Micro 2 Example Final Exam (2023 practice exam, not a real sitting) · Dr. Boaz Zik · worked-solution

Corner Solutions, Efficiency Locus, PPF & Fixed Price (2023 Example Exam)

Corner Solutions, Efficiency Locus, PPF & Fixed Price (2023 Example Exam)

Part of: Micro-Economics II Micro 2 Example Final Exam (2023), Micro-Economics II, Dr. Boaz Zik. A practice exam, not a real sitting. 3 hours, cheat sheet and calculator allowed. Part 1 = 10 true/false statements (5 points each), Q2 = 25 points, Q3 = 25 points. Builds on: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities Practice: PS_02-Isoquants, RTS & Properties of the Profit Function, PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings, PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare, PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner, PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation

Source

Answers follow the TA recitation "Micro 2 - 2023, Recitation 12 - Example Exam" (Yosi Ganel, 41 slides). The 2026 version of that recitation was not needed. Where the recitation gives a setup but no explicit verdict, that is flagged and the verdict is completed from its own working.

What this paper tests

Part Core idea Where it is taught
Part 1 (1), (7) Perfect Substitutes technology: corner cost minimisation, comparing RTS with the input price ratio PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function
Part 1 (2), (4), (10) Contract Curve of Cobb-Douglas agents: what its shape says about preferences PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner
Part 1 (3) Profit maximisation with increasing marginal cost Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium
Part 1 (5) PPF depends on technology, not on tastes PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation
Part 1 (6) Pareto Efficiency vs Pareto Dominance vs a social planner's ranking PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare
Part 1 (8) Externalities and Pareto efficiency Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities
Part 1 (9), Q3 Partial Equilibrium with a fixed price: Consumer Surplus, Firm Surplus, Social Welfare PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings
Q2 Production Economy: Efficiency Locus, PPF, optimal allocation, equilibrium prices Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities, PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation
Intuition: the one move behind each part
  • True/false: for a "necessarily" or "always" claim, one counterexample makes it false. For "the contract curve is a line", go back to MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2.
  • Q2: find where the two firms' RTS are equal (efficiency locus), turn it into a PPF, then set RPT=MRSRPT = MRS.
  • Q3: demand is marginal utility, supply is marginal cost; a fixed price above equilibrium means the short side (demand) sets the quantity.

Part 1 — True or false (50 points, 5 points each)

(1) Higher pl/pkp_l/p_k and the same output x0x_0

Statement. A firm makes x0x_0 from capital and labour. The ratio pl/pkp_l/p_k rises and the firm keeps producing x0x_0. After the change the firm necessarily uses less labour and more capital.

Answer: False

Why. "Necessarily" fails for a technology with corner solutions. Take f(l,k)=a l+b kf(l,k) = a\,l + b\,k (Perfect Substitutes). When pl/pkp_l/p_k rises, the firm can:

  • switch from the corner "labour only" to the corner "capital only", or
  • stay at the same corner (only ll, or only kk), where usage does not change at all.

So labour does not have to fall and capital does not have to rise.

Intuition

With smooth (Cobb-Douglas) isoquants a higher pl/pkp_l/p_k does shift the firm towards capital. The statement is only false because the claim covers every technology. See the bang-bang behaviour in PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function.

(2) Agent 2's taste parameter moves from aa to b>ab > a

Statement. U1=x1ay11−aU_1 = x_1^a y_1^{1-a} and U2=x2ay21−aU_2 = x_2^a y_2^{1-a}, resources Xˉ,Yˉ\bar X, \bar Y. Agent 2's utility changes to x2by21−bx_2^b y_2^{1-b} with a<b<1a<b<1. Any interior allocation on the old contract curve is no longer Pareto efficient.

Answer: True

The recitation sets up the two contract curves and the check but stops before stating the verdict. The verdict below is completed from its working.

Before the change. MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 gives

a y1(1−a) x1=a y2(1−a) x2  ⇒  y1x1=y2x2=Yˉ−y1Xˉ−x1\frac{a\,y_1}{(1-a)\,x_1} = \frac{a\,y_2}{(1-a)\,x_2} \;\Rightarrow\; \frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{y_2}{x_2} = \frac{\bar Y - y_1}{\bar X - x_1}

Cross-multiplying, Xˉy1=Yˉx1\bar X y_1 = \bar Y x_1: the old contract curve is the diagonal of the Edgeworth Box.

