Contract Law
- #legal-and-tax
- #contract-law
- #offer-and-acceptance
- #freedom-of-contract
- #contract-interpretation
- #contract-formation
- #public-policy
- #israeli-contracts-law
Contract Law
Part of: Legal and Tax Aspects | Key concepts: Contract, Offer and Acceptance, Intention to Create Legal Relations, Legal Capacity, Freedom of Contract, Public Policy, Contract Interpretation, Serious Intention (Gmirot Da'at), Definiteness (Mesuyamut), Writing Requirement, Memorandum of Understanding
Session 4 — Legal and Tax Aspects of Entrepreneurship, Dr. Yuval Reinfeld (Reichman University). Statutory references are to the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973 and the Contracts (Remedies for Breach) Law, 1970, unless stated otherwise.
Why This Session Exists
Session 3 built the vessel (the company); contracts are the bloodstream that runs through every venture — founders' agreements, employment, NDAs, leases, investment rounds, EULAs all live or die on contract law. A founder needs to know three things: when a binding contract actually exists, how a court will read it when the parties later disagree, and how far "we agreed to it" can take you before the law refuses to help. This session answers all three.
The thread running through the whole sessionContract law is a constant tug-of-war between freedom of contract (let people make their own deals — Section 24) and public policy (the state's refusal to enforce deals that harm society or the weak — Section 30). Every doctrine here — capacity, intention, interpretation, the writing requirement, completion mechanisms — is the law deciding where on that spectrum to stand. The recurring lesson: substance beats form, and freedom of contract today is "weak and eroded."
Part 1 — What Is a Contract?
DefinitionA contract is a legally binding agreement between two or more parties — a promise or set of promises that the law will enforce. In plain terms: an understanding in which people agree to do (or not do) something, and if they fail to perform, the law may intervene.
The defining word is enforceable. Many agreements exist without legal force (see Part 2); what turns an understanding into a contract is that the state stands behind it.
Sources of contract law
Contracts have deep historical roots developed over centuries:
- Roman law — the principle ==pacta sunt servanda== ("agreements must be kept") is the bedrock.
- Common law — developed in England through judicial precedent (judge-made law).
- Jewish law — a further historical source feeding Israel's mixed jurisdiction.
Conditions for a valid contract
The five (in Israel, four) conditionsA contract requires:
- Offer and acceptance — one party proposes terms, the other agrees (Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.).
- Intention to create legal relations — both parties must mean the deal to be legally binding (CA 440/75 Zandbank v. Danziger).
- Legal capacity — the parties must be legally able to contract (not minors, not mentally incapacitated).
- Legality of purpose — the contract must not violate the law or public policy (Kestenbaum).
- Certainty / definiteness — the contract must be specific enough to be enforced (CA 77/158 Hava Rabinai).
Consideration is NOT required in Israeli lawIn common-law systems, a contract needs consideration — each side must exchange something of value (money, goods, services). Israeli contract law dropped this requirement. A gratuitous promise can still bind (this is why the Gift Law and cases like Barashi turn on serious intention rather than on consideration). Don't import the common-law consideration rule into an Israeli exam answer.
Part 2 — Types of Contracts & the Consent/Contract Distinction
Obligatory vs. real transactions
Two transaction archetypes
- An obligatory transaction faces the future and carries risk: performance (and compensation) happens later, not at the moment of agreement. Example: a contractor selling an apartment "on paper" before it is built.
- A real transaction is the old marketplace model: each party shows up with goods and exchanges immediately. There is no risk — everyone is compensated on the spot.
Every contract carries entry and exit costs.
The entrepreneurial world runs almost entirely on obligatory transactions (investment, employment, SaaS subscriptions, founders' vesting) — precisely the risky, future-facing deals that need contract law's protection.
Common contract types in a venture
Employment contract · lease agreement · sales contract · service agreement · founders' agreement · NDA (confidentiality) · loan agreement · EULA (end-user licence) · Terms of Use (ToU/ToS/T&C) · real-estate contract · insurance policy · partnership agreement · investment agreements.
Consent ≠ Contract
Consent is broader than contractAt the base of every agreement lies consent — two parties agreeing on something. But consent does not automatically become a contract or even a legally recognized agreement. The concept of consent is wider than both "agreement" and "contract."
The classic non-contract: a political dealTwo Members of Knesset agree to vote for a bill; one later changes his mind and votes against. There are consequences (reputation) but no legal consequences — there was consent, but no intention to create legal relations, so no contract.
