Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed B (March 2023) · Dr. Boaz Zik · worked-solution

Production Economy, Price Floor & Ceiling, Exchange True-False (2023 Moed B)

Production Economy, Price Floor & Ceiling, Exchange True-False (2023 Moed B)

Part of: Micro-Economics II Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed Bet (March 2023), Micro-Economics II, Dr. Boaz Zik. 3 hours, cheat sheet and calculator allowed. Part 1 is 50 points (ten true/false items, 5 points each); Q2 and Q3 are open questions. Builds on: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities Practice: PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings, PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare, PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner, PS_07-Core, Corner Endowments & Equilibrium vs the Social Planner, PS_08-Production Economy, Efficiency Locus & Input Allocation

Source

The paper has two official solution files. Part 1 has only the circled True/False verdicts (no reasoning), so every explanation below is written here, not copied. Q2 and Q3 follow the worked official solution (the 7th page of that file is blank). All ten verdicts and every number were re-checked and agree with the official ones. Where the official text has a typo it is flagged with a > [!warning].

What this paper tests

Intuition: the one move behind each open question
  • Q2: efficient production means equal RTS across firms, which gives the efficiency locus; the PPF then turns inputs into outputs, and the optimum is where the consumer's MRS equals the RPT (the PPF slope).
  • Q3: demand is the marginal utility, supply is marginal cost. A price fixed by the government means the short side of the market trades: demand if the price is above equilibrium, supply if it is below.

Part 1 — True or false (50 points)

Answer key

# Statement in short Official verdict
1 Swapping the Cobb-Douglas exponents between the agents leaves the contract curve unchanged False
2 Economy 2 equilibrium gives each agent twice the xx of economy 1 True
3 A higher bb in the consumer's utility shifts the PPF out in xx False
4 Planner prefers aa to bb, and bb Pareto dominates cc, so planner prefers aa to cc True
5 010_1 and 020_2 are always on the contract curve True
6 Quasilinear technology: marginal cost equals pkp_k beyond some quantity True
7 A consumer price subsidy lowers social welfare True
8 The planner always prefers equilibrium to any allocation off the contract curve False
9 Non-equilibrium positive prices give excess demand for one good and excess supply of the other True
10 Equilibrium utility is at least endowment utility True

1. Same contract curve after swapping exponents? (False)

Answer

False. Swapping which agent has exponent aa and which has bb changes the contract curve unless a=ba=b.

Write k=a1−ak = \frac{a}{1-a} and m=b1−bm = \frac{b}{1-b}, with k<mk<m because a<ba<b. The Contract Curve is where MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2, with X=Y=50X=Y=50:

MRS1=k y1x1,MRS2=m 50−y150−x1MRS_1 = k\,\frac{y_1}{x_1}, \qquad MRS_2 = m\,\frac{50-y_1}{50-x_1}

Economy 1 (agent 1 has aa, agent 2 has bb):

y1=50 m x150k+(m−k) x1y_1 = \frac{50\,m\,x_1}{50k + (m-k)\,x_1}

Economy 2 swaps the roles (kk and mm exchange places):

y1=50 k x150m+(k−m) x1y_1 = \frac{50\,k\,x_1}{50m + (k-m)\,x_1}

At the box centre x1=25x_1 = 25 economy 1 gives y1=50mk+my_1 = \frac{50m}{k+m} and economy 2 gives 50kk+m\frac{50k}{k+m}. These differ whenever k≠mk \neq m, so the curves differ.

Intuition

The curve bows towards the agent who likes yy more. In economy 1 that is agent 1 (who has the smaller exponent aa on xx); in economy 2 it is agent 2. The curves are mirror images of each other, not the same curve.

2. Twice the xx in economy 2? (True)

Answer

True.

In each economy the two agents are identical (same Cobb-Douglas exponent) and have the same endowment. Then the equilibrium is the no-trade allocation: each agent consumes their own endowment. Both want the same bundle at any price ratio, so the market clears with each keeping what they have.

  • Economy 1: each agent consumes (20,20)(20, 20), so x=20x = 20.
  • Economy 2: each agent consumes (40,30)(40, 30), so x=40x = 40.

40=2×2040 = 2\times 20.

Intuition

The exponents aa and bb are a distraction. When both agents are clones with identical endowments, there are no gains from trade, so the equilibrium allocation equals the endowment.

3. Does a change in preferences move the PPF? (False)

Answer

False. The PPF is built from the firms' technologies and the resource constraints only. Preferences do not enter it.

