General Equilibrium Production Economy & Externalities
- #micro-economics-ii
- #general-equilibrium
- #production-economy
- #edgeworth-box-production
- #efficiency-locus
- #PPF
- #RPT
- #second-welfare-theorem
- #externalities
- #pigouvian-tax
- #coase-theorem
- #market-failure
General Equilibrium Production Economy & Externalities
Part of: Micro-Economics II | Key concepts: Production Economy, Efficiency Locus, PPF, RPT, Second Welfare Theorem, Externalities, Pigouvian Tax, Coase Theorem, Market Failure
What This Presentation Is About
This note picks up from Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium, which established the First Welfare Theorem in an exchange economy. Here we:
- Complete the welfare theorems — the Second Welfare Theorem and why lump-sum taxes dominate distortionary taxes.
- Extend general equilibrium to production — two firms produce two goods using two inputs. We find what "efficiency" means, how the Production Possibility Frontier is derived, and why competitive markets attain the efficient outcome (MRS = RPT).
- Analyse externalities — one of the main reasons markets fail to be efficient. We cover consumption externalities, production externalities, the Pigouvian tax, and the Coase theorem.
Part 1 — Completing the Welfare Theorems
Recap of the First Welfare Theorem
In a competitive exchange economy, the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. This is remarkable: no government coordination is required — free agents pursuing their own interests, guided only by prices, achieve a socially efficient outcome.
The Second Welfare Theorem
Second Welfare TheoremIn a competitive free market, any Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium, provided the right initial endowments are chosen.
What this tells us about redistribution: If society wants a particular "fair" allocation — not just any efficient one — it can achieve it by redistributing endowments and then letting markets work. This is better, in principle, than direct intervention in prices (subsidies, price controls), because:
- Distortionary taxes/price controls alter agents' incentive margins, potentially pushing the economy off the Pareto frontier.
- A lump-sum tax (a tax independent of the agent's choices) does not distort margins — the agent still faces the same relative prices and will trade to an efficient outcome.
The practical caveatThe Second Welfare Theorem is partly hypothetical. To implement the "right" endowment, the government would need complete information about preferences and production functions — computationally impossible. In practice, taxes always create some distortion, so there is an unavoidable equity–efficiency tradeoff: redistributing income for fairness costs efficiency.
Part 2 — General Equilibrium: Production Economy
Setting Up the Economy
We now consider an economy with production:
- Two goods: and .
- Two inputs: labour and capital (fixed quantities and ).
- Two firms: Firm 1 produces with ; Firm 2 produces with .
- A representative consumer with utility who owns all inputs and firm profits.
The feasibility constraint is and .
The Edgeworth Box for Production
Just as in the exchange economy we used an Edgeworth box for consumption bundles, we use one here for input allocation:
- Horizontal axis = total labour .
- Vertical axis = total capital .
- Origin (bottom-left): Firm 1's input allocation.
- Origin (top-right, flipped): Firm 2's input allocation.
- Each point in the box is a feasible allocation.
Firm 1's isoquants run from in the standard orientation. Firm 2's isoquants are flipped around and overlaid on the box.
Efficiency in ProductionAn input allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no reallocation that strictly increases one firm's output without reducing the other's. Graphically, this occurs precisely where the two firms' isoquants are tangent.
At a tangency, the firms have the same Rate of Technical Substitution:
The ==efficiency locus== (also called the Pareto set) is the set of all Pareto efficient input allocations — all points where the isoquants are tangent.
From Efficiency Locus to the PPF
Each point on the efficiency locus corresponds to a specific pair (the outputs of the two firms). Tracing out all these pairs gives the ==Production Possibility Frontier (PPF)==.
Production Possibility Frontier (PPF)The PPF shows all combinations of that can be produced when the economy uses its inputs efficiently. Points inside the frontier are feasible but inefficient; points outside are infeasible.
Shape: We assume the PPF is concave (bowed out), because of diminishing marginal productivity — transferring inputs from to yields diminishing returns as grows.
Rate of Product Transformation (RPT)
Rate of Product Transformation (RPT)The RPT at a point on the PPF is the number of units of that must be sacrificed to produce one more unit of while remaining on the frontier: We assume RPT is increasing in (the PPF gets steeper as more is produced).