Agreements the law will NOT enforceEven where consent exists, a contract fails (is void or voidable) when it is:
- Contrary to law — e.g. a drug-sale contract or an agreement to launder money.
- Missing formal requirements — e.g. a real-estate contract not in writing as the law demands.
- Based on coercion, deception, or abuse — e.g. exploiting a supplier's financial distress to force an unfair deal.
- Containing unfair clauses — e.g. a lease letting the landlord evict the tenant with no notice or reason.
Why the state must intervene at all
Enforcement = legal validityThe element of enforceability is what separates a contract from a mere understanding. Individuals get great freedom to act — yet the state must sometimes intervene, because without enforcement, promises about the future (obligatory transactions) would be worthless and no one would risk relying on them.
CA 3158/20 Achi Tekuma Ltd. v. Daniel Meshulam — you can't enforce a hidden illegal dealA 2004 sale agreement transferred lease rights for $305,000. The seller claimed the real deal was different — he was secretly promised three apartments, undocumented for tax reasons, and the cash was never actually paid. Justice Grosskopf (Supreme Court): you cannot legitimize an illegal transaction by concealing it. The parties' intention at formation was to act in a clearly illegal manner, so even the hidden contract is void as an illegal contract — no enforcement. Lesson: illegality of purpose (condition 4) kills the contract, and dressing it up cannot save it.
Part 3 — Special Contract Laws & the "Cry of Fairness"
Beyond the general statute, specific contract types get their own protective laws under the principle ==lex specialis== (the specific law overrides the general):
The special-contracts regimeConsumer Protection Law · Standard Contracts Law · Insurance Contracts Law · Gifts Law · Sale Law · Banking Law. Each exists because one side is structurally weaker and needs extra protection.
Examples of the heightened requirements:
- Spouses — a prenuptial agreement requires a notary.
- Standard contracts — stricter protection against the stronger drafting party (think SaaS click-wrap terms).
- Sale of real estate — must be in writing (with the narrow exception of Kalmer v. Gai, Part 7).
This is the "cry of fairness": the law refuses to treat a consumer signing a 40-page bank form as the equal of the bank that wrote it.
Part 4 — Fundamental Principles: Freedom vs. Its Limits
Freedom of contract (Section 24)
Section 24 — Freedom of contract"The content of a contract may be whatever the parties agree upon." This bundles freedom of design (freedom to form a contract at all) and freedom of content (freedom to set its terms).
Can freedom be absolute? — No.
Aharon Barak's principle: no right is absoluteBarak taught that freedom of contract cannot be absolute — every right must be balanced against competing rights and freedoms. The real question is which way the court leans. The course's blunt conclusion: today the court prefers other freedoms at the expense of freedom of contract — freedom of contract is "quite weak and quite eroded."
The Barak–Zamir debate (Rekant case)Can a contractual clause override the principle of equality (here, age-based)?
- Justice Barak: constitutional values like equality prevail over freedom of contract — fundamental rights can limit contractual autonomy.
- Justice Zamir: warns this "endangers the status of contract law," because excessive judicial intervention undermines the predictability and stability of contracts.
In Association of Insurance Appraisers v. The Insurance Commissioner, Zamir made the paradox explicit: sometimes you must limit freedom of contract in the name of freedom of contract itself. The resolution is proper judicial discretion to find the balance point — fairness without gutting contractual autonomy.
Public policy & illegality (Section 30)
Section 30 — the void contractA contract is void when it is illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy (Egged v. Mashiach). Sections 24 and 30 are the two poles: Section 24 (freedom) versus Section 30 (public policy). The clash between them maps the conservative vs. liberal divide on the bench.
Egged v. Mashiach — indirect restraints count tooAn indirect contractual restriction on freedom of occupation. The court was unimpressed that the restraint was indirect: even an indirect restriction implied by a Basic Law is equivalent to a direct restriction on freedom of occupation. You cannot evade public policy by being subtle about it.
A contract cannot contradict cogent (mandatory) provisions
Some rules can't be contracted awayCogent provisions are mandatory legal rules that a contract may not override, no matter what the parties agree (Zim v. Maziar; Lagil Trampoline; Levin v. Levin).
Three cogent-provision cases
- Zim v. Maziar (Justice Zilber): freedom of contract matters, but it stands below the sanctity of life. Public policy voids exemption clauses of that kind — the court doesn't abolish freedom of contract, but life-and-death matters nullify such waivers.
