Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed B (April 2024) · Dr. Boaz Zik · worked-solution

Cost Functions, Exchange Equilibrium, Price Cap & Public Good Provision (2024 Moed B)

Cost Functions, Exchange Equilibrium, Price Cap & Public Good Provision (2024 Moed B)

Part of: Micro-Economics II Micro 2 Final Exam, Moed B (April 2024), Micro-Economics II, Dr. Boaz Zik. 3 hours, open material, 4 questions, 25 points each. Builds on: Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities, Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism Practice: PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings, PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner

Source

Answers follow the official solution (8 pages). Where the official text has a typo or a gap, the answer is kept and a > [!warning] callout says so. Part 4d has no worked official solution.

What this paper tests

Question Core idea Where it is taught
Q1 Cost Minimisation with a technology that mixes a concave input and a linear input: a kinked Cost Function, and when the two-input firm is cheaper than the one-input firm PS_03-Cost Minimisation & Properties of the Cost Function, Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium
Q2 Exchange Economy with Cobb-Douglas agents: Contract Curve, Walrasian Equilibrium, and what happens when agent 2's utility is scaled by AA PS_06-Exchange Equilibrium, Walrasian Prices & the Social Planner
Q3 Partial Equilibrium with Quasilinear Utility and a maximum price (Price Ceiling): welfare effects, then shifts in demand and in costs under a binding cap PS_04-Partial Equilibrium, Welfare & Price Ceilings
Q4 Public good with square-root benefits: stand-alone provision, social optimum, Nash equilibria, free riding Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism
Intuition: the one move behind each question
  • Q1: compare marginal product per dollar of each input. Labour is used first (its marginal product falls), capital takes over once labour's marginal product per dollar has dropped to capital's.
  • Q2: identical Cobb-Douglas exponents mean identical MRS at any common ratio y/xy/x, so the contract curve is the box diagonal. Scaling a utility function by AA changes nothing real.
  • Q3: under a binding cap, the quantity is set by the supply side (MCMC equals the cap). Everything that does not move MCMC leaves quantity unchanged.
  • Q4: each player equates her own marginal benefit to the price; the planner equates the sum.

Q1 — Cost functions with one and two inputs (25 points)

Input prices: pl=3p_l = 3, pk=12p_k = 12 in parts a to c, then pk=24p_k = 24 in part d.

1a — Cost function for f(l,k)=l+kf(l,k) = \sqrt{l} + k (10 points)

Answer
C(q)={3q2q≤212q−12q>2C(q) = \begin{cases} 3q^2 & q \le 2 \\ 12q - 12 & q > 2 \end{cases}

Step 1: where does the firm switch inputs? The technology has Diminishing RTS in labour: MPl=12lMP_l = \frac{1}{2\sqrt l} falls with ll, while MPk=1MP_k = 1 is constant. The Tangency Condition sets the RTS equal to the price ratio:

MPlMPk=12l=plpk=312\frac{MP_l}{MP_k} = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{l}} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = \frac{3}{12}

so 2l=42\sqrt{l} = 4, i.e. l=2\sqrt{l} = 2 and l=4l = 4.

Step 2: read off the two regimes. Labour alone can produce at most 4=2\sqrt{4} = 2 units while its marginal product per dollar is still at least capital's.

  • If q≤2q \le 2: use labour only, l(q)=q2l(q) = q^2 and k(q)=0k(q) = 0. Cost =3q2= 3q^2.
  • If q>2q > 2: labour is held at the tangency level l=4l = 4 (which delivers 4=2\sqrt 4 = 2 units) and capital supplies the rest, k(q)=q−2k(q) = q - 2. Cost =3⋅4+12(q−2)=12q−12= 3\cdot 4 + 12(q-2) = 12q - 12.
Intuition

Labour is cheap but has diminishing returns, capital is dear but each unit always adds exactly one unit of output. The first units of output come from labour. Once labour's marginal cost has risen to 1212 (the cost of a unit of output via capital), the firm stops adding labour and buys capital. Check: MC=6qMC = 6q for q<2q<2 reaches 1212 at q=2q = 2, and is 1212 ever after. The cost function is continuous at the kink: 3⋅22=12=12⋅2−123\cdot 2^2 = 12 = 12\cdot 2 - 12.

