Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed A (February 2025) · Dr. Boaz Zik · worked-solution

Quasilinear Production Economy, Exchange Equilibrium & Price Controls (2025 Moed A)

Quasilinear Production Economy, Exchange Equilibrium & Price Controls (2025 Moed A)

Part of: Micro-Economics II Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed A (February 2025), Micro-Economics II, Dr. Boaz Zik. 3 hours, calculator only. Part 1 is 10 true/false statements (50 points); Q2 is 25 points; Q3 is 25 points. Builds on: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities Practice: PS_02-Isoquants, RTS & Properties of the Profit Function, PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings, PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare, PS_07-Core, Corner Endowments & Equilibrium vs the Social Planner, PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation

Source

Answers follow the official solutions: the 4-page Part 1 file and the 24-page open-question slides (Q2 and Q3). Where the official text has a typo or a gap, the answer is kept and a > [!warning] callout flags it.

Question text transcribed from a scan

The question paper is an image-only scan with no text layer. All question text below was transcribed by hand from the rendered pages and cross-checked against the statements restated in the solution files. If a symbol looks odd (for example "a<0<1a<0<1" in statement 4, which is printed that way in the scan), the note says so.

What this paper tests

Intuition: the one move behind each part
  • Part 1: every statement is a "never/necessarily" claim, so one counter-example kills it. Look for the extreme case (price near zero, a lopsided allocation).
  • Q2: with a linear PPF the optimum is a corner unless the consumer's MRS happens to equal the RPT. Compare MRS with RPT.
  • Q3: a fixed price sets the quantity at the short side of the market. Here both prices give x=15x = 15, so welfare is identical and only the split of surplus changes.

Part 1 — True or false (50 points, 5 each)

The instructions say each answer needs a written argument; an answer without one scores zero.

(1) Same isoquant, shifted bundle — False

Statement. f(l,k)=l⋅kf(l,k) = l\cdot k. Bundles (lA,kA)(l_A,k_A) and (lB,kB)(l_B,k_B) lie on the same isoquant. Then f(lA,kA)=f(lB,kB)<f(lA+1, kB+1)f(l_A,k_A) = f(l_B,k_B) < f(l_A+1,\,k_B+1).

Answer

False. Counter-example: (lA,kA)=(1,9)(l_A,k_A) = (1,9) and (lB,kB)=(9,1)(l_B,k_B) = (9,1).

Both bundles give f=9f = 9, but the bundle (lA+1, kB+1)=(2,2)(l_A+1,\,k_B+1) = (2,2) gives f=4<9f = 4 < 9, which is a lower isoquant.

Intuition

The statement adds one unit of each input, but it mixes lAl_A with kBk_B. When the two bundles are far apart, lAl_A is small and kBk_B is small, so "adding one" to the wrong pair does not help much. The claim would be safe only for the same bundle: (l+1,k+1)(l+1,k+1) always beats (l,k)(l,k) here.

(2) Pareto dominance and a Pareto efficient allocation — False

Statement. If AA Pareto dominates BB and CC is Pareto efficient, then CC Pareto dominates BB.

Answer

False. Counter-example (utilities):

Allocation Agent 1 Agent 2
A 10 10
B 9 9
C 100 0

AA dominates BB (both agents strictly better). CC is Pareto efficient (agent 1 gets everything). But CC does not dominate BB: agent 2 gets 0<90 < 9.

Intuition

"Pareto efficient" says nothing about being better than a particular allocation. Efficient allocations can be extremely unequal, and some of them leave one agent worse off than at BB. Only the efficient allocations that make everyone at least as well off as at BB dominate it.

(3) Change in the consumer's preferences — False

Statement. In a production economy the representative consumer's utility moves from U(x,y)=xay1−aU(x,y) = x^a y^{1-a} to U(x,y)=xby1−bU(x,y) = x^b y^{1-b} with b<ab<a. In the figure (an Edgeworth box of the two firms' inputs, with the blue efficiency locus as the diagonal), point AA is the optimal input allocation before the change and BB is the allocation after. True or false?