- Lagil Trampoline v. Nahmias: a liability-waiver sign had no validity — (a) it wasn't part of the contract (the sign's text appeared inside the facility, not at ticket purchase, the moment of formation), and (b) sanctity of life cannot be waived on a sign.
- Levin v. Levin (Justice Zamir): a clause barring the parties from going to court contradicts public policy — the court "will not lend its hand" to a contract that blocks access to justice, as that breeds anarchy.
The market-overt rule (Section 34, Sale Law)
Section 34 — protecting the good-faith buyerThe market-overt rule can give a good-faith buyer good title even when they bought from someone who wasn't the true owner — but property rights are guarded strictly, so the conditions are demanding.
The four conditions for a market-overt transaction
- Good faith (subjective) — acting honestly, unaware of any defect in title.
- For value — the buyer gave consideration.
- Good faith at the time the asset is transferred.
- The asset was bought from someone who appeared to be the seller, and the sale was in the ordinary course of that seller's business.
Knaan — the flea-market Reuven RubinA woman bought a painting for 250 shekels at a flea market; it turned out to be a stolen Reuven Rubin. Owner vs. museum — who wins? The museum. She had to return the painting, because the sale was not in the ordinary course of the seller's business (he didn't normally sell such paintings), so condition 4 failed. Property rights are "stronger than contractual rights," so the bar is high.
Part 5 — The Statutory Architecture & the Life of a Contract
The two governing statutesIsraeli contract law rests on two acts:
- Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973 — 60 sections (formation, interpretation, validity).
- Contracts (Remedies for Breach) Law, 1970 — 20 sections (what happens when it goes wrong).
The four chronological stages of a contract
- Pre-contractual — offer, negotiations, expressions of interest.
- Formation — the "signing" stage. Note: a contract can exist without a physical signature, and a contract may exist but not yet take effect.
- Performance — doing what the contract requires.
- Termination (everything completed) or breach (something went wrong).
Part 6 — Before Formation: Capacity & Intention
First test — legal capacity
The capacity gateThe first test before a contract can form is legal capacity: is the person legally competent to contract? Minors and legally incapacitated persons cannot express rational will (Sections 3, 4 and 8, Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law).
Second test — intention to create legal relations
This is the precondition and one of the most exam-heavy doctrines. Two complementary lenses — intention and specificity — work together; only in exceptional cases do they contradict (a vague approach vs. a detailed offer). Case law built two tests:
The Theoretical Test (Levin)Examine the parties' intent and consent to establish legal relations. Justice Zamir (Levin): "If the parties have made up their minds to create legal obligations that grant rights or impose duties within the realm of law, then it is a contract." The driver is the autonomy of individual will. This test is not in any statute — it's a product of case law, inferred from the circumstances.
The Practical TestThe parties' intent is inferred from objective indicators:
- The language of the agreement (written or oral) — the text.
- The circumstances and background — the context.
Neither stands alone: "a word cannot stand alone without context, and the circumstances cannot be interpreted without supporting language."
Levin v. Levin — substance beats an express "no legal effect" clauseA divorcing couple drafted a separate alimony agreement and wrote that it would have no legal validity. The husband promised alimony above the legal minimum, then stopped paying. Justice Zamir: the agreement is legally binding. Under the intention test, substance (true purpose + circumstances) outweighs form (the wording). Even though they wrote "no legal effect," the context showed a genuine intent to create obligations. Lesson: you cannot disclaim legal effect by mere words if everything else points to a real deal.
Part 7 — Contract Interpretation: The Apropim Revolution
This is the single most important interpretive doctrine in Israeli contract law.
Section 25(a) — the original two-step rule
Section 25(a) (original wording)"A contract shall be interpreted according to the intent of the parties, as implied from the contract itself, and insofar as it is not implied from it — from the circumstances." This created a two-step test: examine the language first; only if intent is unclear, look to external circumstances.
Apropim — Barak rewrites the order
Apropim (Justice Barak): the pendulum modelBarak argued the legislator was mistaken. Interpretation should begin with the circumstances, move to the language, then return to the circumstances — a pendulum model. The circumstances are the more significant tool for uncovering true intent. His signature line: saying "the language is clear" marks the end of the interpretive process, not its beginning.
The facts behind ApropimTo house the 1990s wave of immigration from the former USSR, the Ministry of Housing promised contractors that the state would buy unsold apartments — up to 50% in central Israel, up to 100% in the periphery. The contract spelled out the deduction for delay clearly for the center, but for the periphery it specified the deduction only for a delay in submitting the purchase request, not for a construction delay. The gap forced the court to decide how to read the contract — by language alone, or by purpose and circumstances.