1b — Cost function for f(l)=lf(l) = \sqrt{l} (5 points)

Answer

C(q)=3q2C(q) = 3q^2

With one input there is no choice: q=lq = \sqrt l gives l=q2l = q^2 and cost =pl q2=3q2= p_l\,q^2 = 3q^2.

1c — When is the two-input firm strictly cheaper? pk=12p_k = 12 (5 points)

Answer

For all q>2q > 2.

Compare the two cost functions from 1a and 1b:

  • For q≤2q \le 2 they are identical, 3q23q^2 (the two-input firm chooses labour only, so it behaves like the one-input firm).
  • For q>2q > 2 the difference is
3q2−(12q−12)=3(q−2)2>03q^2 - (12q - 12) = 3(q-2)^2 > 0

so the two-input firm is strictly cheaper.

1d — The same question with pk=24p_k = 24, and the economics (5 points)

Answer
C(q)={3q2q≤424q−48q>4C(q) = \begin{cases} 3q^2 & q \le 4 \\ 24q - 48 & q > 4 \end{cases}

The two-input firm is strictly cheaper for all q>4q > 4 (compare q>2q > 2 in part c).

Derivation. Tangency: 12l=324\frac{1}{2\sqrt l} = \frac{3}{24}, so 2l=82\sqrt l = 8, l=4\sqrt l = 4, l=16l = 16. For q≤4q \le 4 use labour only (l=q2l = q^2, cost 3q23q^2). For q>4q > 4: l=16l = 16, k=q−4k = q - 4, cost =3⋅16+24(q−4)=24q−48= 3\cdot 16 + 24(q-4) = 24q - 48. The gap is 3q2−(24q−48)=3(q−4)2>03q^2 - (24q - 48) = 3(q-4)^2 > 0 for q>4q>4.

PP05_q1_cost_functions

Left: pk=12p_k = 12, kink at q=2q = 2. Right: pk=24p_k = 24, kink at q=4q = 4. The dashed curve is the one-input cost 3q23q^2. The two-input cost never lies above it and separates from it only after the kink.

Economic explanation (official)

The quantity beyond which the two-input firm is cheaper depends on relative prices. The more expensive capital is, the later the firm moves from producing with labour to producing with capital, so the two-input firm has an advantage only at a larger quantity.

Intuition

Capital is a "backup" input. It only has value once labour has become expensive at the margin. If capital costs twice as much, labour must run twice as far up its marginal-cost curve (6q6q must reach 2424, not 1212) before capital is worth buying. So the kink moves from q=2q = 2 to q=4q = 4.


Q2 — Exchange economy with a scale factor AA (25 points)

U1(x1,y1)=x1ay11−aU_1(x_1,y_1) = x_1^{a}y_1^{1-a} and U2(x2,y2)=A⋅x2ay21−aU_2(x_2,y_2) = A\cdot x_2^{a}y_2^{1-a}. Total resources X‾\overline X and Y‾\overline Y.

2a — Numerical case: a=0.4a = 0.4, A=1A = 1, ω1=(30,70)\omega^1 = (30, 70), ω2=(70,30)\omega^2 = (70, 30)

Totals: X‾=Y‾=100\overline X = \overline Y = 100.

(1) Contract curve (6 points)

Answer

y1=x1y_1 = x_1

On the Contract Curve, MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2. Both agents have exponent aa and A=1A=1:

a1−a⋅y1x1=a1−a⋅y2x2\frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{a}{1-a}\cdot\frac{y_2}{x_2}

so y1x1=y2x2=100−y1100−x1\frac{y_1}{x_1} = \frac{y_2}{x_2} = \frac{100 - y_1}{100 - x_1}. Cross-multiplying gives 100 y1−x1y1=100 x1−x1y1100\,y_1 - x_1y_1 = 100\,x_1 - x_1y_1, so y1=x1y_1 = x_1. The contract curve is the diagonal of the Edgeworth Box.