Why RPT increasesAs the economy shifts production toward , the inputs employed in have lower marginal products (diminishing returns), while the inputs released from are the least productive ones first. The opportunity cost of an extra unit of therefore rises — RPT increases.
Optimal Production: MRS = RPT
The representative consumer maximises subject to the feasibility constraint that lies on (or below) the PPF. Since is increasing, the optimum is on the PPF, and:
Efficiency condition for a production economyThe socially optimal allocation is the point on the PPF where:
The MRS (consumer side) equals the RPT (production side).
Intuition: MRS tells us how much the consumer is willing to give up for one more unit of (without losing utility). RPT tells us how much must be sacrificed in production to get one more . When MRS > RPT, shifting production toward makes the consumer better off (they value the extra more than it costs). When MRS < RPT, shift back. At MRS = RPT, no reallocation can improve welfare.
| Scenario | Implication | Direction to move |
|---|---|---|
| Consumer values more than it costs to produce | Increase | |
| Producing costs more than consumer values it | Decrease | |
| Optimal — cannot improve welfare | Stay here |
Equilibrium in a Production Economy
In a competitive equilibrium:
-
Firms minimise costs → each firm's RTS equals the input price ratio . Since both firms face the same input prices, both have the same RTS → they operate on the efficiency locus → production is on the PPF. ✓
-
Key result — RPT equals cost ratio: Along the PPF, total cost is fixed. At any point , this means . Differentiating, the slope of the iso-cost locus is:
- Firms price at marginal cost (perfect competition) → and . Therefore:
- Consumer maximises utility → sets .
Combining: — the competitive equilibrium achieves the socially optimal outcome. This is the Third Welfare Theorem result for a production economy (an extension of Theorem 1).
How equilibrium prices are found in practiceTo find the full equilibrium:
- Derive the efficiency locus (set using resource constraints).
- Derive the PPF.
- Find by solving .
- Normalise one output price (e.g., ), set .
- Use the cost function and to find input prices.
- Verify the budget constraint holds: .
Worked Examples
Example 1 — Linear PPF
Economy:
Step-by-step solutionEfficiency locus: , . Setting equal with , gives .
PPF: Substituting into : . For : . So the PPF is — a straight line, with .
Optimal point: . Set so . Substituting into PPF: .
Example 2 — Quadratic PPF
Economy:
Step-by-step solutionEfficiency locus: .
PPF: , so . Then . PPF: .
RPT: .
Optimal point: . Setting : . Substituting into PPF and solving: , .
Example 3 — Symmetric PPF
Economy:
Step-by-step solutionEfficiency locus: .
PPF: , . PPF: .
RPT: .
Optimal point: . Set . Substituting into PPF: .
Part 3 — Externalities and Market Failure
Why Markets Can Fail
The First Welfare Theorem assumed:
- Competitive markets (price-taking firms and consumers)
- Perfect information (no hidden quality)
- No externalities (agents' decisions affect only themselves)
A violation of any of these creates a market failure — the competitive equilibrium is no longer Pareto efficient. This section analyses externalities.
Externality (definition)An externality exists when the choices of one agent directly enter the utility function of a consumer or the cost function of a firm — without being reflected in market prices.
Note: If A's purchases raise the price of a good and this hurts B, that is not an externality — it is transmitted via the price mechanism. An externality bypasses the price mechanism entirely.
Examples: Second-hand smoke (negative), vaccination (positive), R&D spillovers (positive), river pollution (negative).
Externalities in Consumption
Why the Market Equilibrium Fails
Consider Homer and Barney, each consuming cigars and whiskey :
Key observation: Each agent's MRS (between their own cigars and whiskey) is independent of the other's consumption. So each agent's demand function is the same as if there were no externality — the equilibrium allocation is computed as if doesn't exist.
But if at the equilibrium (marginal private benefit of smoking < marginal harm imposed on the other), then both agents would be better off smoking less. The equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.
Worked Example, . Endowments each.
Equilibrium: Each agent's demand (ignoring the external term) gives . Market clearing: , .
Each agent's utility = .
Compare the allocation , : Utility = .
Both agents are better off at than at the equilibrium . The market overproduces cigars.
The Coase Theorem — Tradeable Externalities
Why does the market fail? Because the harm from smoking is non-tradeable — Homer cannot pay Barney to smoke less through a market transaction.