After the change. The condition becomes

a y1(1−a) x1=b (Yˉ−y1)(1−b) (Xˉ−x1)\frac{a\,y_1}{(1-a)\,x_1} = \frac{b\,(\bar Y - y_1)}{(1-b)\,(\bar X - x_1)}

Check an old point. Take any interior point (x~1,y~1)(\tilde x_1, \tilde y_1) on the old diagonal. There y~1x~1=Yˉ−y~1Xˉ−x~1\frac{\tilde y_1}{\tilde x_1} = \frac{\bar Y - \tilde y_1}{\bar X - \tilde x_1}, so the common ratio y/xy/x cancels from both sides and the new condition would need

a1−a=b1−b\frac{a}{1-a} = \frac{b}{1-b}

But a1−a\frac{a}{1-a} is strictly increasing in aa, so a<ba<b gives a1−a<b1−b\frac{a}{1-a} < \frac{b}{1-b}. The MRS are not equal at the old point, so it is no longer Pareto efficient.

Intuition

The diagonal was efficient only because both agents had the same tastes. Once agent 2 values xx relatively more, trade is possible at every interior diagonal point (agent 2 buys xx from agent 1 for yy). The edge points are excluded because there one agent holds nothing of a good and the MRS comparison is not interior.

(3) C′(0)>pC'(0) > p and C′′(x)>0C''(x) > 0

Answer: True

The marginal cost of the very first unit already exceeds the price. Since C′′>0C''>0, marginal cost is rising, so every further unit costs even more. At every positive quantity the firm would make a loss on the margin, so the profit-maximising quantity is 0.

(4) Two exchange economies with aa vs bb

Statement. Economy 1: both agents have xay1−ax^a y^{1-a}. Economy 2: both agents have xby1−bx^b y^{1-b}, with 0<a<b<10<a<b<1. Resources Xˉ=50\bar X = 50, Yˉ=70\bar Y = 70 in both. The contract curve is the same.

Answer: True

Again the recitation derives both contract curves, finds them identical, and does not print the word "True".

In economy 1:

a y1(1−a) x1=a y2(1−a) x2  ⇒  y1x1=70−y150−x1  ⇒  x1=50 y170\frac{a\,y_1}{(1-a)\,x_1} = \frac{a\,y_2}{(1-a)\,x_2} \;\Rightarrow\; \frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{70 - y_1}{50 - x_1} \;\Rightarrow\; x_1 = \frac{50\,y_1}{70}

In economy 2 the same steps give the same equation, because b1−b\frac{b}{1-b} cancels exactly as a1−a\frac{a}{1-a} did. When the two agents have identical preferences, the contract curve is the box diagonal whatever the parameter is.

Contrast with (2)

(4) changes both agents together, so the tastes stay identical and the curve does not move. (2) changes only agent 2, so the tastes diverge and the curve moves.

(5) Representative consumer's aa rises to bb: does the PPF shift?

Answer: False

The PPF depends only on technology and resource endowments. The consumer's utility chooses which point on the PPF is produced (the tangency RPT=MRSRPT = MRS), but it does not move the frontier itself.

(6) Efficient aa, inefficient bb, planner prefers aa

Statement. If a social planner prefers allocation aa (Pareto efficient) to bb (not efficient), then aa Pareto dominates bb.

Answer: False

Counterexample (official). U1=x1y1U_1 = x_1 y_1, U2=x2y2U_2 = x_2 y_2, endowments (10,10)(10,10) each, planner welfare W=U1⋅U2W = U_1 \cdot U_2. The contract curve is x1=y1x_1 = y_1.

Allocation (x1,y1)(x_1,y_1), (x2,y2)(x_2,y_2) On contract curve? U1U_1 U2U_2 WW
aa (10,10)(10,10), (10,10)(10,10) yes, Pareto efficient 100 100 10,000
bb (1,2)(1,2), (19,18)(19,18) no (y1/x1=2≠18/19y_1/x_1 = 2 \ne 18/19), not efficient 2 342 684

The planner prefers aa to bb (10,000 vs 684), yet agent 2 is worse off at aa (100<342100 < 342). So aa does not Pareto dominate bb.