(2) Equilibrium prices and quantities (6 points)

Answer

x1=y1=54x_1 = y_1 = 54,   x2=y2=46\;x_2 = y_2 = 46,   px=23\;p_x = \frac{2}{3} (good yy is the numeraire, py=1p_y = 1).

A Cobb-Douglas consumer spends the share aa of wealth on xx. Agent 1 has wealth 30px+7030p_x + 70:

x1=0.4 (30px+70)px=12+28pxx_1 = \frac{0.4\,(30p_x + 70)}{p_x} = 12 + \frac{28}{p_x}

Agent 2 has wealth 70px+3070p_x + 30:

x2=0.4 (70px+30)px=28+12pxx_2 = \frac{0.4\,(70p_x + 30)}{p_x} = 28 + \frac{12}{p_x}

Market clearing for xx, x1+x2=100x_1 + x_2 = 100:

40+40px=100  ⇒  px=2340 + \frac{40}{p_x} = 100 \;\Rightarrow\; p_x = \frac{2}{3}

Then x1=12+28⋅32=54x_1 = 12 + 28\cdot\frac32 = 54 and x2=28+12⋅32=46x_2 = 28 + 12\cdot\frac32 = 46. For yy: y1=0.6 (30⋅23+70)=0.6⋅90=54y_1 = 0.6\,(30\cdot\frac23 + 70) = 0.6\cdot 90 = 54 and y2=46y_2 = 46. By Walras' Law the yy market clears too.

PP05_q2_edgeworth_equilibrium

Trade moves agent 1 from the endowment (30,70)(30, 70) to (54,54)(54, 54), which lies on the diagonal contract curve, as the First Welfare Theorem requires.

Intuition

Agent 1 starts with a lot of yy and little xx, agent 2 the reverse, and they have the same tastes. Trade moves them to the same bundle proportions. Agent 1 ends with slightly more than half of each good because xx is cheap relative to yy (px=23p_x = \frac23), and agent 1 holds more yy-wealth: at these prices agent 1's wealth is 9090 against agent 2's 76.6776.67.

2b — Equal split endowments: agent 2's utility is AA times agent 1's (7 points)

Endowments: ω1=ω2=(X‾/2,Y‾/2)\omega^1 = \omega^2 = (\overline X/2, \overline Y/2).

Answer

The equilibrium is at the endowment (no trade), so U2=A⋅U1U_2 = A\cdot U_1 in equilibrium.

Why (official). Both agents hold the same bundle, and they have the same MRSMRS (the factor AA does not enter the MRSMRS, because it multiplies the whole utility function). So at the endowment MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2: the endowment is already on the contract curve, and no mutually beneficial trade exists. The price ratio that supports it is the common MRSMRS, and each agent demands exactly her endowment. Then

U1=(X‾2)a(Y‾2)1−a,U2=A⋅(X‾2)a(Y‾2)1−a=A⋅U1.U_1 = \left(\tfrac{\overline X}{2}\right)^{a}\left(\tfrac{\overline Y}{2}\right)^{1-a}, \qquad U_2 = A\cdot\left(\tfrac{\overline X}{2}\right)^{a}\left(\tfrac{\overline Y}{2}\right)^{1-a} = A\cdot U_1 .
Intuition

Same bundle plus same tastes means nothing to trade. The only difference between the agents is the scale factor AA, which multiplies utility but has no effect on choices.

2c — Moving from A=LA = L to A=HA = H with L<HL < H (6 points)

Answer

The equilibrium allocation does not change. It is the endowment under both values of AA.