Barak's conclusion"The transition from the internal source (the contract's language) to the external source (the surrounding circumstances) is not subject to any preliminary conditions. No prior examination is required to determine whether the language is clear — that question becomes clear only at the end of the interpretive process."
Vegetable Growers Association — a partial pushbackJustice Rivlin (majority): the goal is always the parties' intent, and the starting point is the language — "the vessel containing the parties' intent" and "sometimes the central evidence." A contract cannot be given a meaning its language cannot bear. The court moves back and forth between language and circumstances, subject to a rebuttable presumption that the contract's purpose is what its ordinary wording suggests. This softens Apropim toward the text without abandoning the pendulum.
The 2011 amendment of Section 25
Why Section 25 was amended (2011)Critics said Apropim created legal uncertainty, invited litigation, and undermined the principle that the written agreement is the decisive expression of intent — leaving courts free to pick between competing readings. The 2011 amendment aimed to restore certainty while preserving the parties' true bargain.
Section 25 — current wording (post-2011)(a) A contract is interpreted according to the intent of the parties as implied from the contract and from the circumstances — however, if the intent is explicitly implied from the language, the contract is interpreted according to its language. (b) Where multiple interpretations are possible, prefer the one that upholds validity over one that voids it. (b1) Where one party had an advantage in drafting (e.g. a standard form), prefer the interpretation against that party (contra proferentem). (c) Customary terms are read by their customary meaning in such contracts.
Did the amendment actually change anything?Largely a codification of the back-and-forth: language and circumstances are now read together, but a clear linguistic intent governs (a nod back toward the text). The deeper interpretive freedom Apropim unleashed never fully went away. Note also the completion tools that fill gaps: Section 39 (good faith), Section 26 (custom between the parties, then custom in similar contracts), and complementary statutes like the Sale Law.
Section 26 — filling gaps by custom"Details not determined in the contract shall be according to the custom between the parties, and absent that — the custom common in contracts of the same type; these details are deemed agreed upon." This is the statutory engine of contract completion (Part 9).
Part 8 — Formation: Offer, Acceptance & Serious Intention
Section 1 — how a contract is born"A contract is formed by way of offer and acceptance." Two elements are then tested: serious intention (gmirot da'at) — the mental element — and definiteness (mesuyamut) — the factual element.
Offer and acceptance mechanics
Sections 2 & 5 — defining offer and acceptance
- Section 2 (Offer): a communication is an offer if it shows the offeror's serious intention (gmirot da'at) to contract and is sufficiently definite to allow formation by acceptance. An offer may be made to the public (Shamsian).
- Section 5 (Acceptance): acceptance is by a notice from the offeree delivered to the offeror, showing serious intention to contract in accordance with the offer.
Formation happens at delivery of acceptance — not at the meeting of mindsEven if minds met on Sunday, if the notice of acceptance is delivered only on Tuesday, the contract forms on Tuesday. And Section 60(b) makes constructive notice enough: a notice is "delivered" when it reaches the recipient or their address — so a letter sitting unread in your mailbox already concluded the contract.
The offeree holds the stronger handOnce the offeror makes an offer, they are bound by it and depend on the offeree's decision — they have tied themselves to the terms. The offeree can take it or leave it. That asymmetry matters in negotiations (e.g. a real-estate sale).
Serious intention (gmirot da'at) — the objective test
The test for serious intentionSerious intention (gmirot da'at) is the mental element (loosely, the mens rea of contract). The test is objective (Barashi). Rabinai says examine intention "exactly at the moment of signing." Barak (in Apropim) conceded that a perfect overlap of wills "never truly exists" — there is always a meeting of the minds somewhere in between — but if the evidence shows an identical subjective intention at formation, that governs (rare), even if the parties objectively appeared to intend otherwise.
Peretz Bonei HaNegev v. Bochbot (CA 1932/90)Bochbot contracted to sell his apartment (lived in by his son) in three installments; he cashed only part of the first payment and returned the rest. He claimed he couldn't read or write and didn't understand the deal — that he thought signing would earn him $1,000 compensation, not that it was a sales contract. Legal questions: is the contract valid, and did the father have gmirot da'at? (He withdrew the illiteracy argument on appeal.) The case probes whether the objective act of signing reflected a true intention to sell.