Intuition

Pareto Dominance needs every agent weakly better off. A planner's score trades one agent's gain against another's loss, so it can rank aa higher while someone loses. See PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare.

(7) f=2l+3kf = 2l + 3k, pl=4p_l = 4, pk=5p_k = 5, output 6

Statement. The firm uses only labour.

Answer: False
RTS=MPlMPk=23,plpk=45RTS = \frac{MP_l}{MP_k} = \frac23, \qquad \frac{p_l}{p_k} = \frac45

Since 23<45\frac23 < \frac45, labour is relatively too expensive for what it delivers: the firm uses only capital (k=6/3=2k = 6/3 = 2).

Intuition: output per dollar

Labour gives 24=0.5\frac{2}{4} = 0.5 units per dollar, capital gives 35=0.6\frac{3}{5} = 0.6 units per dollar. Capital is the better buy, so the corner is "capital only". This is the same test as apl\frac{a}{p_l} vs bpk\frac{b}{p_k} for perfect substitutes.

(8) Exchange economy with externalities

Statement. The equilibrium is necessarily not Pareto efficient.

Answer: False

Use the whisky and cigars example from the lecture (Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities). There can be a situation where, at every point in the box, the marginal utility gain from smoking one more cigar is larger than the damage it does to the other agent. Then cutting a cigar would lower total benefit, so the equilibrium is still efficient.

Exam trap

"Externality" does not automatically mean "market failure". Inefficiency arises only when the external damage outweighs the private gain at the margin. The word "necessarily" is the clue that a single counterexample is enough.

(9) A maximal price always raises consumer surplus

Answer: False

A Price Ceiling has two opposing effects on Consumer Surplus:

  • the lower price raises surplus on every unit still bought;
  • the lower quantity (a binding ceiling cuts quantity traded to what firms supply) loses surplus on the units that are no longer sold.

The net effect can go either way, so "always" is false. The recitation points to the problem set on this topic; in this vault that is PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings (the recitation calls it "Problem set 3", a numbering mismatch).

(10) Straight-line contract curve

Statement. U1=x1ay11−aU_1 = x_1^a y_1^{1-a} and U2=c (x2by21−b)U_2 = c\,(x_2^b y_2^{1-b}). The contract curve is a straight line (a diagonal, as the box figure shows). Then we must have b=ab = a.

Answer: True

If b≠ab \neq a, the tangency condition

a y1(1−a) x1=b y2(1−b) x2\frac{a\,y_1}{(1-a)\,x_1} = \frac{b\,y_2}{(1-b)\,x_2}

does not reduce to y1x1=y2x2\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{y_2}{x_2}, so the contract curve is not the straight diagonal. Only b=ab = a gives the line. The constant cc scales utility but does not enter the MRS.


Q2 — Production economy (25 points)

Firms: f1(l1,k1)=2 l11/3k12/3f_1(l_1,k_1) = 2\,l_1^{1/3}k_1^{2/3} and f2(l2,k2)=2 l21/3k22/3f_2(l_2,k_2) = 2\,l_2^{1/3}k_2^{2/3} (firm 1 makes XX, firm 2 makes YY). The representative consumer has U(x,y)=x1/3y2/3U(x,y) = x^{1/3}y^{2/3}. Resources: k1+k2=50k_1 + k_2 = 50 and l1+l2=50l_1 + l_2 = 50.

Typos in the printed question and recitation

The question prints the utility as x1/3l2/3x^{1/3}l^{2/3}; the second good is yy (U=x1/3y2/3U = x^{1/3}y^{2/3}), as the solution uses. The recitation also labels firm 2's function "f1(l2,k2)f_1(l_2,k_2)"; it is f2f_2.

a. Efficiency locus (5 points)

Answer

k1=l1k_1 = l_1

Marginal products of firm 1:

MPl1=2 l1−2/3k12/33,MPk1=4 l11/3k1−1/33MP_{l_1} = \frac{2\,l_1^{-2/3}k_1^{2/3}}{3}, \qquad MP_{k_1} = \frac{4\,l_1^{1/3}k_1^{-1/3}}{3}
RTS1=MPl1MPk1=k12 l1,RTS2=k22 l2RTS_1 = \frac{MP_{l_1}}{MP_{k_1}} = \frac{k_1}{2\,l_1}, \qquad RTS_2 = \frac{k_2}{2\,l_2}

Equate the RTS and substitute k2=50−k1k_2 = 50 - k_1, l2=50−l1l_2 = 50 - l_1:

k12 l1=50−k12 (50−l1)  ⇒  k1=l1\frac{k_1}{2\,l_1} = \frac{50 - k_1}{2\,(50 - l_1)} \;\Rightarrow\; k_1 = l_1

PP03_q2_efficiency_locus

The efficiency locus is the diagonal of the input box. The dot marks the optimum found in part c.