Why (official). Part (b) holds for any AA, and the MRSMRS does not depend on AA. So the equilibrium is at the common endowment whether A=LA = L or A=HA = H. Only the utility level of agent 2 changes (it scales up with AA); the allocation and prices stay the same.

Intuition

Utility is ordinal. Multiplying a utility function by a positive constant represents the same preferences, so demands, prices and allocations are unaffected. Agent 2 is "happier" in HH only in the sense of the number attached to the same bundle, which has no economic meaning by itself. (It would matter for a social planner who adds utilities, as in PS_07-Core, Corner Endowments & Equilibrium vs the Social Planner.)


Q3 — Partial equilibrium and a maximum price (25 points)

Demand comes from a representative consumer with Quasilinear Utility A⋅x−x2+yA\cdot x - x^2 + y (income high enough for an interior solution). Supply comes from a representative firm with f(k,l)=l1/4k1/4f(k,l) = l^{1/4}k^{1/4} and input prices plp_l, pkp_k.

Setup used in every part

For quasilinear utility, the inverse demand equals the marginal utility of xx: PD(x)=A−2xP^D(x) = A - 2x. The inverse supply is the marginal cost, C′(x)C'(x). Surplus formulas: CS=Ax−x2−pxCS = Ax - x^2 - px and FS=px−C(x)FS = px - C(x).

3a — A=180A = 180, pl=pk=1p_l = p_k = 1

(i) Cost function (4 points)

Answer

C(x)=2x2C(x) = 2x^2

Tangency: RTS=kl=plpk=1RTS = \frac{k}{l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k} = 1, so l=kl = k. The isoquant is l1/4k1/4=l1/2=xl^{1/4}k^{1/4} = l^{1/2} = x, so l(x)=k(x)=x2l(x) = k(x) = x^2 and

C(x)=1⋅x2+1⋅x2=2x2.C(x) = 1\cdot x^2 + 1\cdot x^2 = 2x^2 .

The marginal cost is MC=4xMC = 4x.

(ii) Equilibrium and welfare (4 points)

Answer

x∗=30x^* = 30, p∗=120p^* = 120, CS=900CS = 900, FS=1800FS = 1800, SW=2700SW = 2700.

Inverse demand is 180−2x180 - 2x. Set it equal to marginal cost, 180−2x=4x180 - 2x = 4x, so x∗=30x^* = 30 and p∗=120p^* = 120.

CS=180⋅30−302−120⋅30=5400−900−3600=900CS = 180\cdot 30 - 30^2 - 120\cdot 30 = 5400 - 900 - 3600 = 900
FS=120⋅30−2⋅302=3600−1800=1800FS = 120\cdot 30 - 2\cdot 30^2 = 3600 - 1800 = 1800
SW=CS+FS=2700.SW = CS + FS = 2700 .

(iii) A maximum price of 80 (4 points)

Answer

x=20x = 20, CS=1600CS = 1600, FS=800FS = 800, SW=2400SW = 2400.

Equilibrium Cap of 80 Change
Quantity 30 20 down 10
CSCS 900 1600 up 700
FSFS 1800 800 down 1000
SWSW 2700 2400 down 300

The cap of 80 is below the equilibrium price 120, so it binds. At a price of 80 consumers want 180−2x=80180 - 2x = 80, i.e. x=50x = 50, but the firm supplies only where MC=80MC = 80, i.e. 4x=804x = 80, x=20x = 20. The quantity traded is the short side, supply: x=20x = 20.

CS=180⋅20−202−80⋅20=3600−400−1600=1600CS = 180\cdot 20 - 20^2 - 80\cdot 20 = 3600 - 400 - 1600 = 1600
FS=80⋅20−2⋅202=1600−800=800FS = 80\cdot 20 - 2\cdot 20^2 = 1600 - 800 = 800
Typo in the official solution

The official text calls the second expression "the consumer surplus" twice: it says "The consumer surplus equal 80x−2x280x - 2x^2" (this is the firm surplus, giving 800) and later "The consumer surplus decreased" (it means the firm surplus). The numbers (1600 and 800) and the direction of each change are right.