Answer

False. The figure shows a move to more XX and less YY, but the change should do the opposite.

The PPF is the same before and after, because only preferences changed, not technology. With b<ab<a the consumer weights yy more heavily (the exponent on yy rises from 1−a1-a to 1−b1-b). The new optimum on the same PPF therefore has less XX and more YY. The figure moves A→BA \to B along the locus in the direction of more XX, so it cannot be right.

Intuition

Moving along the Efficiency Locus is moving along the PPF. A taste shift towards yy must slide the economy towards yy.

(4) Equilibrium never equals the endowment — True

Statement. U1=x1ay11−aU_1 = x_1^{a} y_1^{1-a} and U2=4⋅x2ay21−aU_2 = 4\cdot x_2^{a} y_2^{1-a}, with a<0<1a<0<1 (as printed; clearly meant 0<a<10<a<1). Endowments: ω1=(20,30)\omega_1 = (20,30), ω2=(30,20)\omega_2 = (30,20). The equilibrium allocation never equals the endowment allocation.

Answer

True. The contract curve is the straight line y1=x1y_1 = x_1 for any aa, and the endowment is not on it.

The two agents have the same Cobb-Douglas shares (the factor 4 does not change the MRS). So MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 gives y1x1=y2x2\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{y_2}{x_2}, i.e. each agent holds the same ratio as the economy as a whole: YX=5050=1\frac{Y}{X} = \frac{50}{50} = 1, so y1=x1y_1 = x_1. A competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient (First Welfare Theorem), so it lies on this line. The endowment ω1=(20,30)\omega_1 = (20,30) has ω1y=30≠20=ω1x\omega_{1y} = 30 \neq 20 = \omega_{1x}, so it is off the line.

Intuition

At the endowment agent 1 holds y/x=1.5y/x = 1.5 and agent 2 holds y/x=2/3y/x = 2/3. Their MRSs differ, so there are gains from trade and the endowment cannot be an equilibrium.

(5) An allocation not Pareto dominated — False

Statement. Same preferences, X‾=10\overline{X} = 10, Y‾=40\overline{Y} = 40. The allocation (x1,y1)=(1,5)(x_1,y_1) = (1,5), (x2,y2)=(9,35)(x_2,y_2) = (9,35) is not Pareto dominated by any allocation.

Answer

False. The contract curve is y1=4x1y_1 = 4x_1, and (1,5)(1,5) is not on it, so the allocation is not Pareto efficient, hence it is Pareto dominated by some allocation.

Same logic as (4): y1x1=YX=4\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{Y}{X} = 4. At (1,5)(1,5) the ratio is 5≠45 \ne 4. By definition, an allocation that is not Pareto efficient is dominated by some feasible allocation.

(6) A maximal price improves consumer surplus — False

Statement. In the partial equilibrium model, setting a maximal price necessarily improves consumer surplus.

Answer

False. Take increasing marginal cost and a ceiling close to zero.

The firm then supplies almost nothing, so quantity traded is almost zero and consumer surplus is almost zero. Without the ceiling, consumer surplus at the equilibrium price is strictly positive. So the ceiling made consumers worse off.

Intuition

A ceiling gives consumers a lower price on the units still traded but cuts the number of units. For a mild ceiling the first effect wins; for a harsh one the second does. "Necessarily" is the word that makes the statement false. See Price Ceiling.

(7) A minimal price impairs consumer surplus — True

Statement. In the partial equilibrium model, setting a minimal price necessarily impairs consumer surplus.

Answer

True. A minimum price forces the market price strictly above the equilibrium price, so consumer surplus is smaller than at equilibrium.

Two things hurt consumers at once: they pay more per unit, and the quantity traded falls (the short side is demand). Both effects reduce the area under the demand curve and above the price.