A move from aa to b>ab>a puts more weight on xx, which moves the optimal point along the PPF towards more xx (the MRS curve changes), but the frontier itself stays where it is.

4. Transitivity with Pareto dominance (True)

Answer

True.

Two facts about the planner: (i) the planner's preferences are transitive; (ii) the planner respects Pareto dominance, because social welfare is increasing in each agent's utility, so if bb dominates cc the planner prefers bb to cc. Then a≻ba \succ b and b≻cb \succ c give a≻ca \succ c.

Assumption

This needs a planner whose welfare is increasing in the agents' utilities (as in the course's Cobb-Douglas planner of PS_05-Pareto Efficiency, Dominance & Social Welfare). A planner who ignored Pareto dominance could break the chain.

5. Are the origins always on the contract curve? (True)

Answer

True.

At 010_1 agent 2 holds the entire endowment of both goods. Any move gives agent 1 something and so must take it from agent 2, who strictly prefers more of each good (Local Nonsatiation). So no Pareto improvement exists: the allocation is Pareto efficient. The same holds for 020_2.

Intuition

The contract curve in the Edgeworth box runs corner to corner, from 010_1 to 020_2. Efficiency says nothing about fairness, so "one agent gets everything" is efficient.

6. Quasilinear technology and marginal cost (True)

Answer

True.

With f=g(l)+kf = g(l) + k and gg concave, MPl=g′(l)MP_l = g'(l) (decreasing) and MPk=1MP_k = 1. The RTS is g′(l)g'(l), and the Tangency Condition is g′(l∗)=pl/pkg'(l^*) = p_l/p_k, which fixes labour at one constant level l∗l^* regardless of output.

  • For small qq (below g(l∗)g(l^*)) the firm hits the corner k=0k=0 and uses only labour.
  • For q≥g(l∗)q \ge g(l^*) labour stays at l∗l^* and all extra output comes from capital: k=q−g(l∗)k = q - g(l^*).

So for large qq:

C(q)=pl l∗+pk (q−g(l∗)),C′(q)=pkC(q) = p_l\,l^* + p_k\,\big(q - g(l^*)\big), \qquad C'(q) = p_k

Beyond the threshold g(l∗)g(l^*), marginal cost equals the price of capital.

7. Consumer price subsidy in partial equilibrium (True)

Answer

True (social welfare falls).

A subsidy to buyers pushes trade above the competitive quantity. For the extra units, the marginal cost exceeds the marginal value, so each extra unit destroys value. Counting the government's cost of the subsidy, social welfare falls by the Deadweight Loss triangle. Only at the competitive quantity is W(x)=v(x)−C(x)W(x) = v(x) - C(x) maximised.

8. Planner prefers equilibrium to any off-curve allocation? (False)

Answer

False.

A planner who puts heavy weight on one agent can prefer an allocation that gives that agent much more, even if that allocation is inefficient, to a balanced equilibrium. Being off the contract curve only means some allocation Pareto dominates it, not that the equilibrium beats it for this planner.

What would make it true

The statement would be true for any allocation that the equilibrium Pareto dominates, since a planner who respects Pareto dominance prefers the equilibrium to those. It is not true for every off-curve allocation.

9. Prices that are not an equilibrium (True)

Answer

True.

Walras' Law: for any positive prices, pxzx+pyzy=0p_x z_x + p_y z_y = 0 where zz is excess demand. If zx=0z_x = 0 then pyzy=0p_y z_y = 0 forces zy=0z_y = 0, which would be an equilibrium. So at non-equilibrium prices both zxz_x and zyz_y are non-zero, and since pxzx=−pyzyp_x z_x = -p_y z_y with positive prices they have opposite signs: excess demand for one good and excess supply of the other.

10. Equilibrium utility vs endowment utility (True)

Answer

True.

The endowment is always affordable (it costs exactly the agent's income), so the agent could choose it. The optimum on the same budget set is at least as good: Ui(xi∗)≥Ui(ωi)U_i(x_i^*) \ge U_i(\omega_i). This is Individual Rationality; it is why every equilibrium lies in the Core-style "lens" inside the box.


Q2 — Production economy (points not stated in the sources)

Firms: f1(l1,k1)=2 l11/3k12/3f_1(l_1,k_1) = 2\,l_1^{1/3}k_1^{2/3} and f2(l2,k2)=2 l21/3k22/3f_2(l_2,k_2) = 2\,l_2^{1/3}k_2^{2/3}. Representative consumer U(x,y)=x1/3y2/3U(x,y) = x^{1/3}y^{2/3}. Resources: k1+k2=50k_1+k_2 = 50 and l1+l2=50l_1+l_2 = 50.

