Company Law & Corporate Structures
- #legal-and-tax
- #company-law
- #corporate-structure
- #securities
- #corporate-governance
- #agency-problem
- #separate-legal-personality
- #israeli-companies-law
Company Law & Corporate Structures
Part of: Legal and Tax Aspects | Key concepts: Types of Legal Entities, Articles of Association, Limited Liability, Share, Bond, Option (Security), Corporate Governance, Agency Problem, Separate Legal Personality, Piercing the Corporate Veil
Session 3 — Legal and Tax Aspects of Entrepreneurship, Dr. Yuval Reinfeld (Reichman University). Statutory references are to the Israeli Companies Law (1999) unless stated otherwise.
Why This Session Exists
Session 2 introduced the vocabulary of legal entrepreneurship and named "improper corporate structure" as one of the five core risks. This session drills into the single most consequential structural choice a founder makes — what legal vessel to pour the venture into — and then opens the vessel up: how a company is built, what it can issue (shares, bonds, options), who controls it, and — crucially — when the law will let creditors reach past the company to the people behind it.
The thread running through the whole sessionEverything here orbits one idea: a company is a separate legal person that the law conjures into existence so that risk can be contained. Limited liability is the headline benefit; the agency problem, minority oppression, and veil-piercing are all the prices and limits of that benefit. Read every topic as either "how the separation is built" or "when the separation breaks down."
Part 1 — Types of Legal Entities
Before "company" there is a menu of vehicles. Israeli law is unusually rich here because several entities are historical relics of the pre-state Yishuv (e.g. the cooperative society). The founder's job is to pick the vehicle whose liability, taxation, and control profile fits the venture.
| Entity | Liability | Registration | Taxation | Typical use |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sole Proprietor (Osek Murshe/Patur) | Personal — no separation | Simple, no lawyer needed | Simple, single-layer (personal income tax); expenses deductible | Most small businesses, freelancers, clinics, shops |
| Partnership | Personal, joint & several | Not required (though technically mandatory) — very easy | Pass-through: each partner files personally | Law/accounting firms; ≤ 20 partners (except professional) |
| Association (Amuta) | Separate (like a corporation) | Registrar of Associations | Tax benefits, donations under Section 46 | Non-profits; purposes must be social; profits cannot be distributed |
| Cooperative Society (Agudah Shitufit) | Members bear larger responsibility on liquidation | Registrar of Cooperative Societies | Profits shared by participation, not capital | Kibbutzim, moshavim, Egged; "one member, one vote" |
| Statutory Corporation | Defined by statute; no owner | Created by law | n/a | Public bodies (Academy of the Hebrew Language, Council for Higher Education) |
| Company (Ltd.) | Limited to investment | Registrar of Companies | Double taxation (corporate tax + dividend tax) | Startups, businesses raising capital, risky ventures |
Sole Proprietor — the simplest default
DefinitionA sole proprietor (Osek Murshe or, below a revenue threshold, Osek Patur) is not a separate legal entity — the business is the person. Its appeal is simple, single-layer taxation (unlike a company's double taxation) and the fact that business expenses are deductible.
The rule of thumb taught in the course: once expected annual revenue exceeds ~500,000 NIS, or you take on partners, need investors, or run real operational risk, you should consider switching to a company.
Partnership — easy to form, dangerous on liability
Definition (Section 1, Partnerships Ordinance)A partnership is a legal association of two or more persons (or companies) who run a business together to make a profit, and who are not incorporated in another form (company, cooperative). Its purpose under Israeli (and English) law is running a business.
Three defining features explain why partnerships are risky:
- Fiduciary duty between partners — each must act in good faith toward the others.
- Personal, joint and several liability — every partner is fully liable for all the partnership's obligations.
- Mutual agency — every partner acts as an agent of the partnership and of all other partners, and can bind them through ordinary-course actions. (Contrast a company, which acts only through its board and CEO under the Companies Law and its articles.)
The agency trap of partnershipsBecause each partner can bind all the others and is personally liable for everything, one partner's mistake can bankrupt the rest personally. A company solves both problems at once: it acts only through defined organs, and it shields shareholders behind limited liability.
Partnerships require no registration, are limited to 20 partners (except professional ones), and can be dissolved easily.
Law firm — why partnerships persistA law firm is traditionally an unlimited partnership. A limited partnership is possible (so long as at least one partner is not exempt), and even a private company (Ltd.) is possible under strict limits (e.g. all shareholders must be lawyers). But note: professional liability is always personal — a lawyer cannot hide malpractice behind a corporate veil. This is why personal-accountability professions keep using partnerships.
Cooperative society — the egalitarian "hybrid creature"
DefinitionA cooperative society (Agudah Shitufit) is a uniquely Israeli entity blending economic activity with communal, egalitarian principles. Legally it is a "strange hybrid" — part non-profit, part profit-distributing business.
Its distinguishing features:
- Objectives: promote self-help, cooperation, and improving members' living conditions.
- Equality: each member has equal rights regardless of how much they invested — there are no controlling shareholders and no shares.
- Profit distribution: based on participation in the cooperative's activity, not on capital contributed.
- Governance: the democratic principle — one member, one vote.
- Supervision: the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, not the Companies Law.
- Capital limits: caps on how much any one member can hold, to prevent concentration of power.
This egalitarian structure becomes legally decisive in the Pri HaEmek case below.
Company vs. Partnership — the three axes of difference
This comparison is the hinge of Part 1. A company differs from a partnership along three axes:
| Axis | Partnership | Company (Ltd.) |
|---|---|---|
| Legal structure | A combination of ≥2 persons; formed by simply agreeing to partner (registration rarely enforced) | A constructed legal structure: shareholders + board of directors + officers; needs articles, directors, share allocation, registration |
| Legal liability | Fully transparent — every partner personally liable for all debts, and binds the others | A separate legal body; shareholders generally not liable beyond their investment |
| Taxation & bookkeeping | Like a sole proprietor — simple books, each partner files personally at personal rates | Double-entry books, audited annual report; pays corporate tax, shareholders pay dividend/capital-gains tax |
The trade-off in one lineA partnership is cheap and simple but personally dangerous; a company is costly and formal but protective and investable. Founders accept the company's overhead precisely to buy limited liability and the ability to issue shares.
Part 2 — Forming & Structuring a Company
Why establish a company?
Two drivers recur: the mission (operating a real business with growth ambitions) and investors (you cannot sell equity in a sole proprietorship). Add risk-shielding and tax planning at higher profit levels, and the company becomes the natural vehicle.
How to establish a company — the two steps
Step 1 — Choose the company type:
| Type | Defining feature |
|---|---|
| Limited company (Ltd.) | Shareholders' liability is limited to their investment |
| Private company | Not traded on a stock exchange |
| Public company | Shares offered to the public (traded on an exchange) |
| Single-member company | Owned by one person |
Step 2 — File the required documents: an application to register, the Articles of Association, a declaration of first directors, and a one-time registration fee. On completion the Registrar issues a Certificate of Incorporation.
The Articles of Association — the company's constitution
DefinitionThe Articles of Association (Takanon) are the company's foundational governing document — its internal constitution. They are mandatory (Section 15).
The Companies Law splits the contents into mandatory and optional:
| Mandatory content (Section 18) | Optional content (Section 19) |
|---|---|
| Company name | Number of directors |
| Company objectives | Rules for corporate governance |
| Details of registered share capital | Powers of shareholders and directors |
| Details on limitation of liability | Rights and duties of shareholders and directors |
| Conditions for transfer of shares |
The Articles are a contract (Section 18 / 15)Critically, the Articles constitute a contract between (a) the company and its shareholders, and (b) the shareholders among themselves, governing all the rights and obligations they specify. This "articles-as-contract" idea is the legal lever in the Pri HaEmek case — you cannot unilaterally rewrite the deal between members.
Limited liability & the structure of the company
Limited liabilityLimited liability means a shareholder's exposure is capped at the amount they invested in their shares. If the company collapses, they lose their shares — but creditors generally cannot pursue their personal assets.
The company's internal architecture is taught with a political analogy:
| Organ | Political analogy | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Shareholders (general meeting) | The Knesset (legislature) | Ultimate owners; vote at the general meeting; hold minority rights (equality, transparency, protection from oppression); receive dividends |
| Officers (CEO + Board of Directors) | The government (executive) | Run the company; set and execute strategy |
| Employees | The civil service | Carry out operations |
Minority rights — protecting the small shareholder
Because majority shareholders control the vote, the law arms the minority with defensive rights:
- Right to information (financial statements, major transactions).
- Voting rights at the general meeting.
- Right to file a derivative suit if officers harm the company.
- Right to petition the court in cases of minority oppression.
- Right to propose topics for the general meeting (in some cases).
These rights are the law's answer to the majority-vs-minority agency problem discussed in Part 5.
Private vs. Public company
| Dimension | Private company | Public company |
|---|---|---|
| Board size / chair | May have 1 director; chair optional and may also be CEO | ≥ 4 directors; chair mandatory and generally cannot also be CEO (without general-meeting approval) |
| CEO | Optional — board can run it directly | Must appoint at least one CEO |
| External directors | Not required | ≥ 2 external (independent) directors |
| Reporting | To the Registrar of Companies only | To the Registrar + Securities Authority + the exchange (cf. Paz vs. Yellow) |
| Disclosure | Limited | Principle of full disclosure — detailed quarterly & annual reports |
| Going public | — | Becomes public via an IPO (public offering with a prospectus) |
Why the public company carries so much regulationA public company sells shares to dispersed investors who don't run the company and can't monitor it. The value of their shares depends on management's performance, so the law forces transparency (full disclosure) as the price of access to public capital — only an informed investor can make a rational decision. The heavier governance (external directors, mandatory CEO/chair separation) protects that public interest.
Part 3 — Securities: Shares, Bonds & Options
A company funds itself by issuing securities. The three core instruments differ in one fundamental way: shares = ownership, bonds = debt, options = a right to buy.
Shares — units of ownership
DefinitionA share is a security granting a unit of ownership in the company. It gives participation rights, influence over management, and entitlement to profits.
A share bundles together five rights:
| Right | Source | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Voting rights | Section 188 | Vote at general meetings; influence major decisions (director appointments, major transactions) |
| Dividends | Section 190 | Share in distributed profits |
| Liquidation rights | — | Proportional claim on residual assets after all debts are paid |
| Value per Articles | — | The Articles fix the rights/value of each class of share |
| Distribution by investment | — | Bigger investment → more shares → more rights |
One-share-one-vote vs. share classesIn a private company, the default is often "one share = one vote." In a public company, different share classes may carry different voting power — letting founders keep control while raising capital (super-voting shares).
Dividends — the solvency guardrail (Section 190)A dividend is a distribution of company profits (cash or stock) to shareholders. It may only be paid when (1) the company has sufficient profits and (2) the distribution doesn't endanger solvency. This protects creditors: shareholders cannot drain a fragile company.
Liquidation & distribution by investmentOn liquidation, if 1M NIS remains after debts, shareholders split it proportionally. And rights track investment: if A invests 500,000 NIS → 5 shares and B invests 100,000 NIS → 1 share, then A receives 5× the profits/dividends of B.
Bonds — lending to the company
DefinitionA bond is essentially a loan from the investor to the company (or government): a contractual obligation to repay principal + interest. The company is the borrower; the bondholder is a creditor, not an owner.
Bond cash flowInvest 1,000 NIS at 5%/year → receive 50 NIS interest annually, plus your 1,000 NIS back at maturity. A real-estate firm needing project finance might issue a 10,000 NIS bond promising repayment in 5 years at 3% (300 NIS/year) — instead of a bank loan.
| Government bonds | Corporate bonds | |
|---|---|---|
| Issuer | The government | Private/public companies |
| Risk | Generally low | Higher |
| Interest | Typically lower | Often higher, or collateral-backed |
Types of private (corporate) bonds: tradable (sold on the exchange), non-tradable (private placement to banks/institutions), convertible (can convert into shares under set conditions), and collateral-backed (secured against company assets to reduce investor risk).
Bond vs. share — the one distinction to rememberBondholder = lender, not a partner in ownership; gets fixed repayment + interest, ranks ahead of shareholders on liquidation. Shareholder = owner, participates in control and upside, but is last in line if the company fails. Debt is safer but capped; equity is riskier but unlimited.
Options — the right, not the obligation, to buy
DefinitionAn option is a derivative: a contract giving you the right (but not the obligation) to buy (or sell) an asset — usually a share — at a pre-agreed price (the strike price) within a fixed period (until the expiration date). Its value is derived from the underlying share.
Why "no obligation" is the whole pointYou buy an option to purchase a share at a strike of 500 NIS, paying a premium of 50 NIS.
- Scenario 1 — share rises to 600 NIS: exercise the option, buy at 500, sell at 600. Gross gain 100 NIS, net +50 NIS after the premium.
- Scenario 2 — share falls to 400 NIS: you don't exercise (buying at 500 would lose money). Your loss is only the 50 NIS premium.
The payoff is therefore capped on the downside (the premium) and open on the upside: where is the share price at expiry and is the strike. This asymmetry — limited loss, unlimited gain — is exactly why options are the backbone of employee equity (ESOP): an employee can only win.
Part 4 — Corporate Governance: Who Holds Which Power?
The Companies Law allocates powers among the organs and limits how far they can be delegated. This is the machinery that turns "the company" into concrete decisions.
Powers of shareholders (Section 57)
The general meeting holds the constitutional powers it cannot give away:
- Appoint the board of directors.
- Approve transactions with interested parties.
- Increase/decrease share capital (allocate shares).
- Appoint the company's auditor and internal auditor.
Powers of the board of directors (Section 92)
The board's mandateThe board of directors is appointed by shareholders, sets strategy and supervision, appoints and dismisses the CEO, and approves the financial statements. The recurring question: which of these can be delegated down to the CEO?
| Can be delegated to CEO | Cannot be delegated |
|---|---|
| Ongoing administrative powers | Appointment/dismissal of the CEO |
| Executing board-approved strategy / action plans | Approval of financial statements |
| Negotiating defined matters | Determining general business strategy |
| Pre-defined professional tasks (project management, small contracts) | Dividend decisions & significant capital changes |
| e.g. running the budget up to a ceiling | Substantive structural change or IPO |
The logic of the delegation lineAnything operational and reversible can flow to the CEO; anything constitutional, irreversible, or conflict-prone (who runs the company, what the accounts say, how to deploy capital) stays with the board. The board exists to monitor the CEO — it cannot delegate away the very decisions that constitute that monitoring.
Limitations of the board — why boards underperform (Section 92)
The slides are unusually candid about the board's real-world weaknesses:
- Often appointed by the controlling shareholder (so not truly independent).
- Superficiality — directors don't dig deep.
- Limited information — they rely on the CEO for what they know.
- Acting as a "rubber stamp."
The law's structural answer: external directors. In a private company the articles govern (minimum one director); in a public company there must be ≥ 2 external (independent) directors, and at least one must have accounting and financial expertise (Sections 239–240; see also 240(b)). External directors exist to represent the company's interest — including the minority's — against the controlling shareholder.
Part 5 — The Agency Problem
Definition (Section 192(a))The agency problem arises when an officer (CEO, director, senior manager) is legally bound to act for the company's benefit but has personal interests that pull the other way. Section 192(a) imposes a duty of loyalty + duty of care: the officer must act only for the company, not for himself or a third party. Under the Companies Law his actions count as the corporation's actions — which is exactly why his loyalty matters so much.
The session maps three distinct agency conflicts, each with its own victim:
| Conflict | Who's tempted | Who's harmed | Classic example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shareholders ↔ management | Managers spend the company's money on perks (executive jet, big car) instead of profitable investment | Shareholders | A CEO signs a costly contract with a friend's firm despite worse terms — acting for the friend, not the company |
| Majority ↔ minority shareholders | Controllers make decisions that benefit themselves at the minority's expense | Minority shareholders | (Why minority rights & external directors exist) |
| Shareholders ↔ creditors | Shareholders push excessive risk for big upside, knowing they're shielded if it fails | Creditors | Thin-capitalization gambles (→ Northern Chicks) |
The shareholders-vs-creditors conflict is the subtle oneBecause shareholders enjoy limited liability, they capture the upside of risky bets but offload the downside onto creditors if the company is liquidated. This asymmetry encourages reckless risk-taking — and is the precise mischief the subordination doctrine (Part 7) was built to correct.
Spot-the-agency-problemA director wants to invest a large sum in a project run by another company owned by his relative, even though better proposals exist. The conflict between his personal tie and the company's interest is a textbook agency problem and a breach of the Section 192(a) duty of loyalty.
Part 6 — Separate Legal Personality & the Corporate Veil
This is the doctrinal heart of company law.
The rule (Section 4)A company has separate legal personality: it is capable of any right or obligation consistent with its nature — it can own, contract, sue, be sued, and even bear criminal liability (the Modiin case). There is a corporate veil separating the company's debts from its shareholders' personal debts.
The consequence is limited liability: a shareholder who paid 10 NIS for shares can never be sued for more than 10 NIS, even if the company collapses into debt. The company alone bears its obligations.