Barashi (CA 3601/96) — when the objective test isn't enoughRelatives had a mentally and physically unstable, ill elderly man sign a gift contract transferring his assets to them — drafted entirely by them, signed in a car, ~18 months after he'd made a sound-minded will saying something different. He was never declared incompetent.
- District Court: at signing he lacked understanding of the documents' meaning — legally, no gmirot da'at — so the transactions were invalid; also unconscionability/exploitation.
- Supreme Court (Justice Beinisch): appellate courts rarely disturb factual findings; the gift promise counts as a contract (the Gift Law is silent on gmirot da'at, so the Contracts Law applies). Crucially, the objective test is insufficient where the signer has impaired capacity — the external act of signing does not reflect true will. Appeal dismissed. Lesson: the objective test bends for vulnerable parties.
Part 9 — Definiteness, Completion & the Writing Requirement
Definiteness (mesuyamut)
The factual elementDefiniteness (mesuyamut) asks whether the agreement is specific enough to enforce — the actus reus of contract. Crucially, a contract need not be perfectly complete if serious intention is proven; courts have completion mechanisms to fill gaps.
Hof HaTchelet (Blue Coast, CA 133/89) — completing a missing plotThe contract sold "one of" the seller's plots without specifying which. On execution the seller claimed it was a mere MOU lacking definiteness. The court completed it and transferred ownership. On missing price, the court drew a sharp line: if the absence of a price reflects an underlying disagreement, it signals no consent (a deliberate "negative arrangement") — the court cannot complete it. But if the parties simply didn't know the market value at the time, the court will complete by setting a reasonable price.
Essential terms of a real-estate deal — and the Dor Energy erosionTraditional case law required: nature of the property, date of delivery, nature of the transaction, payment dates (plus taxes and expenses). ==Dor Energy== "eroded" these into just three minimal essentials: (1) date of delivery, (2) price, (3) nature of the transaction. A missing appendix was held minor; Justice Or completed it via completion mechanisms and custom — a binding contract had formed.
The five completion mechanismsWhere there is serious intention + definiteness but one detail is missing, a court can complete it via:
- Agreed mechanism — the parties pre-specified how to fill it (e.g. "per an appraiser").
- Dispositive legal provisions — statutory defaults (e.g. Section 46: a reasonable price).
- Principle of optimal performance — where a party tries to withdraw over a missing detail (as in Dor Energy), complete it in favor of performance so the contract survives.
- Custom (usage) — complete per similar agreements.
- Reasonableness & good faith — complete per accepted standards and Section 39 good faith.
The definiteness takeaway"There is no need for the contract to be perfectly complete if serious intention has been proven." If gmirot da'at is clear, courts strain to save the deal (Dor Energy) rather than let a party escape on a technicality — what the slides call avoiding "pettiness" that "ruins a deal."
The writing requirement
Section 8, Land Law — writing is constitutive for real estate"A transaction in real estate requires a written document; in its absence, the transaction is invalid." For land, writing isn't just evidence — it's a condition of validity.
Section 12 — good faith in negotiation"In negotiating a contract, a person shall act in an accepted manner and in good faith; a party who did not shall be liable for the damage caused." Bad-faith negotiation has consequences even before a contract forms.
Kalmer v. Gai — when good faith softens the writing ruleA combination transaction with incomplete documents. Justice Barak (majority): in special and exceptional circumstances, the writing requirement can be relaxed through good faith; where the writing principle conflicts with good faith, good faith prevails — provided two conditions:
- Change of position — the promisee actually relied on the contract and began performing/acting on it.
- Degree of fault of the withdrawing party — whether the party now backing out is the one who induced the reliance.
Barak framed this as a "flexible balance": the writing requirement must be applied with great care, and only in extreme cases strengthened. It expresses the system's "monarchic" balance of caution with flexibility. Exception to the rule, not the rule.
Part 10 — Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
Is an MOU binding?A memorandum of understanding (MOU) is an interim agreement, and the parties' intent determines its legal effect. It may show intent to contract, no intent, or a non-binding intent / suspensive condition. An MOU can be a stage in negotiations that a party may still withdraw from — or it can already be a binding contract. The decider is, again, intention + definiteness (Rabinai).
Rabinai — the MOU that was a contractA short MOU (signed 20.1.72) named the seller, the buyer (Man Sheked Ltd.), the lot, the total price (275,000 IL), an advance (15,000 IL), and a payment schedule tied to signing a "final contract." Despite calling itself a memorandum, it contained all the essential terms — so it satisfied gmirot da'at + mesuyamut and was treated as binding. The label "MOU" does not control; the substance does.
