Theory of the firm & costs 22

  • Theory of the Firm:

    How firms choose inputs and output to maximise profit. Lec 04

  • Production Function:

    f(l,k)f(l,k) — output obtained from labour and capital; its shape (concave l\sqrt{l}, Cobb-Douglas, linear) fixes the isoquants, RTS and marginal cost. Lec 04

  • Cost Function:

    C(q)C(q) — minimum cost to produce qq units. Lec 04

  • Marginal Physical Product:

    Extra output from one more unit of an input, other inputs fixed. Lec 04

  • Marginal Cost:

    C′(x)C'(x) — cost of one more unit of output; a competitive firm produces where p=MCp = MC, so MC is the supply curve (rising if CC is convex, constant under constant returns to scale). Lec 04

  • Profit Maximisation:

    Firm chooses q∗q^* where MR=MCMR = MC; SOC requires Π′′<0\Pi'' < 0. PS 01

  • Optimal Profit Function:

    Π∗(w,p)\Pi^*(w,p) — profit at the optimal q∗q^*; homogeneous degree 1, increasing in pp, decreasing in ww. PS 01

  • Homogeneity of Degree 1:

    Π∗(tw,tp)=tΠ∗(w,p)\Pi^*(tw,tp) = t\Pi^*(w,p); only relative prices matter for production decisions. PS 01

  • Envelope Theorem:

    ∂Π∗/∂p=q∗\partial\Pi^*/\partial p = q^* (Hotelling's Lemma); derivative of value function w.r.t. a parameter equals partial derivative of objective. PS 01

  • Isoquant:

    Set of input bundles (l,k)(l,k) producing the same output. Lec 04

  • RTS:

    Rate of Technical Substitution: MPl/MPkMP_l / MP_k — slope of isoquant. Lec 04

  • Diminishing RTS:

    RTS decreases as ll rises along isoquant; implies convex isoquants and preference for input diversity. PS 02

  • Convex Isoquant:

    Isoquant bows inward; midpoint of two bundles on same isoquant lies on a higher isoquant. PS 02

  • Cobb-Douglas Production Function:

    f(l,k)=lωkεf(l,k)=l^\omega k^\varepsilon; RTS =(ω/ε)(k/l)= (\omega/\varepsilon)(k/l); diminishing RTS, convex isoquant. PS 02

  • Quasilinear Production Function:

    f=g(l)+kf = g(l) + k with gg concave: MPk=1MP_k = 1 and RTS=g′(l)RTS = g'(l), so labour is fixed at the tangency level l∗l^* and output beyond g(l∗)g(l^*) comes from capital (marginal cost then equals pkp_k). PP 02

  • Constant Returns to Scale:

    Scaling all inputs by tt scales output by tt (e.g. Cobb-Douglas with exponents summing to 1); cost is linear in output, MC=ACMC = AC, competitive profit is zero, and scaling a production economy's resources by tt scales its PPF by tt. PS 03

  • Perfect Substitutes:

    f=al+bkf=al+bk; linear isoquants; corner solution using cheaper MP/priceMP/\text{price}; bang-bang switching. PS 03

  • Isocost Line:

    Set of input bundles with the same total cost. Lec 04

  • Cost Minimisation:

    Choosing (l,k)(l,k) to minimise pll+pkkp_l l + p_k k subject to f(l,k)=q0f(l,k)=q_0. PS 03

  • Tangency Condition:

    Interior cost min: RTS =MPl/MPk=pl/pk= MP_l/MP_k = p_l/p_k (isocost tangent to isoquant). PS 03

  • Conditional Input Demand:

    Cost-minimising input quantities l(q0),k(q0)l(q_0), k(q_0) as functions of prices and output. PS 03

  • Corner Solution:

    Optimum on a boundary (l=0l=0 or k=0k=0); arises when tangency is infeasible or violates non-negativity. PS 03

Partial equilibrium & welfare 13

  • Partial Equilibrium:

    Single-market equilibrium with other prices fixed. Lec 04

  • Quasilinear Utility:

    U=v(x)+yU=v(x)+y; no income effects on xx, so surplus areas are money-valued and additive. PS 04

  • Consumer Surplus:

    Area between demand curve and price. → Lec 04 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).