Reading of "minimal price"

The official solution treats the floor as binding (set above the equilibrium price). A floor at or below equilibrium changes nothing, so consumer surplus would be unchanged rather than lower. State the binding assumption in your answer.

(8) Constant marginal cost and a demand increase — False

Statement. The firm's cost function is C(x)=a⋅xC(x) = a\cdot x, a>0a>0. An increase in demand raises the firm's equilibrium profit.

Answer

False. Marginal cost is the constant C′(x)=aC'(x) = a, so in equilibrium p=ap = a and the firm earns zero profit whatever the demand.

Demand moves quantity, not price. Each unit sells at marginal cost, so profit per unit is zero.

Intuition

Same logic as the perfect-substitutes supply in PP_04: a flat supply curve leaves no surplus for the firm.

(9) Forced quantities and the efficiency locus — False

Statement. In an equilibrium of a production economy, firm 1 (2) is required to produce xx (yy) different from the equilibrium quantity x∗x^* (y∗y^*). The demanded quantities of labour and capital necessarily correspond to a point on the efficiency locus.

Answer

False. As in the class proof that the equilibrium allocation is optimal, equilibrium prices only clear the input markets at the equilibrium quantities.

At other forced quantities, the firms' cost-minimising demands at those prices need not add up to the available inputs: one input is over-demanded and the other under-demanded. Inputs would not be fully allocated, so the point is not on the Efficiency Locus.

(10) MRS above RPT — False

Statement. On the PPF at a point where the consumer's MRS is strictly greater than the RPT, the amount of XX is greater than under the optimal allocation.

Answer

False. The amount of XX at that point is smaller than at the optimum.

If MRS>RPTMRS > RPT, the consumer values an extra unit of XX (in terms of YY) more than the economy has to give up to produce it. The economy should move along the PPF towards more XX and less YY, so the optimal XX is greater than at this point.


Q2 — Production economy with quasilinear utility (25 points)

Setup. Two firms: f1(l1,k1)=l1ak11−af_1(l_1,k_1) = l_1^{a}k_1^{1-a} and f2(l2,k2)=l2ak21−af_2(l_2,k_2) = l_2^{a}k_2^{1-a}, 0<a<10<a<1. The representative consumer has U(x,y)=c⋅x+yU(x,y) = c\cdot x + y. Resources: k1+k2=50k_1+k_2 = 50 and l1+l2=50l_1+l_2 = 50. Firm 1 makes XX, firm 2 makes YY.

A stray "b" in the official slides

The printed question has no bb in f2f_2, but the official slides carry a factor bb in y=b (50−l1)y = b\,(50-l_1) and in the corner answer y=50by = 50b. The slide that gives the PPF drops it (y=50−xy = 50 - x), and the later answers (y=4934y = 49\tfrac34, y=9934y = 99\tfrac34) also use b=1b=1. This note follows the printed question, so b=1b = 1. See the "Economic reasoning" box in part 2 for the role bb plays when it is present.

1a — Efficiency locus (3 points)

Answer

k1=l1k_1 = l_1 (the diagonal of the input box).

MPl1=a l1a−1k11−a,MPk1=(1−a) l1ak1−aMP_{l_1} = a\,l_1^{a-1}k_1^{1-a}, \qquad MP_{k_1} = (1-a)\,l_1^{a}k_1^{-a}
RTS1=MPl1MPk1=a k1(1−a) l1,RTS2=a k2(1−a) l2RTS_1 = \frac{MP_{l_1}}{MP_{k_1}} = \frac{a\,k_1}{(1-a)\,l_1}, \qquad RTS_2 = \frac{a\,k_2}{(1-a)\,l_2}

Efficiency needs RTS1=RTS2RTS_1 = RTS_2 (see Efficiency Locus), so k1l1=k2l2=50−k150−l1\frac{k_1}{l_1} = \frac{k_2}{l_2} = \frac{50-k_1}{50-l_1}. Cross-multiplying: k1(50−l1)=l1(50−k1)k_1(50-l_1) = l_1(50-k_1), so 50k1=50l150k_1 = 50l_1, i.e. k1=l1k_1 = l_1.