Typo in the question paper

The printed utility reads U(x,y)=x1/3 l2/3U(x,y) = x^{1/3}\,l^{2/3}. The solution uses U(x,y)=x1/3y2/3U(x,y) = x^{1/3}y^{2/3}, so the "ll" is a typo for yy.

a. Efficiency locus

Answer

k1=l1k_1 = l_1

Efficient production needs RTS1=RTS2RTS_1 = RTS_2 (Efficiency Locus). For firm 1:

MPl1=23 l1−2/3k12/3,MPk1=43 l11/3k1−1/3MP_{l_1} = \tfrac23\,l_1^{-2/3}k_1^{2/3}, \qquad MP_{k_1} = \tfrac43\,l_1^{1/3}k_1^{-1/3}
RTS1=MPl1MPk1=k12 l1RTS_1 = \frac{MP_{l_1}}{MP_{k_1}} = \frac{k_1}{2\,l_1}

Firm 2 is identical, so RTS2=k22 l2RTS_2 = \frac{k_2}{2\,l_2}. Equating:

k1l1=k2l2=50−k150−l1\frac{k_1}{l_1} = \frac{k_2}{l_2} = \frac{50 - k_1}{50 - l_1}

Cross-multiplying: k1(50−l1)=l1(50−k1)k_1(50 - l_1) = l_1(50 - k_1), so 50k1=50l150k_1 = 50 l_1, i.e. k1=l1k_1 = l_1.

Minor typo in the official working

The official text prints the marginal products without the constant 2 from the production function (13l−2/3k2/3\frac13 l^{-2/3}k^{2/3} and 23l1/3k−1/3\frac23 l^{1/3}k^{-1/3}). The factor 2 multiplies both and cancels in the ratio, so RTS=k2lRTS = \frac{k}{2l} and the answer are unaffected.

Intuition

Both firms have the same technology, so efficiency means they use inputs in the same proportion. In the input box that is the diagonal.

b. Production possibility frontier

Answer

y=100−xy = 100 - x

On the locus k1=l1k_1 = l_1 and k2=l2=50−l1k_2 = l_2 = 50 - l_1:

x=2 l11/3l12/3=2 l1,y=2 (50−l1)x = 2\,l_1^{1/3}l_1^{2/3} = 2\,l_1, \qquad y = 2\,(50 - l_1)

So l1=x/2l_1 = x/2 and y=100−2 l1=100−xy = 100 - 2\,l_1 = 100 - x.

c. Optimal allocation

Answer

x∗=3313x^* = 33\tfrac13, y∗=6623y^* = 66\tfrac23, l1∗=k1∗=1623l_1^* = k_1^* = 16\tfrac23, l2∗=k2∗=3313l_2^* = k_2^* = 33\tfrac13.

The RPT is the (absolute) slope of the PPF, which is 11. The consumer's MRS:

MRS=13x−2/3y2/323x1/3y−1/3=y2xMRS = \frac{\tfrac13 x^{-2/3}y^{2/3}}{\tfrac23 x^{1/3}y^{-1/3}} = \frac{y}{2x}

Set RPT=MRSRPT = MRS: 1=y2x1 = \frac{y}{2x}, so y=2xy = 2x. Into the PPF: 2x=100−x2x = 100 - x, so x∗=1003x^* = \frac{100}{3} and y∗=2003y^* = \frac{200}{3}. Then l1=x/2=503=1623l_1 = x/2 = \frac{50}{3} = 16\tfrac23 and l2=50−l1=3313l_2 = 50 - l_1 = 33\tfrac13, with k=lk = l in each firm.

PP02_q2_efficiency_locus_and_ppf

Left: the efficiency locus is the diagonal of the input box and the optimum sits on it. Right: the optimum is where the indifference curve is tangent to the PPF.

d. Equilibrium prices

Answer

px=1p_x = 1 (with py=1p_y = 1 as numeraire), pl∗=23p_l^* = \tfrac23, pk∗=43p_k^* = \tfrac43.

