PS6

  1. 1

    Question 1. Consider the exchange economy U1(x1,y1)=x1y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1y_1 and U2(x2,y2)=x2y2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2y_2 with ω1X=10\omega_1^X=10, ω1Y=20\omega_1^Y=20 and ω2X=20\omega_2^X=20, ω2Y=10\omega_2^Y=10.

  2. 1a

    (a) Present the contract curve as the set of bundles (x1,y1)(x_1,y_1) for agent 1.

  3. 1b

    (b) Present the set of Pareto efficient allocations that are better for both agents than the initial endowment.

  4. 1c

    (c) Look at the bundle (x1,y1)=(x2,y2)=(15,15)(x_1,y_1)=(x_2,y_2)=(15,15). Is this bundle Pareto efficient? Prove your answer and provide an economic explanation for your result.

  5. 2

    Question 2. Consider the exchange economy U1(x1,y1)=x11/3y12/3U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1^{1/3}y_1^{2/3} and U2(x2,y2)=x2 y21/2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2\,y_2^{1/2} with ω1X=8\omega_1^X=8, ω1Y=8\omega_1^Y=8 and ω2X=16\omega_2^X=16, ω2Y=16\omega_2^Y=16.

  6. 2a

    (a) Present the contract curve as the set of bundles (x1,y1)(x_1,y_1) for agent 1.

  7. 2b

    (b) Present the set of Pareto efficient allocations that are better for both agents than the initial endowment.

  8. 2c

    (c) Look at the bundle (x1,y1)=(x2,y2)=(12,12)(x_1,y_1)=(x_2,y_2)=(12,12). Is this bundle Pareto efficient? Prove your answer and provide an economic explanation for your result.

  9. 3

    Question 3. Consider the exchange economy U1(x1,y1)=x1y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1y_1 and U2(x2,y2)=x2 y21/2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2\,y_2^{1/2} with ω1X=5\omega_1^X=5, ω1Y=10\omega_1^Y=10 and ω2X=15\omega_2^X=15, ω2Y=20\omega_2^Y=20.

  10. 3a

    (a) Present the contract curve as the set of bundles (x1,y1)(x_1,y_1) for agent 1.

  11. 3b

    (b) Assume now that there is a social planner whose welfare can be represented as

    W((x1,y1),(x2,y2))=U1(x1,y1)⋅U2(x2,y2).W\big((x_1,y_1),(x_2,y_2)\big)=U_1(x_1,y_1)\cdot U_2(x_2,y_2).
  12. 3bi

    (i) Consider the allocation (x1,y1)=(5,12)(x_1,y_1)=(5,12) and (x2,y2)=(15,18)(x_2,y_2)=(15,18). Show that it is Pareto efficient.

  13. 3bii

    (ii) Consider the allocation (x1,y1)=(10,18)(x_1,y_1)=(10,18) and (x2,y2)=(10,12)(x_2,y_2)=(10,12). Show that it is not Pareto efficient.

  14. 3biii

    (iii) Show that the social planner prefers the latter allocation (BB) over the former (AA).

  15. 3biv

    (iv) Find an allocation on the contract curve that is better for the planner than the latter allocation (BB).

  16. 4

    Question 4. Consider the exchange economy U1(x1,y1)=x11/3y12/3U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1^{1/3}y_1^{2/3} and U2(x2,y2)=x2 y21/2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2\,y_2^{1/2} with ω1X=8\omega_1^X=8, ω1Y=8\omega_1^Y=8 and ω2X=16\omega_2^X=16, ω2Y=16\omega_2^Y=16 (the same economy as Question 2).

  17. 4a

    (a) Find the equilibrium price ratio px∗py∗\frac{p_x^{*}}{p_y^{*}} and the equilibrium allocation.

  18. 4b

    (b) Show that for any price ratio pxpy<px∗py∗\frac{p_x}{p_y}<\frac{p_x^{*}}{p_y^{*}} there will be over-demand for good XX.

  19. 4c

    (c) Show that for any price ratio pxpy>px∗py∗\frac{p_x}{p_y}>\frac{p_x^{*}}{p_y^{*}} there will be over-demand for good YY.

  20. 5

    Question 5. Consider the exchange economy U1(x1,y1)=x1a⋅y1bU_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1^a\cdot y_1^b and U2(x2,y2)=x2a⋅y2bU_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2^a\cdot y_2^b (note that both agents have the same utility function) with ω1X=15\omega_1^X=15, ω1Y=15\omega_1^Y=15 and ω2X=15\omega_2^X=15, ω2Y=15\omega_2^Y=15.

  21. 5a

    (a) Assume that the ratio of the equilibrium prices is px∗py∗=2\frac{p_x^{*}}{p_y^{*}}=2. Find the ratio ab\frac ab.

  22. 5b

    (b) Assume that the ratio of the equilibrium prices is px∗py∗=32\frac{p_x^{*}}{p_y^{*}}=\frac32. Find the ratio ab\frac ab.

  23. 6

    Question 6. Consider the exchange economy U1(x1,y1)=x1y1U_1(x_1,y_1)=x_1y_1 and U2(x2,y2)=x2 y21/2U_2(x_2,y_2)=x_2\,y_2^{1/2} with ω1X=5\omega_1^X=5, ω1Y=10\omega_1^Y=10 and ω2X=15\omega_2^X=15, ω2Y=20\omega_2^Y=20 (the same economy as Question 3).

  24. 6a

    (a) Find the equilibrium price ratio and the equilibrium allocation.

  25. 6b

    (b) Assume now that there is a social planner whose welfare can be represented as

    W((x1,y1),(x2,y2))=U1(x1,y1)⋅U2(x2,y2).W\big((x_1,y_1),(x_2,y_2)\big)=U_1(x_1,y_1)\cdot U_2(x_2,y_2).
  26. 6bi

    (i) Find an allocation that is not Pareto efficient which the social planner prefers to the equilibrium allocation.

  27. 6bii

    (ii) Find another endowment allocation under which the equilibrium outcome is better for the social planner than the allocation you found in (i).

Method cheat-sheet

Contract curve: MRS1=MRS2MRS_1=MRS_2, solve for y1(x1)y_1(x_1). Walrasian equilibrium: Cobb-Douglas budget shares, demands, clear the xx market, get p∗p^{*}, then back out the allocation (it lies on the contract curve). Planner: maximise W=U1U2W=U_1U_2; its optimum is Pareto efficient; to implement it, redistribute endowments (Second Welfare Theorem).

Pitfall

MRS2=2y2x2MRS_2=\frac{2y_2}{x_2} for U2=x2y21/2U_2=x_2y_2^{1/2}: the factor of 2 comes from ab=11/2\frac ab=\frac{1}{1/2}. Forgetting it corrupts the whole contract curve.

Related: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities