PS10

  1. 1a

    Question 1 (noise externality). Factory A produces air conditioners and Factory B, located next to it, produces bottles. Noise from A's production breaks some of B's bottles, which raises B's production cost. Let aa be the quantity produced by A and bb the quantity produced by B. The costs are

    CA(a)=a2,CB(b,a)=b2+b⋅a,C_A(a) = a^2, \qquad C_B(b,a) = b^2 + b\cdot a,

    and the prices are pa=40p_a = 40 and pb=80p_b = 80.

    (a) What are the quantity of air conditioners and the quantity of bottles in a competitive equilibrium, and what is each firm's profit?

  2. 1b

    Question 1 (noise externality). Factory A produces air conditioners and Factory B, located next to it, produces bottles. Noise from A's production breaks some of B's bottles, which raises B's production cost. Let aa be the quantity produced by A and bb the quantity produced by B. The costs are

    CA(a)=a2,CB(b,a)=b2+b⋅a,C_A(a) = a^2, \qquad C_B(b,a) = b^2 + b\cdot a,

    and the prices are pa=40p_a = 40 and pb=80p_b = 80.

    (b) What are the quantities produced in the efficient allocation?

  3. 1c

    Question 1 (noise externality). Factory A produces air conditioners and Factory B, located next to it, produces bottles. Noise from A's production breaks some of B's bottles, which raises B's production cost. Let aa be the quantity produced by A and bb the quantity produced by B. The costs are

    CA(a)=a2,CB(b,a)=b2+b⋅a,C_A(a) = a^2, \qquad C_B(b,a) = b^2 + b\cdot a,

    and the prices are pa=40p_a = 40 and pb=80p_b = 80.

    (c) What is the size of the Pigouvian tax tt on each air conditioner that would yield an efficient allocation?

  4. 1d

    Question 1 (noise externality). Factory A produces air conditioners and Factory B, located next to it, produces bottles. Noise from A's production breaks some of B's bottles, which raises B's production cost. Let aa be the quantity produced by A and bb the quantity produced by B. The costs are

    CA(a)=a2,CB(b,a)=b2+b⋅a,C_A(a) = a^2, \qquad C_B(b,a) = b^2 + b\cdot a,

    and the prices are pa=40p_a = 40 and pb=80p_b = 80.

    Now firm A needs a "noise permit" for each unit it produces. Permits trade in a competitive market at price rr. In the initial endowment firm A receives ωA\omega_A permits and firm B receives ωB\omega_B, and Ω=ωA+ωB\Omega = \omega_A+\omega_B.

    (d) Write the maximisation problem of firm A and of firm B.

  5. 1e

    Question 1 (noise externality). Factory A produces air conditioners and Factory B, located next to it, produces bottles. Noise from A's production breaks some of B's bottles, which raises B's production cost. Let aa be the quantity produced by A and bb the quantity produced by B. The costs are

    CA(a)=a2,CB(b,a)=b2+b⋅a,C_A(a) = a^2, \qquad C_B(b,a) = b^2 + b\cdot a,

    and the prices are pa=40p_a = 40 and pb=80p_b = 80.

    Now firm A needs a "noise permit" for each unit it produces. Permits trade in a competitive market at price rr. In the initial endowment firm A receives ωA\omega_A permits and firm B receives ωB\omega_B, and Ω=ωA+ωB\Omega = \omega_A+\omega_B.

    (e) Find the equilibrium in the market: what is the equilibrium price rr? How many units of good A and good B are produced? Does the initial allocation of permits (ωA\omega_A and ωB\omega_B) change the equilibrium quantities?

  6. 1f

    Question 1 (noise externality). Factory A produces air conditioners and Factory B, located next to it, produces bottles. Noise from A's production breaks some of B's bottles, which raises B's production cost. Let aa be the quantity produced by A and bb the quantity produced by B. The costs are

    CA(a)=a2,CB(b,a)=b2+b⋅a,C_A(a) = a^2, \qquad C_B(b,a) = b^2 + b\cdot a,

    and the prices are pa=40p_a = 40 and pb=80p_b = 80.

    Now firm A needs a "noise permit" for each unit it produces. Permits trade in a competitive market at price rr. In the initial endowment firm A receives ωA\omega_A permits and firm B receives ωB\omega_B, and Ω=ωA+ωB\Omega = \omega_A+\omega_B.

    (f) Calculate the smallest number of noise permits for firm A, ωA\omega_A, that one should provide to firm A so that the equilibrium allocation with noise permits Pareto dominates the allocation with no permits from clause (a).

    The question sheet is cut off

    Part (f) in the PDF ends mid-sentence ("...with no permits from clause"). The recitation reads it as clause (a), and so does this page.

  7. 2a

    Question 2 (consumption externalities). A production economy with two agents, Homer (H) and Barney (B), and two goods, C and W. Each enjoys their own bundle but is hurt by the other's bundle:

    UH(cH,wH,cB)=10+cH1/2wH1/2−cB2/3wB1/3U_H(c_H, w_H, c_B) = 10 + c_H^{1/2}w_H^{1/2} - c_B^{2/3}w_B^{1/3}
    UB(cB,wB,cH)=10+cB1/2wB1/2−cH2/3wH1/3U_B(c_B, w_B, c_H) = 10 + c_B^{1/2}w_B^{1/2} - c_H^{2/3}w_H^{1/3}

    Initial endowments are (ωc,ωw)=(18,20)(\omega_c, \omega_w) = (18, 20) for each agent.

    (a) Find the equilibrium allocation and prices, and calculate the agents' utilities in equilibrium.

  8. 2b

    Question 2 (consumption externalities). A production economy with two agents, Homer (H) and Barney (B), and two goods, C and W. Each enjoys their own bundle but is hurt by the other's bundle:

    UH(cH,wH,cB)=10+cH1/2wH1/2−cB2/3wB1/3U_H(c_H, w_H, c_B) = 10 + c_H^{1/2}w_H^{1/2} - c_B^{2/3}w_B^{1/3}
    UB(cB,wB,cH)=10+cB1/2wB1/2−cH2/3wH1/3U_B(c_B, w_B, c_H) = 10 + c_B^{1/2}w_B^{1/2} - c_H^{2/3}w_H^{1/3}

    Initial endowments are (ωc,ωw)=(18,20)(\omega_c, \omega_w) = (18, 20) for each agent.

    (b) Consider the same environment with an initial endowment of (ωcB,ωwB)=(22,20)(\omega_c^B, \omega_w^B) = (22, 20) and (ωcH,ωwH)=(22,20)(\omega_c^H, \omega_w^H) = (22, 20). Find the equilibrium allocation and prices, and calculate the agents' utilities in equilibrium.

  9. 2c

    Question 2 (consumption externalities). A production economy with two agents, Homer (H) and Barney (B), and two goods, C and W. Each enjoys their own bundle but is hurt by the other's bundle:

    UH(cH,wH,cB)=10+cH1/2wH1/2−cB2/3wB1/3U_H(c_H, w_H, c_B) = 10 + c_H^{1/2}w_H^{1/2} - c_B^{2/3}w_B^{1/3}
    UB(cB,wB,cH)=10+cB1/2wB1/2−cH2/3wH1/3U_B(c_B, w_B, c_H) = 10 + c_B^{1/2}w_B^{1/2} - c_H^{2/3}w_H^{1/3}

    Initial endowments are (ωc,ωw)=(18,20)(\omega_c, \omega_w) = (18, 20) for each agent.

    (b) (the second economy has endowments (22,20)(22,20) for each agent; the first has (18,20)(18,20).)

    (c) In which economy is the agents' situation better? How can you explain your answer, given that each agent's utility is increasing in their own consumption of each good?

  10. 2d

    Question 2 (consumption externalities). A production economy with two agents, Homer (H) and Barney (B), and two goods, C and W. Each enjoys their own bundle but is hurt by the other's bundle:

    UH(cH,wH,cB)=10+cH1/2wH1/2−cB2/3wB1/3U_H(c_H, w_H, c_B) = 10 + c_H^{1/2}w_H^{1/2} - c_B^{2/3}w_B^{1/3}
    UB(cB,wB,cH)=10+cB1/2wB1/2−cH2/3wH1/3U_B(c_B, w_B, c_H) = 10 + c_B^{1/2}w_B^{1/2} - c_H^{2/3}w_H^{1/3}

    Initial endowments are (ωc,ωw)=(18,20)(\omega_c, \omega_w) = (18, 20) for each agent.

    (d) Consider the initial economy (endowments (18,20)(18,20)). Find a price other than the equilibrium price under which the agents' chosen allocation Pareto dominates the equilibrium allocation.

  11. 3a

    Question 3 (public goods). An economy with NN agents and two goods, a public good GG and money YY. Agent ii contributes gig_i to the public good (one dollar per unit), total provision is G=∑igiG = \sum_i g_i, and

    Ui=V(G)+yi=V(G)+(I−gi),U_i = V(G) + y_i = V(G) + (I - g_i),

    where VV is the same valuation function of the public good for all agents, and all agents have the same income II (assume it is large enough never to bind).

    Assumptions the solution uses implicitly

    VV is increasing and concave (V′>0V'>0, V′′<0V''<0), so V′V' is decreasing and equations like V′(go)=1V'(g^o)=1 have a unique solution.

    (a) Show that for any NN there exists a Nash equilibrium where all agents take the same action (a symmetric equilibrium), and prove that it is a Nash equilibrium. How does the overall quantity of the public good in equilibrium change as the number of agents in the economy increases?

  12. 3b

    Question 3 (public goods). An economy with NN agents and two goods, a public good GG and money YY. Agent ii contributes gig_i to the public good (one dollar per unit), total provision is G=∑igiG = \sum_i g_i, and

    Ui=V(G)+yi=V(G)+(I−gi),U_i = V(G) + y_i = V(G) + (I - g_i),

    where VV is the same valuation function of the public good for all agents, and all agents have the same income II (assume it is large enough never to bind).