The foundation: Salomon (England, 1897)
Salomon v. Salomon & Co.The 1897 English ruling is the bedrock of separate legal personality. It held that a company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders even when the main shareholder runs it in practice. Incorporation creates a genuine legal wall, not a sham.
Organ theory — giving the company a "mind"
DefinitionOrgan theory lets the law attribute the human characteristics needed for liability (intent, conduct) to the corporation itself. The mental and behavioural elements that exist in an organ (a senior officer) are treated as the corporation's own.
Tzuk Or (CA 407/89) — the philosophical justificationJustice Barak rejected the idea that a corporation is "artificial." If the corporation is artificial, then so are ownership, rights, and contracts. The corporation is a real object of rights and duties — but it exists only through human beings: "there is no corporation without law, and no law without human beings." The corporation acts only through the actions of people, and organ theory is what lets those actions be the company's actions.
Modiin — criminal liability, but boundedJustice Barak held organ theory can impose criminal liability on a company — but only where justified. For offences a corporation typically commits (e.g. tax offences) liability is appropriate; for offences like bigamy it makes little sense; many fall in a gray area. "The mental element in the organ is captured as the mental element of the corporation."
Why we grant separate personality at all
The justificationsSeparate legal personality (and the limited liability it carries) exists to encourage reasonable risk-taking — it offers opportunity without ruinous personal risk, capping the shareholder's exposure at their investment. Without it, almost no one would fund innovation. The doctrines below are the safety valves that stop this shield from being abused.
Piercing the corporate veil (Section 6)
The exceptionPiercing the corporate veil ("raising the curtain") lets a court look through the company to its shareholders/officers and impose personal liability. Under Section 6, the court may do so where the separate personality is abused.
When the court deviates from limited liabilitySection 6 permits piercing where there is:
- Use of the company for fraud or to wrong creditors.
- Harm to the company's purpose by taking unreasonable risk about repaying debts.
- Awareness or willful blindness by a shareholder to improper conduct.
The hard question the slides pose — "Where is the boundary?" — has no bright line. Piercing is exceptional; courts protect the Salomon principle and only lift the veil for genuine abuse.
Part 7 — Subordination Doctrine: the Northern Chicks Case
CaseCA 4263/04 — Kibbutz Mishmar HaEmek v. Adv. Tomer Manor (liquidator of Northern Chicks). The question: is thin capitalization alone enough to subordinate a shareholder's debt to the company's other creditors?
Thin capitalizationThin capitalization is when a company is financed mainly by loans (often from its owners) rather than equity. It leaves the company exposed — there is no equity safety cushion in a crisis.
Facts: Northern Chicks was formed in 1998 by Ravaya HaEmek (66%) and Ramot Yohanan Hatchery (33%) with share capital of only 190 NIS. It marketed chicks on thin capitalization, and within two years collapsed (a feed-quality failure, a problematic market, and conflicted mismanagement). The owners had funded it largely via shareholder loans and then filed debt claims to recover those loans as ordinary creditors.
Credit hierarchy (who gets paid first)
- Secured creditors (mortgage, liens)
- Priority creditors (employees, taxes)
- Unsecured creditors (regular creditors, then subordinated creditors, and last — the shareholders)
Subordination doctrine (Section 6(c), per Justice Rubinstein)Subordination of debt is "the suspension of a shareholder's right to repayment of his debt from the company until after the company has fully paid all its obligations to other creditors." The court treated the shareholder loans as if they were equity, so external creditors are paid in full first.
Ruling: in cases of thin capitalization + improper management, repayment to shareholders can be delayed until external creditors are fully paid. Profits that should have been the company's safety cushion had been routed to owners as loans — so those loans were subordinated.
Subordination vs. piercing — a gentler toolSubordination is an alternative doctrine to "raising the curtain." Piercing destroys the separation (shareholders become personally liable); subordination preserves it but merely re-orders the queue — shareholders still only risk what they put in, but they can't jump ahead of real creditors by dressing up equity as debt. It is the proportionate response to the shareholders-vs-creditors agency problem. (Critique noted in the judgment: it effectively requires more equity though the law doesn't say so, and the required amount is unclear.)
Part 8 — Pri HaEmek: Can a Majority Strip Limited Liability?