Intuition

Both firms have the same Cobb-Douglas exponents, so their RTS are equal exactly when both use the same capital-labour ratio. With the same totals of 50 each, that is the diagonal. Same logic as the identical-agents contract curve in Part 1. See PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation.

b. Production possibility frontier (5 points)

Answer

y=100−xy = 100 - x

On the locus k1=l1k_1 = l_1:

x=2 l11/3l12/3=2 l1x = 2\,l_1^{1/3}l_1^{2/3} = 2\,l_1
y=2 (50−l1)1/3(50−l1)2/3=2 (50−l1)=100−2 l1=100−xy = 2\,(50 - l_1)^{1/3}(50 - l_1)^{2/3} = 2\,(50 - l_1) = 100 - 2\,l_1 = 100 - x

c. Optimal allocation (5 points)

Answer

x∗=1003x^* = \tfrac{100}{3}, y∗=2003y^* = \tfrac{200}{3}, l1∗=k1∗=503l_1^* = k_1^* = \tfrac{50}{3}, l2∗=k2∗=1003l_2^* = k_2^* = \tfrac{100}{3}

The slope of the PPF gives the RPT:

RPT=1RPT = 1

The consumer's MRS:

MRS=y2xMRS = \frac{y}{2x}

Set RPT=MRSRPT = MRS and use the PPF:

1=y2x  ⇒  y=2x,2x=100−x  ⇒  x=1003,  y=20031 = \frac{y}{2x} \;\Rightarrow\; y = 2x, \qquad 2x = 100 - x \;\Rightarrow\; x = \frac{100}{3},\; y = \frac{200}{3}

Inputs follow from x=2 l1x = 2\,l_1, so l1=k1=503l_1 = k_1 = \frac{50}{3} and l2=k2=50−503=1003l_2 = k_2 = 50 - \frac{50}{3} = \frac{100}{3}.

PP03_q2_ppf_optimum

The planner picks the point where the consumer's indifference curve just touches the PPF.

d. Equilibrium prices (5 points)

Answer

px∗=1p_x^* = 1, py∗=1p_y^* = 1, pl∗=23p_l^* = \tfrac23, pk∗=43p_k^* = \tfrac43

Output prices. At the optimum the consumer's MRS equals the price ratio:

MRS(x∗,y∗)=y∗2x∗=200/32⋅100/3=1=px∗MRS(x^*,y^*) = \frac{y^*}{2x^*} = \frac{200/3}{2 \cdot 100/3} = 1 = p_x^*

with py=1p_y = 1 as the numeraire.

Input prices. Firm 1's RTS equals the input price ratio:

RTS(k1∗,l1∗)=k12 l1=12=pl∗pk∗RTS(k_1^*, l_1^*) = \frac{k_1}{2\,l_1} = \frac12 = \frac{p_l^*}{p_k^*}

Firm 1's cost function. From k12l1=plpk\frac{k_1}{2 l_1} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} we get k1=2 l1 plpkk_1 = 2\,l_1\,\frac{p_l}{p_k}. Substituting into x=2 l11/3k12/3x = 2\,l_1^{1/3}k_1^{2/3}:

x=25/3 l1(plpk)2/3x = 2^{5/3}\,l_1\left(\frac{p_l}{p_k}\right)^{2/3}

so the conditional input demands are

l1=x25/3(pkpl)2/3,k1=x22/3(plpk)1/3l_1 = \frac{x}{2^{5/3}}\left(\frac{p_k}{p_l}\right)^{2/3}, \qquad k_1 = \frac{x}{2^{2/3}}\left(\frac{p_l}{p_k}\right)^{1/3}
C(x)=pl x25/3(pkpl)2/3+pk x22/3(plpk)1/3C(x) = p_l\,\frac{x}{2^{5/3}}\left(\frac{p_k}{p_l}\right)^{2/3} + p_k\,\frac{x}{2^{2/3}}\left(\frac{p_l}{p_k}\right)^{1/3}

and C′(x)C'(x) is the same expression with xx removed. At plpk=12\frac{p_l}{p_k} = \frac12 (so pkpl=2\frac{p_k}{p_l} = 2) this simplifies to