    Assumptions the solution uses implicitly

    VV is increasing and concave (V′>0V'>0, V′′<0V''<0), so V′V' is decreasing and equations like V′(go)=1V'(g^o)=1 have a unique solution.

    (b) Derive the quantity that maximises social welfare. How does this quantity change as the number of agents increases? What does this say about how the market failure changes as NN grows?

  13. 4a

    Question 4 (altruism and public goods). Consider the public good model from class with two agents. Agent ii has income IiI_i, contributes gig_i, total provision is G=g1+g2G = g_1+g_2, and yi=Ii−giy_i = I_i - g_i. Assume the agents are altruistic, specifically

    U1=V1(G)+y1+α(V2(G)+y2),α≤1,U_1 = V_1(G) + y_1 + \alpha\big(V_2(G) + y_2\big), \qquad \alpha \le 1,
    U2=V2(G)+y2+β(V1(G)+y1),β≤1.U_2 = V_2(G) + y_2 + \beta\big(V_1(G) + y_1\big), \qquad \beta \le 1.

    (α=0\alpha = 0: selfish. α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1): partly altruistic. α=1\alpha=1: fully altruistic.)

    Assumptions

    As in Q3: Vi′>0V_i' > 0 and Vi′′<0V_i'' < 0, and α,β≥0\alpha,\beta \ge 0.

    (a) Derive what the possible equilibria are in this case.

  14. 4b

    Question 4 (altruism and public goods). Consider the public good model from class with two agents. Agent ii has income IiI_i, contributes gig_i, total provision is G=g1+g2G = g_1+g_2, and yi=Ii−giy_i = I_i - g_i. Assume the agents are altruistic, specifically

    U1=V1(G)+y1+α(V2(G)+y2),α≤1,U_1 = V_1(G) + y_1 + \alpha\big(V_2(G) + y_2\big), \qquad \alpha \le 1,
    U2=V2(G)+y2+β(V1(G)+y1),β≤1.U_2 = V_2(G) + y_2 + \beta\big(V_1(G) + y_1\big), \qquad \beta \le 1.

    (α=0\alpha = 0: selfish. α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1): partly altruistic. α=1\alpha=1: fully altruistic.)

    Assumptions

    As in Q3: Vi′>0V_i' > 0 and Vi′′<0V_i'' < 0, and α,β≥0\alpha,\beta \ge 0.

    (b) Show that the equilibrium quantity of the public good is greater than in the case where the agents are selfish.

  15. 4c

    Question 4 (altruism and public goods). Consider the public good model from class with two agents. Agent ii has income IiI_i, contributes gig_i, total provision is G=g1+g2G = g_1+g_2, and yi=Ii−giy_i = I_i - g_i. Assume the agents are altruistic, specifically

    U1=V1(G)+y1+α(V2(G)+y2),α≤1,U_1 = V_1(G) + y_1 + \alpha\big(V_2(G) + y_2\big), \qquad \alpha \le 1,
    U2=V2(G)+y2+β(V1(G)+y1),β≤1.U_2 = V_2(G) + y_2 + \beta\big(V_1(G) + y_1\big), \qquad \beta \le 1.

    (α=0\alpha = 0: selfish. α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1): partly altruistic. α=1\alpha=1: fully altruistic.)

    Assumptions

    As in Q3: Vi′>0V_i' > 0 and Vi′′<0V_i'' < 0, and α,β≥0\alpha,\beta \ge 0.

    (c) Show that the equilibrium quantity of the public good increases when α\alpha and β\beta increase.

  16. 4d

    Question 4 (altruism and public goods). Consider the public good model from class with two agents. Agent ii has income IiI_i, contributes gig_i, total provision is G=g1+g2G = g_1+g_2, and yi=Ii−giy_i = I_i - g_i. Assume the agents are altruistic, specifically

    U1=V1(G)+y1+α(V2(G)+y2),α≤1,U_1 = V_1(G) + y_1 + \alpha\big(V_2(G) + y_2\big), \qquad \alpha \le 1,
    U2=V2(G)+y2+β(V1(G)+y1),β≤1.U_2 = V_2(G) + y_2 + \beta\big(V_1(G) + y_1\big), \qquad \beta \le 1.

    (α=0\alpha = 0: selfish. α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1): partly altruistic. α=1\alpha=1: fully altruistic.)

    Assumptions

    As in Q3: Vi′>0V_i' > 0 and Vi′′<0V_i'' < 0, and α,β≥0\alpha,\beta \ge 0.

    (d) Show that when either α=1\alpha = 1 or β=1\beta = 1 the equilibrium quantity is equal to the socially optimal quantity.

Related: Lec_05-Production Economy & Externalities, Lec_06-Public Goods & Altruism