At the optimum MRS=pxpyMRS = \frac{p_x}{p_y}. With py=1p_y = 1:

MRS(x∗,y∗)=66232⋅3313=1=px∗MRS(x^*,y^*) = \frac{66\tfrac23}{2\cdot 33\tfrac13} = 1 = p_x^*

Firms: cost minimisation requires RTS=plpkRTS = \frac{p_l}{p_k}. At k1∗=l1∗k_1^* = l_1^* this is 12\frac12, so pk=2plp_k = 2p_l and k1=l1k_1 = l_1 as expected. Firm 1's cost to produce x=2l1x = 2l_1 (so l1=k1=x/2l_1 = k_1 = x/2):

C(x)=pl x2+pk x2=32 pl xC(x) = p_l\,\frac{x}{2} + p_k\,\frac{x}{2} = \frac{3}{2}\,p_l\,x

Profit maximisation gives C′(x)=px=1C'(x) = p_x = 1, so 32pl=1\frac32 p_l = 1:

pl∗=23,pk∗=2pl∗=43p_l^* = \tfrac23, \qquad p_k^* = 2p_l^* = \tfrac43
Check (not in the official solution)

Firm 1 revenue =1⋅1003= 1\cdot\frac{100}{3}, cost =23⋅503+43⋅503=1003= \frac23\cdot\frac{50}{3} + \frac43\cdot\frac{50}{3} = \frac{100}{3}, so profit is zero, as constant returns require. Total input income =23⋅50+43⋅50=100=x∗+y∗= \frac23\cdot 50 + \frac43\cdot 50 = 100 = x^* + y^*.

e. Technology change: f2=4 l21/3k22/3f_2 = 4\,l_2^{1/3}k_2^{2/3}

Answer

x∗x^* stays the same, y∗y^* increases, so the ratio y∗x∗\frac{y^*}{x^*} increases. Good yy is now relatively cheaper to produce.

The efficiency locus is still k1=l1k_1 = l_1 (the constant 4 cancels in the RTS). With l2=50−l1l_2 = 50 - l_1:

x=2 l1,y=4 (50−l1)=200−2xx = 2\,l_1, \qquad y = 4\,(50 - l_1) = 200 - 2x

The new PPF has RPT=2RPT = 2. With MRS=y2x=2MRS = \frac{y}{2x} = 2 we get y=4xy = 4x, so 4x=200−2x4x = 200 - 2x and x∗=1003x^* = \frac{100}{3}, y∗=4003y^* = \frac{400}{3}. The ratio rises from 22 to 44.

PP02_q2_new_technology_ppf

The PPF pivots out around its xx-intercept (100, 0), because only the yy-technology improved. The optimum moves up along the ray y=4xy = 4x (steeper than the old ray y=2xy = 2x).

Intuition

The official answer is graphical: yy production is relatively better, and with Cobb-Douglas preferences the consumer's choice of xx does not change, while yy rises. The algebra above confirms it: x∗=1003x^* = \frac{100}{3} before and after, y∗y^* goes from 2003\frac{200}{3} to 4003\frac{400}{3}.


Q3 — Partial equilibrium, a price above and a price below equilibrium

Demand from a consumer with U=120x−x2+yU = 120x - x^2 + y (yy is money, income high enough for an interior solution). Supply from a firm with f(k,l)=l1/4k1/4f(k,l) = l^{1/4}k^{1/4} and pk=pl=1p_k = p_l = 1.

a. Cost function

Answer

C(x)=2x2C(x) = 2x^2

The tangency condition is kl=plpk=1\frac{k}{l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = 1, so k=lk = l. The isoquant is x=l1/4l1/4=l1/2x = l^{1/4}l^{1/4} = l^{1/2}, so l(x)=k(x)=x2l(x) = k(x) = x^2, and

C(x)=1⋅x2+1⋅x2=2x2C(x) = 1\cdot x^2 + 1\cdot x^2 = 2x^2

Marginal cost, which is the supply curve, is C′(x)=4xC'(x) = 4x.

b. Equilibrium

Answer

xe=20x^e = 20, pe=80p^e = 80

For Quasilinear Utility the inverse demand is the marginal utility of xx: PD(x)=120−2xP^D(x) = 120 - 2x. The inverse supply is PS(x)=C′(x)=4xP^S(x) = C'(x) = 4x. Equate: 120−2x=4x120 - 2x = 4x, so xe=20x^e = 20 and pe=80p^e = 80.

At equilibrium (reference level for parts c and d):

CS=∫020(120−2x−80) dx=[40x−x2]020=400CS = \int_0^{20} (120 - 2x - 80)\,dx = \Big[40x - x^2\Big]_0^{20} = 400
PS=∫020(80−4x) dx=[80x−2x2]020=800PS = \int_0^{20} (80 - 4x)\,dx = \Big[80x - 2x^2\Big]_0^{20} = 800
SW=400+800=1200SW = 400 + 800 = 1200

c. Government price of 90

Answer

Quantity traded x=15x = 15. CS=225CS = 225 (down 175), PS=900PS = 900 (up 100), SW=1125SW = 1125 (down 75).