C′(x)=pl2+pk2C'(x) = \frac{p_l}{2} + \frac{p_k}{2}

In equilibrium px∗=C′(x∗)p_x^* = C'(x^*) with px∗=1p_x^* = 1:

1=pl+pk2  ⇒  pl+pk=21 = \frac{p_l + p_k}{2} \;\Rightarrow\; p_l + p_k = 2

With pk=2 plp_k = 2\,p_l: 3 pl=23\,p_l = 2, so pl∗=23p_l^* = \frac23 and pk∗=43p_k^* = \frac43.

Intuition

Quick check: the firm's revenue at the optimum is pxx∗=1003p_x x^* = \frac{100}{3}, its input bill is 23⋅503+43⋅503=1003\frac23\cdot\frac{50}{3} + \frac43\cdot\frac{50}{3} = \frac{100}{3}. Zero profit, as expected for constant returns to scale.

e. Proportions with U=xay1−aU = x^a y^{1-a} (5 points)

Answer

x=100 ax = 100\,a and y=100 (1−a)y = 100\,(1-a), i.e. xy=a1−a\dfrac{x}{y} = \dfrac{a}{1-a}

RPT=1=a y(1−a) x=MRS  ⇒  xy=a1−aRPT = 1 = \frac{a\,y}{(1-a)\,x} = MRS \;\Rightarrow\; \frac{x}{y} = \frac{a}{1-a}

With y=100−xy = 100 - x:

(1−a) x=a (100−x)  ⇒  x=100 a(1-a)\,x = a\,(100 - x) \;\Rightarrow\; x = 100\,a

so y=100 (1−a)y = 100\,(1 - a). For a=13a = \tfrac13 this reproduces part c.

Intuition

The PPF is a straight line of slope −1-1 (constant RPT), so the Cobb-Douglas consumer simply spends the expenditure share aa on xx: the output share of xx is aa.


Q3 — Partial equilibrium with a fixed price (25 points)

Demand comes from a representative consumer with quasilinear utility 100x−x2+y100x - x^2 + y (yy is money). Supply comes from a firm with f(l,k)=l1/4k1/4f(l,k) = l^{1/4}k^{1/4}, pl=pk=12p_l = p_k = \tfrac12.

Setup used in every part

For Quasilinear Utility the inverse demand is the marginal utility, PD(x)=100−2xP^D(x) = 100 - 2x. The inverse supply is marginal cost, PS(x)=C′(x)P^S(x) = C'(x).

a. Cost function (5 points)

Answer

C(x)=x2C(x) = x^2

The tangency condition:

RTS=kl=plpk=1  ⇒  k=lRTS = \frac{k}{l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; k = l

On the isoquant x=l1/4k1/4=l1/2x = l^{1/4}k^{1/4} = l^{1/2}, so l(x)=k(x)=x2l(x) = k(x) = x^2 and

C(x)=12 x2+12 x2=x2,C′(x)=2xC(x) = \frac12\,x^2 + \frac12\,x^2 = x^2, \qquad C'(x) = 2x

b. Equilibrium (5 points)

Answer

xe=25x^e = 25, pe=50p^e = 50

PD=100−2x=2x=PS  ⇒  xe=25,  pe=50P^D = 100 - 2x = 2x = P^S \;\Rightarrow\; x^e = 25,\; p^e = 50

Competitive-equilibrium benchmarks (used in part c):

Quantity Calculation Value
Social Welfare ∫025(100−2x−2x) dx=100⋅25−2⋅252=2500−1250\int_0^{25}(100 - 2x - 2x)\,dx = 100\cdot25 - 2\cdot25^2 = 2500 - 1250 1,250
Consumer Surplus ∫025(100−2x−50) dx=1250−625\int_0^{25}(100 - 2x - 50)\,dx = 1250 - 625 625
Firm Surplus ∫025(50−2x) dx=1250−625\int_0^{25}(50 - 2x)\,dx = 1250 - 625 625

c. Government fixes the price at 60 (10 points)

Answer

Quantity x=20x = 20. Consumer surplus 400 (down from 625), firm surplus 800 (up from 625), social welfare 1,200 (down from 1,250).