1b — Production possibility frontier (3 points)

Answer

y=50−xy = 50 - x

On the locus k1=l1k_1 = l_1, so x=l1al11−a=l1x = l_1^{a}l_1^{1-a} = l_1. Firm 2 gets the rest, l2=k2=50−l1l_2 = k_2 = 50-l_1, so y=(50−l1)a(50−l1)1−a=50−l1=50−xy = (50-l_1)^{a}(50-l_1)^{1-a} = 50-l_1 = 50-x.

Intuition

Both firms are constant returns to scale and have the same technology, so at equal input ratios one unit of "input pair" makes one unit of either good. The RPT is therefore 11 at every point: the PPF is a straight line.

1c — Optimal allocation with c=2c = 2 (4 points)

Answer

x=50x = 50, y=0y = 0, l1=k1=50l_1 = k_1 = 50, l2=k2=0l_2 = k_2 = 0.

With U=2x+yU = 2x + y the MRS=2MRS = 2 at every point, while the RPT=1RPT = 1 everywhere. Since pxpy<MRS\frac{p_x}{p_y} < MRS (the consumer would pay 2 units of yy for a unit of xx but only has to give up 1), the economy should keep shifting resources to XX until it runs out: a corner solution. All inputs go to firm 1.

PP06_q2_ppf_corner_vs_interior

Left panel: the indifference line (slope −2-2) is steeper than the PPF (slope −1-1), so utility is highest at the XX corner.

2 — Optimum with c=0.5c = 0.5, and why it differs (5 points)

Answer

x=0x = 0, y=50y = 50 (the official slides write y=50by = 50b), with l2=k2=50l_2 = k_2 = 50 and l1=k1=0l_1 = k_1 = 0.

Now MRS=0.5<RPT=1MRS = 0.5 < RPT = 1: giving up a unit of yy to make a unit of xx costs more (1) than the consumer will pay (0.5). So only YY is produced. The corner flips from XX (part 1c) to YY (middle panel above).

Official economic reasoning

The optimum is a corner: only XX or only YY is produced. Two things decide which:

  • the relative productivity of YY, shown by bb: how many units of yy the economy gets for giving up one unit of xx (the slope of the PPF);
  • the relative utility of XX, shown by cc: how many units of yy the consumer would pay for one unit of xx.

If cc is above the PPF slope, produce only XX; if below, produce only YY.

Intuition

With a linear PPF and linear utility, there is no curvature to balance the two goods. The comparison is "my willingness to pay" against "the economy's opportunity cost", and the larger one wins everything.

3 — Optimum with U=x+yU = \sqrt{x} + y (5 points)

Answer

x=14x = \tfrac14, y=4934y = 49\tfrac34.

The PPF is unchanged (y=50−xy = 50 - x, RPT=1RPT = 1), but the MRS now depends on xx, so an interior solution exists. Set MRS=RPTMRS = RPT:

MRS=12x=1  ⇒  x=12  ⇒  x=14MRS = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{x}} = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; \sqrt{x} = \tfrac12 \;\Rightarrow\; x = \tfrac14

Then y=50−14=4934y = 50 - \tfrac14 = 49\tfrac34 (right panel above).

4 — Doubling the resources (5 points)

Answer

xx stays at 14\tfrac14; yy rises to 993499\tfrac34.

Doubling both inputs (k1+k2=100k_1+k_2 = 100, l1+l2=100l_1+l_2 = 100) shifts the PPF out to y=100−xy = 100 - x. The RPT is still 11, and the MRS still equals 12x\frac{1}{2\sqrt{x}}, which depends only on xx. So MRS=RPTMRS = RPT gives x=14x = \tfrac14 again, and y=100−14=9934y = 100 - \tfrac14 = 99\tfrac34.