Price 9090 is above the equilibrium price of 80. At 90 buyers want 120−2x=90120 - 2x = 90, so x=15x = 15 units, while firms would supply 4x=904x = 90, i.e. 22.522.5 units. Supply exceeds demand, so the short side, demand, sets the quantity: x=15x = 15.

CS=∫015(120−2x−90) dx=[30x−x2]015=450−225=225CS = \int_0^{15} (120 - 2x - 90)\,dx = \Big[30x - x^2\Big]_0^{15} = 450 - 225 = 225
PS=∫015(90−4x) dx=[90x−2x2]015=1350−450=900PS = \int_0^{15} (90 - 4x)\,dx = \Big[90x - 2x^2\Big]_0^{15} = 1350 - 450 = 900
Equilibrium (80) Price 90 Change
Consumer surplus 400 225 −175-175
Firm surplus 800 900 +100+100
Social welfare 1200 1125 −75-75

Firms gain because they sell fewer units but at a much higher price; consumers lose on both price and quantity; the net loss of 75 is the Deadweight Loss.

Mislabelled in the official text

The official solution calls the situation at 90 "excess demand". At a price above equilibrium there is excess supply (22.5 supplied vs 15 demanded). The number x=15x = 15 is correct. It also writes "the supply in the market would be PD(x)=120−2xP^D(x) = 120 - 2x", meaning the quantity traded is read off the demand curve.

d. Government price of 60

Answer

Quantity traded x=15x = 15. CS=675CS = 675, PS=450PS = 450, SW=1125SW = 1125.

Price 6060 is below equilibrium. At 60 buyers want 120−2x=60120 - 2x = 60, i.e. 3030 units, but firms supply only 4x=604x = 60, i.e. 1515 units. Now supply is the short side and x=15x = 15.

CS=∫015(120−2x−60) dx=[60x−x2]015=900−225=675CS = \int_0^{15} (120 - 2x - 60)\,dx = \Big[60x - x^2\Big]_0^{15} = 900 - 225 = 675
PS=∫015(60−4x) dx=[60x−2x2]015=900−450=450PS = \int_0^{15} (60 - 4x)\,dx = \Big[60x - 2x^2\Big]_0^{15} = 900 - 450 = 450
Price 90 Price 60
Quantity traded 15 15
Consumer surplus 225 675
Firm surplus 900 450
Social welfare 1125 1125

PP02_q3_price_90_and_60

Both prices cut trade to 15 units, so both lose the same deadweight triangle between 15 and 20 (area 75). Only the split between consumers and the firm differs.

Explanation (comparison with part c)

Social welfare is the same (1125) because welfare depends only on the quantity traded, and the quantity is 15 in both cases. The price only decides who gets the surplus. At 90 the firm captures more of the pie; at 60 consumers do. The gap between equilibrium welfare (1200) and 1125 is the deadweight loss of 75 in both.

Assumption in the consumer surplus

Computing CSCS as ∫015(PD−p) dx\int_0^{15}(P^D - p)\,dx assumes the 15 units go to the buyers who value them most (efficient rationing). With a price at 60 and demand for 30 units, a different rationing rule would give a lower CSCS.


Recap table

Item Tool Answer
P1 (1) Contract curve from MRS equality, swap aa and bb False
P1 (2) Identical agents and endowments: no trade True
P1 (3) PPF is technology only False
P1 (4) Transitivity plus Pareto-respecting planner True
P1 (5) Origins are efficient (one agent holds everything) True
P1 (6) Quasilinear technology: capital is the marginal input True
P1 (7) Subsidy pushes quantity above efficient True
P1 (8) Planner weights can favour an inefficient allocation False
P1 (9) Walras' Law with non-equilibrium prices True
P1 (10) Endowment is affordable True
Q2a RTS equality k1=l1k_1 = l_1
Q2b Substitute locus into production y=100−xy = 100 - x
Q2c RPT=MRSRPT = MRS (3313, 6623)(33\tfrac13,\, 66\tfrac23)
Q2d Cost function and MC=pxMC = p_x pl=23p_l = \tfrac23, pk=43p_k = \tfrac43
Q2e New PPF y=200−2xy = 200 - 2x x∗x^* same, y∗y^* up, ratio 2 to 4
Q3a Tangency C=2x2C = 2x^2
Q3b Demand = supply (20,80)(20, 80)
Q3c Price 90, demand is short side CS=225CS=225, PS=900PS=900, SW=1125SW=1125
Q3d Price 60, supply is short side CS=675CS=675, PS=450PS=450, SW=1125SW=1125