Explanation (official). The consumer surplus rises: the lower price compensates the consumer for the lower quantity. The firm surplus falls because both the quantity and the price fall. Social welfare falls because the allocation no longer coincides with the equilibrium allocation.

Intuition: where the lost welfare goes

The 300300 loss is the Deadweight Loss triangle between demand and marginal cost over the units from 2020 to 3030: at x=20x = 20 demand is 140140 and MC=80MC = 80, so the triangle is 12⋅10⋅60=300\frac12\cdot 10\cdot 60 = 300. Splitting it up: on the 2020 units still traded, the price drop transfers (120−80)⋅20=800(120-80)\cdot 20 = 800 from firm to consumer. On the 1010 units no longer traded, the consumer loses 100100 and the firm loses 200200. So CSCS changes by +800−100=+700+800 - 100 = +700, FSFS by −800−200=−1000-800 - 200 = -1000, and the net is −300-300. This treats the 2020 units as going to the consumers who value them most, as the official CSCS formula does.

PP05_q3_price_cap

Blue: consumer surplus with the cap. Red: firm surplus with the cap. Grey: the deadweight loss triangle, units 20 to 30.

3b — Demand rises (AA increases) under a binding cap (5 points)

Answer

The firm surplus is unchanged. The consumer surplus rises.

Why (official). A higher AA shifts demand out, so the equilibrium price rises and the cap is still below it. The cap still binds, so the quantity is set where MCMC equals the cap. MCMC does not depend on AA, so the quantity is unchanged, and so is the price (it is the cap).

  • Firm surplus =p⋅x−C(x)= p\cdot x - C(x): pp, xx and CC are all unchanged, so it does not change.
  • Consumer surplus =A⋅x−x2−p⋅x= A\cdot x - x^2 - p\cdot x: xx and pp are unchanged, but AA is larger, so it rises by ΔA⋅x\Delta A\cdot x.

PP05_q3_cap_comparative_statics

Left panel: demand shifts up, the quantity stays at the same point (set by the cap meeting MC), so the shaded consumer-surplus area grows while the firm's triangle does not move. Shapes are illustrative; no numbers are implied.

Intuition

The consumer values every unit more, but the firm will not supply any more at a price of the cap. So the consumer enjoys a bigger gain from the same units. The extra demand only produces a bigger shortage.

3c — Input prices plp_l and pkp_k fall under a binding cap (5 points)

Answer

The quantity rises, the price stays at the cap, and both the consumer surplus and the firm surplus rise.

Why (official). A fall in input prices lowers the marginal cost curve. The quantity is where MCMC equals the cap, so it rises. The price stays equal to the cap.

  • Consumer surplus: for a given price it increases in the quantity, so it rises.
  • Firm surplus: the marginal cost has decreased, so the firm earns more on the same price and sells more, so it rises.
Intuition: a quick check with this firm's costs (mine)

With C(x)=c x2C(x) = c\,x^2 where c=2plpkc = 2\sqrt{p_lp_k} (the general version of part a(i)), the firm supplies x=cap2cx = \frac{\text{cap}}{2c} and earns FS=cap24cFS = \frac{\text{cap}^2}{4c}. A lower cc raises both the quantity and FSFS. The result needs the cap to still bind after the fall: if costs fell so far that the equilibrium price dropped below the cap, the cap would stop mattering. The question says the cap is kept, so we assume it still binds.

The right panel of the figure above shows the downward shift in MCMC and the larger quantity.

3d — How (b) and (c) differ (3 points)

Answer (official)

In (b), demand rose. With a maximum price the quantity is set by supply, which did not change, so only the consumer benefits. In (c), costs fell, which increases supply, so the quantity changes and both the firm and the consumer benefit.

Intuition

Under a cap the short side of the market is demand-heavy: there is a shortage. In a shortage the side that is not rationed (the supply side) decides the quantity. Shocks on the demand side just make the shortage bigger. Shocks on the supply side are the ones that actually change what gets traded.