CaseThe Pri HaEmek cooperative (kibbutzim + moshavim) hit insolvency in a severe economic crisis. Its general meeting voted — kibbutz representatives outvoting the moshav representatives — to waive limited liability and attribute the cooperative's debts personally to its members.
Question: Is the general meeting authorized to impose the cooperative's debts on its members?
- District Court: No — you cannot attribute the cooperative's debts to members against their consent.
- Supreme Court (Justice Barak, majority): The cooperative's separate legal personality applies even without limited liability. Attributing personal debts is a substantive change to the foundational bargain, so it requires the unanimous consent of all members — not a mere majority. Result: the general-meeting decision was cancelled; the debts remained the cooperative's alone.
The doctrinal toolkit Pri HaEmek deploysSeparate legal personality · agency relationships between the cooperative and its members · piercing the veil · limited liability · amendment of the foundational documents (and the prohibition on amendments outside the normative framework) · the articles-as-contract (between the corporation and its members, and between members inter se).
Why this matters beyond cooperativesBarak stressed that here there is no difference between a company and a cooperative despite their substantive differences. The principle generalises: the articles are a contract, and a majority cannot unilaterally rewrite the most basic term — who bears the debts. Limited liability is part of the deal each member signed; stripping it is a substantive deviation needing everyone's agreement. This is the direct application of the "articles-as-contract" idea from Part 2.
Summary
- Entity menu: Israeli law offers sole proprietor, partnership, association, cooperative society, statutory corporation, and the company (Ltd.). The choice trades off liability, taxation, and control. Sole proprietors and partnerships expose you personally; the company buys limited liability at the cost of double taxation and formality.
- Company vs. partnership differ on three axes: legal structure (constructed organs vs. a handshake), liability (separate body vs. personal & transparent), and tax/books (corporate tax + audited accounts vs. pass-through).
- Formation: choose the type, then file articles + first-directors declaration to get a Certificate of Incorporation. The Articles of Association are mandatory (s.15), carry mandatory (s.18) and optional (s.19) content, and are a contract between the company and shareholders and among shareholders.
- Structure: shareholders (≈ Knesset) own and vote with minority protections; officers (≈ government: CEO + board) run it; public companies carry far heavier governance and full-disclosure duties than private ones.
- Securities: a share = ownership (voting s.188, dividends s.190, residual liquidation rights); a bond = debt (principal + interest, creditor ranks ahead of shareholders); an option = a right to buy at a strike, with capped loss and open upside ().
- Governance: shareholders hold un-delegable powers (s.57: appoint board, auditor, alter capital); the board (s.92) sets strategy and hires/fires the CEO but cannot delegate the constitutional decisions; external directors (s.239–240) counter weak, controller-captured boards.
- Agency problem (s.192(a)): officers owe loyalty + care; conflicts run management↔shareholders, majority↔minority, and shareholders↔creditors — the last fuelled by limited liability encouraging excessive risk.
- Separate legal personality (s.4): the company is a real legal person (Salomon 1897); organ theory (Tzuk Or; Modiin for crime) attributes human intent to it. The veil can be pierced (s.6) for fraud, unreasonable debt-risk, or willful blindness.
- Safety valves on limited liability: subordination (Northern Chicks, s.6(c)) re-orders shareholder loans behind creditors in thin-cap + mismanagement cases without destroying the veil; Pri HaEmek holds that stripping limited liability needs unanimous member consent because the articles are a binding contract.
Related Notes
- Legal and Tax Aspects — subject hub
- Lec_02-Legal Entrepreneurship — Fundamental Concepts — previous session (corporate structures, contracts, ESOP, valuation — the vocabulary this lecture deepens)
- Lec_01-Introduction & the Israeli Legal System — soft vs hard law, the Israeli legal system, precedent (the framework these cases sit in)
- _Wiki-Link Registry — all wiki-links used in this subject
Concept stubs introduced/used here: Types of Legal Entities, Sole Proprietor, Partnership, Association (Amuta), Cooperative Society, Statutory Corporation, Articles of Association, Certificate of Incorporation, Limited Liability, Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Minority Rights, Derivative Suit, Private vs Public Company, Share, Dividend, Bond, Option (Security), Strike Price, Agency Problem, Duty of Loyalty, Duty of Care, Separate Legal Personality, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Organ Theory, Salomon Case, Tzuk Or Case, Modiin Case, Subordination Doctrine, Thin Capitalization, Northern Chicks Case, Pri HaEmek Case, Israeli Companies Law