Official economic reasoning

Because utility is quasilinear, the demand for xx does not depend on income or resources (no income effect). All the extra resources go to yy.

See Quasilinear Utility for why the good that enters linearly absorbs all changes in wealth.


Q3 — Partial equilibrium with fixed prices (25 points)

Setup. Two goods: XX and YY (money). Consumer utility 120x−x2+y120x - x^2 + y (income high enough that there are no corner solutions). Supply by a representative firm with f(k,l)=l1/4k1/4f(k,l) = l^{1/4}k^{1/4}, input prices pk=pl=1p_k = p_l = 1.

(a) Cost function (8 points)

Answer

C(x)=2x2C(x) = 2x^2, with supply C′(x)=4xC'(x) = 4x.

Cost minimisation: RTS=kl=plpk=1RTS = \frac{k}{l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = 1, so k=lk = l. Then x=l1/4k1/4=k1/2x = l^{1/4}k^{1/4} = k^{1/2}, so k(x)=l(x)=x2k(x) = l(x) = x^2. Therefore

C(x)=pl l(x)+pk k(x)=x2+x2=2x2,PS(x)=C′(x)=4xC(x) = p_l\,l(x) + p_k\,k(x) = x^2 + x^2 = 2x^2, \qquad P^S(x) = C'(x) = 4x

(b) Competitive equilibrium (7 points)

Answer

xe=20x^e = 20, pe=80p^e = 80.

Demand is the marginal utility: PD(x)=120−2xP^D(x) = 120 - 2x (see Quasilinear Utility). Setting PD=PSP^D = P^S gives 120−2x=4x120 - 2x = 4x, so x=20x = 20 and p=4⋅20=80p = 4\cdot 20 = 80.

Surpluses at the competitive equilibrium (used in (c))

CS=∫020(120−2x−80) dx=[40x−x2]020=800−400=400CS = \int_0^{20}(120 - 2x - 80)\,dx = \big[40x - x^2\big]_0^{20} = 800 - 400 = 400 PS=∫020(80−4x) dx=[80x−2x2]020=1600−800=800PS = \int_0^{20}(80 - 4x)\,dx = \big[80x - 2x^2\big]_0^{20} = 1600 - 800 = 800 W=400+800=1200W = 400 + 800 = 1200

(c) Government fixes p=90p = 90 (5 points)

Answer

x=15x = 15, CS=225CS = 225, PS=900PS = 900, W=1125W = 1125. Changes: ΔCS=−175\Delta CS = -175, ΔPS=+100\Delta PS = +100, ΔW=−75\Delta W = -75.

A price of 90 is above the equilibrium price (a floor). At 90, demand is 120−2x=90⇒x=15120 - 2x = 90 \Rightarrow x = 15, while the firm would supply 4x=90⇒x=22.54x = 90 \Rightarrow x = 22.5. The short side is demand, so trade is x=15x = 15.

CS=∫015(120−2x−90) dx=[30x−x2]015=450−225=225CS = \int_0^{15}(120 - 2x - 90)\,dx = \big[30x - x^2\big]_0^{15} = 450 - 225 = 225
PS=∫015(90−4x) dx=[90x−2x2]015=1350−450=900PS = \int_0^{15}(90 - 4x)\,dx = \big[90x - 2x^2\big]_0^{15} = 1350 - 450 = 900
W=CS+PS=225+900=1125W = CS + PS = 225 + 900 = 1125

Against the competitive equilibrium: ΔCS=225−400=−175\Delta CS = 225 - 400 = -175, ΔPS=900−800=+100\Delta PS = 900 - 800 = +100, ΔW=1125−1200=−75\Delta W = 1125 - 1200 = -75.

Official wording

The slide says "there would be excess demand" at 90. In fact at p=90>pep = 90 > p^e there is excess supply (22.522.5 supplied versus 1515 demanded). The number x=15x = 15 is correct and is what the calculation uses.

