Public Goods, Free Riding & Altruism
- #micro-economics-ii
- #public-goods
- #free-riding
- #externalities
- #market-failure
- #nash-equilibrium
- #best-response
- #social-planner
- #under-provision
- #altruism
Public Goods, Free Riding & Altruism
Part of: Micro-Economics II | Key concepts: Public Goods, Free Riding, Nash Equilibrium, Best Response, Under-Provision, Altruistic Utility, Market Failure, Pareto Efficiency
What This Presentation Is About
This is the final section of the cumulative Presentation 6 deck, and it continues straight on from Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities. A public good is treated as a special kind of externality, one that hits many agents at once. That small difference breaks the usual fixes, because every agent now has to guess what everyone else will contribute.
The section does four things:
- Define a public good and name the two problems it causes (under-provision and free riding).
- Illustrate with a small numerical game (Alice and Bob's seminar work).
- Solve the general model twice: the social planner's optimum, then the free-market Nash equilibrium.
- Add altruism: what happens when agents partly care about each other's utility.
Source scopeSlides 298 to 313 of the deck. Slide 297 is only a section divider ("Externalities / Public Goods").
Part 1 — What Is a Public Good?
Public GoodA public good is a good whose aggregate quantity affects agents' utilities. Everyone's utility depends on the total amount provided, not just on what they provide themselves.
Slide examples: national security, a public swimming pool, sidewalks, an elevator in a building, seminar work (a joint group project).
Why it is "a special kind of externality"
An ordinary externality usually involves a pair of agents. A public good is an externality that affects many agents at once. That creates a coordination problem:
- When each agent decides how much to invest in the public good, she must conjecture how much the others invest.
- The slide's link back to the previous lecture: if two agents (Homer and Ned) suffer from Barney's smoking, and Ned wants to bargain with Barney over how much to cut cigar consumption, Ned's decision depends on what Homer is doing.
The two phenomena
| Phenomenon | What happens |
|---|---|
| Under-Provision (a Market Failure) | The public good is provided at a level that is too low |
| Free Riding | An agent invests less (or nothing) because other agents' investment already gives her the benefit |
Part 2 — Example: Alice and Bob's Seminar Work
SetupTwo students, Alice and Bob, hand in one joint seminar paper.
- Each chooses an investment .
- Each unit of investment costs the investor a disutility of 1 (in money).
- The shared grade depends only on total investment:
The grade is the public good: both students get the same one, whoever worked.
Utility from each grade (in money terms):
| Grade | F | D | C | B | A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alice | 0 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 6.5 |
| Bob | 0 | 2 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 4.1 |
Alice is motivated, Bob is less so. Net payoff is the grade utility minus the student's own investment cost.
Best responses (as stated on the slide)
- Bob: if , Bob does not invest (cost exceeds benefit). If , Bob invests 1.
- Alice: if , Alice does not invest. If , she invests .
Stable outcome: free ridingThe only stable situation is Bob invests 0, Alice invests 3, and the grade is B. Bob free rides on Alice's effort.
A Pareto improvement exists
Force Bob to invest 1 (total 4, grade A), and have Alice pay him a fee with .
My check of the slide's numbersNot on the slide, my working. At the free-riding outcome, Alice nets and Bob nets .
Outcome Alice Bob Free riding (, grade B) Bob 1, Alice 3, grade A, fee Alice is better off iff , i.e. . Bob is better off iff , i.e. . This reproduces the slide's range.
Small tie in Alice's choice (my observation)With , Alice nets by investing 2 (grade C) and by investing 3 (grade B). She is indifferent. The slide picks 3 (the rule ""), so I follow that, but the equilibrium is knife-edge for Alice.
Part 3 — The General Model
Model setup
- Two agents, 1 and 2.
- Two goods: the public good and money .
- Quasilinear Utility for both:
- Note has no agent index: both consume the same .
- Each agent can produce one unit of at a cost of 1 dollar (1 unit of ).
- Agents have money endowments and , so .
Because each agent produces and the total is , each agent's utility is .
3a. The Social Planner's Problem
The Social Welfare maximiser picks everyone's contribution and money:
subject to and .
Typo on slide 304The slide writes the second constraint as . It should be (the substituted objective on the same slide correctly uses ).
Substituting the constraints into the objective:
First-order conditions (one per ):
Both conditions are identical, because depends only on the sum . Writing :
Interpretation (Samuelson-style condition)The public good is produced until its marginal social benefit (the sum of both agents' marginal benefits) equals its marginal cost (1).
Many efficient splitsOnly the total is pinned down, so there are many with . The slide states: an allocation is Pareto efficient if and only if .