At p=60p = 60, supply would be 2x=60⇒x=302x = 60 \Rightarrow x = 30 but demand is only 100−2x=60⇒x=20100 - 2x = 60 \Rightarrow x = 20. There is excess supply, so the quantity traded is the short side, demand: x=20x = 20.

Quantity Calculation Value vs equilibrium
Social Welfare ∫020(100−4x) dx=2000−800\int_0^{20}(100 - 4x)\,dx = 2000 - 800 1,200 falls (<1250< 1250)
Consumer Surplus ∫020(100−2x−60) dx=40⋅20−400\int_0^{20}(100 - 2x - 60)\,dx = 40\cdot20 - 400 400 falls (<625< 625)
Firm Surplus ∫020(60−2x) dx=60⋅20−400\int_0^{20}(60 - 2x)\,dx = 60\cdot20 - 400 800 rises (>625> 625)

Check: 400+800=1200400 + 800 = 1200, so the Deadweight Loss is 1250−1200=501250 - 1200 = 50.

PP03_q3_fixed_price_surplus

Left: a price of 60 (quantity 20). Consumers lose, firms gain. Right: a price of 90 (quantity 5), where firm surplus falls to 425.

d. Government fixes the price at 90 (5 points)

Answer

No, the firm does not benefit: its surplus falls from 625 to 425.

At p=90p = 90: demand gives 100−2x=90100 - 2x = 90, so x=5x = 5 (again excess supply, demand is the short side).

Firm surplus=∫05(90−2x) dx=90⋅5−25=425<625\text{Firm surplus} = \int_0^5 (90 - 2x)\,dx = 90\cdot5 - 25 = 425 < 625

Economic explanation (official). The price is higher, but the quantity sold is much lower. For the producer there is a trade-off between price and quantity: the extra margin on 5 units does not make up for the surplus lost on the 20 units that are no longer sold.

Intuition: where the break-even sits (my addition, not in the official solution)

For any fixed price p~\tilde p above 50, x=100−p~2x = \frac{100 - \tilde p}{2} and firm surplus is (100−p~)(3p~−100)4\frac{(100 - \tilde p)(3\tilde p - 100)}{4}. This equals 625 at p~=50\tilde p = 50 (the equilibrium) and again at p~=2503≈83.3\tilde p = \frac{250}{3} \approx 83.3, and is higher in between (for example 800 at 60). So 60 helps the firm and 90 hurts it, consistent with the official answers.


Recap table

Part Tool One-line answer
P1 (1) Corner solutions False: the firm may switch corner or stay put
P1 (2) Contract curve before and after True (verdict completed from the working): old diagonal has unequal MRS once a<ba<b
P1 (3) Rising MC with C′(0)>pC'(0) > p True: optimal quantity is 0
P1 (4) Identical agents give the diagonal True: both economies have the same contract curve
P1 (5) PPF vs tastes False: tastes pick the point, not the frontier
P1 (6) Counterexample with planner W=U1U2W = U_1U_2 False: 10,000 vs 684 but agent 2 loses
P1 (7) RTS vs pl/pkp_l/p_k False: 23<45\frac23 < \frac45, only capital
P1 (8) Whisky and cigars False: marginal gain can exceed damage
P1 (9) Price vs quantity effect on CS False: lower price but lower quantity
P1 (10) MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 True: a straight line needs b=ab = a
Q2a Equate RTS k1=l1k_1 = l_1
Q2b Substitute into f1,f2f_1, f_2 y=100−xy = 100 - x
Q2c RPT=MRSRPT = MRS x=1003x = \frac{100}{3}, y=2003y = \frac{200}{3}
Q2d MRS = pxp_x, px=MCp_x = MC px=py=1p_x = p_y = 1, pl=23p_l = \frac23, pk=43p_k = \frac43
Q2e Same, general aa x=100ax = 100a, y=100(1−a)y = 100(1-a)
Q3a RTS = price ratio C=x2C = x^2
Q3b PD=PSP^D = P^S x=25x = 25, p=50p = 50
Q3c Fixed price 60, short side CS=400CS = 400, FS=800FS = 800, W=1200W = 1200
Q3d Fixed price 90 FS=425<625FS = 425 < 625: firm loses