(d) Government fixes p=60p = 60 (5 points)

Answer

x=15x = 15, CS=675CS = 675, PS=450PS = 450, W=1125W = 1125.

A price of 60 is below equilibrium (a ceiling). At 60, the firm supplies 4x=60⇒x=154x = 60 \Rightarrow x = 15, while demand is 120−2x=60⇒x=30120 - 2x = 60 \Rightarrow x = 30. The short side is supply, so trade is again x=15x = 15.

CS=∫015(120−2x−60) dx=[60x−x2]015=900−225=675CS = \int_0^{15}(120 - 2x - 60)\,dx = \big[60x - x^2\big]_0^{15} = 900 - 225 = 675
PS=∫015(60−4x) dx=[60x−2x2]015=900−450=450PS = \int_0^{15}(60 - 4x)\,dx = \big[60x - 2x^2\big]_0^{15} = 900 - 450 = 450
W=675+450=1125W = 675 + 450 = 1125

PP06_q3_price_controls

Same quantity (15) at both prices. At 90 the firm collects the rent between demand and supply; at 60 the consumers do.

Official comparison of (c) and (d)

At both prices the quantity traded is 1515. The difference is who gets the "green" surplus on the traded units: the firm when p=90p = 90, the consumers when p=60p = 60. Total welfare is the same (11251125) because the quantity is the same; both prices lose 7575 against the competitive 12001200, the Deadweight Loss from the units between x=15x = 15 and x=20x = 20 that are not traded.

Assumption behind the numbers

The consumer surplus integral ∫015(PD−p) dx\int_0^{15}(P^D - p)\,dx assumes that the 15 units go to the consumers who value them most (efficient rationing). If the units were allocated differently, CSCS at p=60p=60 would be lower. The official solution makes this assumption without saying so.


Recap table

Part Tool One-line answer
P1 (1) Counter-example on l⋅kl\cdot k False: (1,9),(9,1)(1,9),(9,1) give 99, but (2,2)(2,2) gives 44
P1 (2) Utility table False: C=(100,0)C=(100,0) efficient but not above B=(9,9)B=(9,9)
P1 (3) Same PPF, taste shift False: b<ab<a means more YY, less XX
P1 (4) Contract curve y1=x1y_1=x_1 True: endowment (20,30)(20,30) is off the line
P1 (5) Contract curve y1=4x1y_1=4x_1 False: (1,5)(1,5) is inefficient, so dominated
P1 (6) Ceiling near zero False: quantity and CSCS go to about 00
P1 (7) Binding floor True: higher price, lower quantity
P1 (8) Constant MC False: p=MCp = MC, profit is 00
P1 (9) Prices clear only at equilibrium quantities False: inputs not fully allocated
P1 (10) MRS>RPTMRS > RPT False: optimum has more XX
Q2-1a RTS1=RTS2RTS_1 = RTS_2 k1=l1k_1 = l_1
Q2-1b Substitute the locus y=50−xy = 50 - x
Q2-1c MRS=2>RPT=1MRS = 2 > RPT = 1 x=50x = 50, y=0y = 0
Q2-2 MRS=0.5<RPT=1MRS = 0.5 < RPT = 1 x=0x = 0, y=50y = 50
Q2-3 MRS=RPTMRS = RPT x=14x = \tfrac14, y=4934y = 49\tfrac34
Q2-4 Quasilinear: no income effect x=14x = \tfrac14, y=9934y = 99\tfrac34
Q3a RTS = price ratio C=2x2C = 2x^2, PS=4xP^S = 4x
Q3b PD=PSP^D = P^S x=20x = 20, p=80p = 80
Q3c Short side at p=90p=90 CS=225CS=225, PS=900PS=900, W=1125W=1125
Q3d Short side at p=60p=60 CS=675CS=675, PS=450PS=450, W=1125W=1125