; raises provision, and restores the social optimum. Lec 06