Details needed to show specificity (certainty)Names of the parties · nature of the asset · nature of the transaction · consideration · payment dates · tax expenses. Per Dor Energy, Sections 5–6 were relaxed — the conservative ("all terms") vs. liberal ("minimal essentials") approaches define the spectrum.
Summary
- A contract is an enforceable agreement. It needs offer & acceptance, intention to create legal relations, capacity, legality of purpose, and certainty — but NOT consideration (Israel dropped the common-law rule).
- Consent is broader than contract: agreement without intention to be legally bound (political deals), or contracts that are illegal, informal, coerced, or unfair, are not enforced. Achi Tekuma — a concealed illegal contract is void regardless.
- Special contract laws (lex specialis: Consumer Protection, Standard Contracts, Insurance, Gifts, Sale, Banking) protect the weaker party — the "cry of fairness."
- The master tension is Section 24 (freedom of contract) vs. Section 30 (public policy / illegality). No right is absolute (Barak); today freedom of contract is "weak and eroded." Cogent provisions can't be waived (Zim v. Maziar, Lagil Trampoline, Levin — sanctity of life, access to courts). The market-overt rule (s.34) protects good-faith buyers under four strict conditions (Knaan).
- Two statutes govern (General Part 1973, Remedies 1970); a contract runs pre-contract → formation → performance → termination/breach.
- Before formation: test capacity (no minors/incapacitated), then intention to create legal relations — a theoretical test (Levin: did they mean to bind?) and a practical test (language + circumstances). Levin v. Levin: substance beats an express "no legal effect" clause.
- Interpretation: Apropim (Barak) replaced the language-first rule with a pendulum (circumstances ↔ language ↔ circumstances); Vegetable Growers re-anchored the language as starting point; the 2011 amendment to s.25 codified reading both together while letting clear language govern, adding validity-preserving and contra-proferentem rules. Gaps fill via s.26 (custom) and s.39 (good faith).
- Formation = offer + acceptance (s.1). An offer (s.2) needs gmirot da'at + definiteness and may be public; acceptance (s.5) forms the contract on delivery of notice (constructive notice suffices, s.60(b)).
- Serious intention (gmirot da'at) is tested objectively (Barashi, Rabinai) — but the objective test bends for impaired-capacity signers (Barashi; Peretz Bonei HaNegev).
- Definiteness (mesuyamut) need not be perfect: courts use five completion mechanisms (agreed mechanism, dispositive law incl. s.46 reasonable price, optimal performance, custom, reasonableness). Dor Energy cut real-estate essentials to delivery date, price, transaction type; Hof HaTchelet completes missing terms unless the gap signals no consent.
- Writing: Section 8 Land Law makes writing constitutive for real estate, but Kalmer v. Gai lets good faith override it in exceptional cases (reliance + fault). An MOU binds or not per the parties' intent — Rabinai shows a "memorandum" with all essential terms is a real contract.
Related Notes
- Legal and Tax Aspects — subject hub
- Lec_03-Company Law & Corporate Structures — previous session (the company is the vessel; contracts run through it — the Articles of Association are themselves a contract)
- Lec_02-Legal Entrepreneurship — Fundamental Concepts — the glossary of agreements (founders', NDA, investment, SLA, licences) that this lecture's doctrine underpins
- Lec_01-Introduction & the Israeli Legal System — mixed jurisdiction, precedent, good faith, soft vs hard law (the framework these cases sit in)
- _Wiki-Link Registry — all wiki-links used in this subject
Concept stubs introduced/used here: Contract, Offer and Acceptance, Intention to Create Legal Relations, Legal Capacity, Consideration, Pacta Sunt Servanda, Obligatory Transaction, Real Transaction, Freedom of Contract, Public Policy, Cogent Provisions, Market Overt Rule, Contract Interpretation, Apropim Doctrine, Section 25 Contracts Law, Serious Intention (Gmirot Da'at), Definiteness (Mesuyamut), Completion Mechanisms, Writing Requirement, Good Faith, Memorandum of Understanding, Special Contract Laws, Achi Tekuma Case, Egged v Mashiach Case, Rekant Case, Zim v Maziar Case, Lagil Trampoline Case, Levin v Levin Case, Knaan Case, Apropim Case, Vegetable Growers Association Case, Peretz Bonei HaNegev Case, Barashi Case, Hof HaTchelet Case, Dor Energy Case, Kalmer v Gai Case, Rabinai Case, Israeli Contracts Law