Q4 — Public good provision (25 points)

Alice has utility ag+ya\sqrt{g} + y and Bob has utility bg+yb\sqrt{g} + y, where g=ga+gbg = g_a + g_b is the total public good and yy is money. Both have the same income II (large enough never to bind). One unit of gg costs 11 dollar. See Public Goods and Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism.

4a — Provision when the other contributes nothing (5 points)

Answer

Alice buys g=4g = 4 (with a=4a = 4). Bob buys g=9g = 9 (with b=6b = 6).

A buyer stops where her marginal utility from the public good equals its price. For Alice, with Bob buying nothing:

a2g=1  ⇒  g=a24=164=4.\frac{a}{2\sqrt g} = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; g = \frac{a^2}{4} = \frac{16}{4} = 4 .

For Bob, with Alice buying nothing:

b2g=1  ⇒  g=b24=364=9.\frac{b}{2\sqrt g} = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; g = \frac{b^2}{4} = \frac{36}{4} = 9 .

4b — a=b=6a = b = 6: optimum, equilibria and efficiency (7 points)

Answer
  • Social optimum: g=36g = 36.
  • Nash equilibria: all pairs (ga,gb)(g_a, g_b) with ga+gb=9g_a + g_b = 9.
  • Level of gg: 99 in equilibrium, which is less than the optimum of 3636.
  • Efficiency: the equilibrium is inefficient (under-provision).

Social optimum. The planner equates the sum of marginal utilities to the cost:

62g+62g=6g=1  ⇒  g=6  ⇒  g=36.\frac{6}{2\sqrt g} + \frac{6}{2\sqrt g} = \frac{6}{\sqrt g} = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; \sqrt g = 6 \;\Rightarrow\; g = 36 .

Nash equilibria. From part (a), each player alone wants a total of 364=9\frac{36}{4} = 9. If the other contributes gbg_b, Alice tops up to reach a total of 99 (or contributes nothing if gb≥9g_b \ge 9):

BRa(gb)=max⁡{0,  9−gb},BRb(ga)=max⁡{0,  9−ga}.BR_a(g_b) = \max\{0,\; 9 - g_b\}, \qquad BR_b(g_a) = \max\{0,\; 9 - g_a\}.

At any pair with ga+gb=9g_a + g_b = 9, ga=9−gb=BRa(gb)g_a = 9 - g_b = BR_a(g_b) and gb=9−ga=BRb(ga)g_b = 9 - g_a = BR_b(g_a), so each choice is a best response to the other. These are all Nash equilibria, and the total is 99 in each.

Why they differ. Each player compares her own marginal utility with the cost and ignores the benefit her contribution gives the other player (a positive externality). The planner counts both benefits. The equilibrium total of 99 is a quarter of the efficient 3636.

Intuition (mine): the welfare loss in numbers

Total surplus from a total of gg is 12g−g12\sqrt g - g (6g+6g6\sqrt g + 6\sqrt g for the two players, minus the cost of gg). At g=36g = 36 it is 72−36=3672 - 36 = 36. At g=9g = 9 it is 36−9=2736 - 9 = 27. The market equilibrium leaves 99 units of surplus on the table, which is why it is not Pareto efficient: a move to g=36g = 36 with a suitable split of the cost can make both players better off.

4c — a=4a = 4, b=6b = 6: a unique equilibrium where only Bob contributes (5 points)

Answer

The only Nash equilibrium is (ga,gb)=(0,9)(g_a, g_b) = (0, 9).

By 4a, Alice alone wants a total of 44 and Bob wants a total of 99. The best responses are:

BRa(gb)=max⁡{0,  4−gb},BRb(ga)=max⁡{0,  9−ga}.BR_a(g_b) = \max\{0,\; 4 - g_b\}, \qquad BR_b(g_a) = \max\{0,\; 9 - g_a\}.

Showing uniqueness.