3b. Why the Condition Characterises Efficiency
The slide shows that if the condition fails, a Pareto improvement exists. Suppose
Ask agent 1 to produce one more unit. Agent 1's utility changes by .
| Case | What happens |
|---|---|
| Agent 1 gains. Agent 2 also gains (extra at no cost). Pareto improvement. | |
| Agent 2 compensates agent 1 by paying . Agent 1 is back at his old utility. |
In the second case agent 2's utility changes by
which is positive by the assumption, so agent 2 gains and agent 1 is no worse off. Pareto improvement.
My intuitionThis is the same idea as the Alice/Bob fee: when the combined marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost, there is surplus on the table. Whoever produces the extra unit can be paid out of the other agent's gain, so both end up better off. (I have kept the slide's argument for the case only, it is the only case the slide covers.)
3c. The Free Market: Nash Equilibrium
To model the market without a planner, the slides import game theory.
Nash EquilibriumA pair is a Nash equilibrium if is agent 1's optimal choice given that agent 2 plays , and is agent 2's optimal choice given that agent 1 plays .
Step 1: the stand-alone optimum. If agent 2 produces nothing, agent 1 would produce solving
( is how much agent 1 wants in total if she had to provide it all herself.)
Step 2: best response. Agent 1 only cares about the total , so:
- If : agent 1 tops the total up to her ideal, .
- If : agent 1's utility is decreasing in , so she produces 0.
Analogously for agent 2:
A Nash equilibrium satisfies and .
The equilibria, by case
| Case | Nash equilibrium | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Every pair with | Agents want the same total, so any split works | |
| Only | Complete free riding by agent 1 | |
| Only | Complete free riding by agent 2 |
My intuitionThe agent who wants the public good more (higher stand-alone level ) ends up providing all of it. The other agent's ideal total is already reached, so she contributes nothing. This matches the Alice/Bob result, where motivated Alice carries the load.
3d. Why the Market Under-Provides
Result: under-provisionIn any equilibrium, the total satisfies either or (the one who contributes is at her own optimum). This implies, at the equilibrium quantity:
So the equilibrium total is smaller than the welfare-maximising .
Why? Each agent cares only about her own utility and does not internalise the effect of her choice on the other agent's welfare.
| Social planner | Free-market Nash equilibrium | |
|---|---|---|
| Condition | or | |
| What is compared to cost 1 | Sum of marginal benefits | One agent's marginal benefit |
| Total quantity | ||
| Who pays | Any split summing to | Often one agent only |
| Pareto efficient? | Yes | No |
My intuitionThe strict "" step also relies on each having positive, diminishing marginal benefit (concave ), which the slide uses implicitly. The key picture: at the non-contributing agent still has a positive marginal benefit, and nobody counts it.
Part 4 — Altruism
The slide's questionWhat happens when agents are altruists, that is, they internalise to some extent the other agent's utility?
Altruistic Utility
- Agent 1: with
- Agent 2: with
and measure how much each agent weighs the other's utility ( is the selfish case above).
Claimed results (to be shown in the problem set):
- With altruists, the equilibrium quantity of the public good is greater than with selfish agents.
- When or , the equilibrium quantity equals the socially optimal quantity.
Not derived on the slidesThe deck states these results and leaves the proof to the problem set, so there is no derivation here. Do not quote a formula for the altruistic equilibrium from this lecture.
My intuitionIf agent 1 sets , she weighs agent 2's utility fully, so her private marginal benefit from becomes , which is the planner's marginal social benefit. This is the same kind of fix as a tax in Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities: change the incentive so the agent counts the external effect. (My reading, not stated on the slide.)
Links to Lecture 5
| Idea | In Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities | Here |
|---|---|---|
| Externality | One agent's choice affects another's utility or cost | A public good affects many agents at once |
| Why markets fail | Private choice ignores the external effect | Each agent ignores the benefit to the others |
| Fix | Pigouvian Tax or Coase Theorem bargaining | Side-payment (Alice/Bob fee), or altruism () |
Difference from the bilateral caseThe Coase-style bargaining of Lec 5 works between two parties. With a public good each agent must guess everyone else's investment, so the pairwise bargain breaks down (slide 299).
Summary
- A public good is a good whose aggregate quantity enters every agent's utility; it is an externality hitting many agents at once.
- Two problems follow: under-provision (a Market Failure) and free riding.
- Alice/Bob example: the stable outcome is Bob 0, Alice 3 (grade B); a fee between 0.4 and 0.5 enables a Pareto improvement with Bob investing 1.
- Model: , , cost of 1 per unit.
- Planner: produce until (sum of marginal benefits equals marginal cost). Efficient iff .
- Nash equilibrium: . If , one agent free rides completely; total provision .
- Altruism () raises provision, and at or restores the social optimum (proof left to the problem set).
Related Notes
- Micro-Economics II (subject hub)
- Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities (externalities, Pigouvian tax, Coase theorem)
- Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium (welfare theorems, Pareto efficiency)
- PS_07-Core, Corner Endowments & Equilibrium vs the Social Planner (social planner vs equilibrium)