  • Firm Surplus:

    Area between price and supply (marginal cost) curve. Lec 04

  • Social Welfare:

    W(x)=v(x)−C(x)W(x)=v(x)-C(x); total value minus cost, maximised at the competitive quantity; in general equilibrium the planner's social welfare function W(U1,U2)W(U_1,U_2), increasing in each agent's utility (also called the social-welfare function). PS 04

  • Deadweight Loss:

    Welfare loss from a policy distorting the equilibrium quantity. Lec 04

  • Marginal Cost Pricing:

    Competitive firms set price equal to marginal cost (p=MCp = MC); with constant MCMC supply is a flat line and profit is zero. PS 04

  • Price Ceiling:

    Legal maximum price; binding if below p∗p^*; creates a shortage with quantity traded = supply (also called a maximum price or price cap). PS 04

  • Price Floor:

    Legal minimum price (also called a minimum price or a fixed price above equilibrium); binding if above p∗p^*, then demand is the short side and quantity traded is demand at the floor. PS 04

  • Short-Side Rule:

    Under a binding price control the quantity traded is the smaller of demand and supply (also called the short side of the market): supply under a binding ceiling, demand under a binding floor. PS 04

  • Efficient Rationing:

    Assumption that scarce units go to the consumers who value them most (top of the demand curve), so CS=∫(PD−p) dxCS = \int (P^D - p)\,dx; random queuing would give lower welfare. PS 04

  • Price Subsidy:

    Per-unit payment to buyers (also consumer subsidy): consumers pay p−Δp - \Delta, shifting demand up by Δ\Delta; pushes quantity above the competitive level so MCMC exceeds marginal value on the extra units and social welfare falls. Lec 04

  • Revealed Preference:

    Argument bounding a value function by evaluating a new optimum at old parameters. PS 04

Exchange economy & general equilibrium 20

  • General Equilibrium:

    Simultaneous equilibrium across all markets. Lec 04

  • Exchange Economy:

    Economy with no production; agents trade endowments. Lec 04

  • Edgeworth Box:

    Graphical tool showing all feasible allocations for two agents and two goods. Lec 04

  • MRS:

    Marginal Rate of Substitution; −dy/dx-dy/dx along an indifference curve; equalised across agents at an efficient allocation. PS 05

  • Local Nonsatiation:

    Near any bundle there is a strictly preferred bundle; used to construct Pareto improvements. PS 05

  • Pareto Efficiency:

    Allocation where no agent can be made better off without making another worse off. Lec 04

  • Pareto Dominance:

    AA dominates BB if weakly better for all agents and strictly better for at least one. PS 05

  • Contract Curve:

    Set of all Pareto efficient allocations in the Edgeworth box. Lec 04

  • Utility Possibility Frontier:

    Pairs (U1,U2)(U_1,U_2) achievable along the contract curve (also called the utility frontier); the planner picks the tangency with the highest social-welfare indifference curve. PP 04

  • Social Planner:

    Hypothetical decision-maker maximising a social welfare function over feasible allocations (e.g. a Cobb-Douglas U1aU21−aU_1^a U_2^{1-a}); compared with the market equilibrium, and able to implement its choice by redistributing endowments. PS 06

  • Walras' Law:

    If one market clears, all other markets also clear. Lec 04

  • Excess Demand:

    zz = demand minus supply (endowment) of a good; by Walras' Law pxzx+pyzy=0p_x z_x + p_y z_y = 0, so at non-equilibrium positive prices both goods have non-zero excess demand (a price above equilibrium gives excess supply). PP 02

  • Walrasian Equilibrium:

    Price ratio + allocation where each agent maximises utility on the budget line through their endowment and all markets clear; equivalently "competitive equilibrium". PS 06

  • Numeraire:

    Good whose price is fixed at 1 (e.g. py=1p_y = 1) so that only relative prices matter; under quasilinear utility the linear good plays this role. PS 09

  • Price Indeterminacy:

    With constant-returns technologies and a corner solution (or a zero-endowment agent) a whole range of price vectors clears all markets and gives zero profit, so the price is not pinned down although the real allocation is. PS 07

  • Core:

    Allocations that are both Pareto efficient and individually rational; the slice of the contract curve inside the lens of indifference curves through the endowment; every Walrasian equilibrium lies here. PS 07

  • Individual Rationality:

    No agent ends up worse than at their own endowment (Ui≥Ui(ωi)U_i \ge U_i(\omega_i)); holds at any equilibrium because the endowment is always affordable. PS 07

  • First Welfare Theorem:

    Every competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Lec 04

  • Second Welfare Theorem:

    Any Pareto efficient allocation is achievable via redistribution of endowments. Lec 05

  • Lump-Sum Tax:

    Tax independent of the agent's choices, so it does not distort margins; the right tool for redistribution (Second Welfare Theorem) but useless for correcting an externality. → Lec 05 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).

Production economy 4

  • Production Economy:

    GE model with firms producing goods from inputs; efficiency requires RTS₁=RTS₂. Lec 05

  • Efficiency Locus:

    Set of Pareto efficient input allocations; all points where firms' isoquants are tangent. Lec 05

  • PPF:

    Production Possibility Frontier — all efficient (x,y)(x,y) output combinations. Lec 05

  • RPT:

    Rate of Product Transformation — opportunity cost of XX in terms of YY on the PPF. Lec 05

Externalities 6

  • Externalities:

    Effect of one agent's choices on another's utility/cost, not reflected in prices. Lec 05

  • Market Failure:

    Situation where competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. → Lec 05 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).

  • Pigouvian Tax:

    Per-unit tax on a negative externality set equal to marginal external harm. Lec 05

  • Marginal External Damage:

    Extra cost or harm that one unit of an agent's activity imposes on another at the margin; the Pigouvian tax equals it at the efficient allocation. PS 10

  • Tradable Permits:

    Property right over units of the externality (e.g. noise) traded at price rr; the permit price plays the role of the Pigouvian tax and the initial split of permits changes who is paid, not the quantities (Coase logic). PS 10

  • Coase Theorem:

    With well-defined property rights and low transaction costs, markets achieve efficiency. Lec 05

Public goods 7

  • Public Goods:

    Good whose aggregate quantity affects every agent's utility (national security, a pool, a joint seminar paper); an externality hitting many agents at once, which causes under-provision and free riding. Lec 06

  • Free Riding:

    An agent invests less (or nothing) because other agents' investment already gives her the benefit; the agent who wants the good more provides it all. Lec 06

  • Under-Provision:

    The market provides a public good at too low a level: in Nash equilibrium V1′+V2′>1V_1' + V_2' > 1 at the equilibrium total, so ge<g∗g^e < g^* and the gap grows with the number of agents. Lec 06

  • Nash Equilibrium:

    Choices where each agent's contribution is her best response to the others' and no one wants to deviate; models the free market for a public good. → Lec 06 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).

  • Best Response:

    Agent's optimal choice given the others' choices; for a public good BR1(g2)=max⁡(g1o−g2, 0)BR_1(g_2) = \max(g_1^o - g_2,\,0), where g1og_1^o solves V1′=1V_1' = 1. → Lec 06 Also in Micro 3 (Year 2, Sem 2).

  • Marginal Social Benefit:

    Sum of all agents' marginal benefits from a public good; the planner provides it until V1′+V2′=V_1' + V_2' = marginal cost (1). Lec 06

  • Altruistic Utility:

    V1(g)+y1+α (V2(g)+y2)V_1(g) + y_1 + \alpha\,(V_2(g) + y_2) with α≤1\alpha \le 1: the agent internalises part of the other's utility; raises provision, and α=1\alpha = 1 restores the social optimum. Lec 06