The fix: Make the externality tradeable. Suppose we create a market for "smoking rights". Barney is assigned a maximum quota of cigars; Homer can buy reductions from Barney. Now:
- Barney's utility over is unchanged.
- Homer's utility is , where is the amount Barney doesn't smoke — which Homer buys.
This is structurally identical to the exchange economy — two agents trading two goods. By the First Welfare Theorem, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Coase Theorem (informal)If property rights over externalities are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero, then market participants can negotiate to an efficient outcome, regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
Coase Theorem limitationsThe Coase theorem requires: (1) well-defined property rights, (2) low transaction costs, and (3) no wealth effects. In practice, many externalities involve millions of parties (e.g., global pollution), making negotiation infeasible.
Externalities in Production
Setup — Steel Mill and Fishery
- Firm S (steel) produces output and pollution , with cost .
- Firm F (fishery) produces fish , but is harmed by pollution: cost with .
Key properties of :
- (producing more steel costs more).
- is convex in : it decreases in pollution up to a level , then increases. So firm S benefits from some pollution (it reduces abatement costs) up to the point .
The Competitive Equilibrium Produces Too Much Pollution
Firm S's problem (ignoring F):
FOCs: and .
Firm F's problem (treating as given):
FOC: .
Social optimum (maximise combined profits):
FOCs:
The last condition says that at the optimum, the marginal saving to S from emitting one more unit of pollution must equal the marginal harm to F. Since , the right-hand side is positive, so at the optimum — meaning S should be producing to the left of where .
Conclusion: Firm S overproduces pollution in the competitive equilibrium because it does not internalise the harm it imposes on F.
Remedy 1 — Pigouvian Tax
Pigouvian TaxA Pigouvian tax is a per-unit charge on pollution imposed on the polluter. Set at: This makes S face the full social cost of its pollution.
How it works: Firm S's problem becomes . The FOC for becomes:
Setting restores the social optimum condition.
Practical difficultyImplementing the Pigouvian tax requires the government to know the firms' technology and — which is private information. In practice, regulators use approximations.
Remedy 2 — Creating a Pollution Market (Coase)
Assign F the right to clean water, which it can sell to S. Let be the price per unit of pollution and the quantity of pollution S is allowed to buy:
- Firm S: → FOC for : .
- Firm F: → FOC for : .
Market clearing ( same for both): ✓ — the social optimum is achieved.
The efficient outcome is the same regardless of whether F or S holds the property right (Coase Theorem) — only the distribution of profits differs.
| Approach | Mechanism | Requires |
|---|---|---|
| Pigouvian tax | Government sets | Full knowledge of , |
| Pollution market | Create tradeable rights, let markets clear | Well-defined property rights; low transaction costs |
| Command & control | Regulation caps at | Knowledge of social optimum |
Worked Example
Setup: , . Prices: , .
Competitive equilibriumFOCs for S: ... and .
FOC for F: .
Profits: , . Total: 1066.81
Social optimumFOCs: ; ; .
Substituting: ; ; .
Total profit: 1098.5 — higher than the competitive case (1066.81). The market failure destroyed 31.69 in total surplus.
Pigouvian tax for this example. The tax on pollution should be set at 13 per unit of .
Summary
| Concept | Key formula / idea |
|---|---|
| Second Welfare Theorem | Any Pareto efficient allocation is achievable; redistribute via lump-sum taxes to avoid distortions |
| Efficiency locus (production) | — both firms have same rate of technical substitution |
| PPF | Maps efficiency locus into output space; concave due to diminishing marginal returns |
| RPT | Opportunity cost of in terms of along the PPF; in equilibrium |
| Optimal production | — consumer's willingness to trade must equal production's opportunity cost |
| Competitive equilibrium | Firms price at MC → → First Best achieved |
| Externality | Effect of one agent's choices on another's utility/cost, not priced by the market |
| Consumption externality | Market overproduces the externality-generating good; marginal private benefit < social cost |
| Coase theorem | Tradeable rights restore efficiency if transaction costs are low |
| Production externality | Polluter sets but optimum requires |
| Pigouvian tax | $t^* = \partial C_F/\partial x\big |
Related Notes
- Lec_04-Theory of the Firm, Partial & General Equilibrium — Theory of the Firm, Partial Equilibrium, Exchange Economy, First Welfare Theorem
- Micro-Economics II — subject hub
- _Wiki-Link Registry — all wiki-links for this subject