  • Candidate (0,9)(0, 9). Bob's best response to ga=0g_a = 0 is 99. Alice's best response to gb=9g_b = 9 is max⁡{0,4−9}=0\max\{0, 4 - 9\} = 0. Each is a best response, so (0,9)(0,9) is a Nash equilibrium.
  • No equilibrium with ga>0g_a > 0. Alice contributes only if gb<4g_b < 4, and then ga=4−gbg_a = 4 - g_b, so the total is 44. But then Bob, who wants a total of 99 and so contributes gb=9−ga≥5g_b = 9 - g_a \ge 5, cannot be playing gb<4g_b < 4. Contradiction.
  • Hence ga=0g_a = 0, and Bob's best response is gb=9g_b = 9. This is the unique equilibrium.

PP05_q4_best_responses

Left: with a=b=6a = b = 6 the two best-response curves coincide along ga+gb=9g_a + g_b = 9, giving a continuum of equilibria. Right: with a=4a = 4, the curves cross only where Alice contributes nothing, at (0,9)(0, 9).

Intuition

Bob wants a total of 99; Alice only wants a total of 44. Once Bob has bought 99, Alice's wish is already met, so she free rides. The one with the stronger taste for the good (b>ab > a) provides it all.

4d — Verbal explanation of under-provision and free riding (8 points)

No official solution

The official solution only says "See the discussion in class." No worked answer is given, so none is written here. The discussion it points to is in Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism, Part 3c (the Nash equilibria by case) and Part 3d ("Why the Market Under-Provides"), with the results Under-Provision and Free Riding. Parts 4b and 4c above are the numerical examples of those two results.


Recap table

Part Tool One-line answer
1a Tangency 12l=plpk\frac{1}{2\sqrt l} = \frac{p_l}{p_k}, then split at the kink C=3q2C = 3q^2 for q≤2q \le 2; 12q−1212q - 12 for q>2q > 2
1b One input, no choice C=3q2C = 3q^2
1c Compare 1a and 1b Two-input firm strictly cheaper for q>2q > 2
1d Same with pk=24p_k = 24 C=3q2C = 3q^2 for q≤4q \le 4; 24q−4824q - 48 for q>4q > 4; cheaper for q>4q > 4; dearer capital delays the switch
2a1 MRS1=MRS2MRS_1 = MRS_2 y1=x1y_1 = x_1
2a2 Cobb-Douglas demands plus market clearing px=2/3p_x = 2/3; agent 1 gets (54,54)(54, 54), agent 2 gets (46,46)(46, 46)
2b Same bundle, same MRSMRS, so no trade Equilibrium at the endowment, U2=A⋅U1U_2 = A\cdot U_1
2c MRSMRS is independent of AA Allocation unchanged when AA goes from LL to HH
3a(i) RTS = price ratio, so l=k=x2l = k = x^2 C=2x2C = 2x^2
3a(ii) 180−2x=4x180 - 2x = 4x x=30x = 30, p=120p = 120, CS=900CS = 900, FS=1800FS = 1800, SW=2700SW = 2700
3a(iii) Cap binds, quantity from MC=80MC = 80 x=20x = 20, CS=1600CS = 1600, FS=800FS = 800, SW=2400SW = 2400
3b Quantity set by MC=MC = cap, which does not move with AA FSFS unchanged, CSCS up
3c MCMC falls, so quantity at the cap rises CSCS and FSFS both up
3d Supply side decides quantity under a cap (b) only consumers gain; (c) both gain
4a Own marginal utility = 1 Alice g=4g = 4; Bob g=9g = 9
4b Sum of marginal utilities = 1; best responses Optimum 3636; Nash: ga+gb=9g_a + g_b = 9; under-provision
4c Best responses max⁡{0,4−gb}\max\{0, 4 - g_b\}, max⁡{0,9−ga}\max\{0, 9 - g_a\} Unique Nash equilibrium (0,9)(0, 9)
4d Class discussion No official solution